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Abstract 
This research concerns the relations and tensions among the state as an institutional 
public power, the people congregating as a collective, and private individuals. It 
intends to investigate these relations through two land politics cases in the Socialist 
Beijing, set against the historical background of the city and Chinese conceptual 
contexts. 
Suggesting certain similarities to public/private demarcation, the thesis starts with a 
genealogy of the Chinese gong-si division, arguing the moral superiority of the 
abstract ideas of gong over si; it argues that changing understandings of gong/public 
and the intricate connections between various gong and si embodiments (i.e. state, 
collective, family, individual) contribute – and in some ways constitutes -- politics. 
Based on data acquired by archival work, in-depth interviews and literature reviews, 
the thesis then grounds the issue into two empirical cases: the land ownership 
nationalisation in the expansion of Tiananmen Square, and the struggles over 
property in the Bell&Drum Towers area from the 1950s to 1970s. The thesis argues 
that the significant power of the state, particularly the compulsory power to 
expropriate land, depends on moral and political authority attained by its status as a 
gong embodiment, is dependent on: its constant practice of constructing other bodies 
such as family and individual as si embodiments; constructing private property and 
private economy as flawed si; and also on its suppression of other public/gong 
entities, especially the collective and the city. However, it also argues, challenges 
from the private/si category and from other potential public/gong bodies always exist 
too. This is reflected in private people‘s strategic use of the normative gong in their 
daily practices related to property and in many collective practices. It is the 
divergence between gong and si and the simultaneous intimacy between them that 
generates politics.  
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Research Context 
Inevitably, personal experience and political-social-cultural background have great 
influence upon the academic interests of a researcher. For me, it is the Chinese 
society where I grew up and my practice as an urban planner that shapes my specific 
research focus.  
Due to rapid urbanisation and economic development in the last three decades, there 
has been extensive land expropriation in all Chinese cities. The first tide of the 
expropriation targeted the rural area, not least in facilitating urban expansion. The 
second wave was in the built-up downtown areas, usually in the guise of urban 
regeneration schemes. This process is still going on now. By the power of land 
expropriation and requisition, municipal governments obtained lands from dispersed 
private owners and then sold or leased them to big estate developers
1
. This can be 
seen as a kind of ‗privatisation‘ or ‗reprivatisation‘ parallel with the purportedly 
neoliberal practice occurring in the UK since the 1980s.  
It is worth noticing that in China, it is the state that enables and dominates the 
ownership transfer. The Constitution of 1982 declared ‗land in the cities is owned by 
the state‘ although in practice people retain the right to ‗use‘ land and to own 
buildings
2
. This land ownership system is called gongyouzhi (public ownership 
system) or guoyouzhi (state ownership system). The government‘s dual roles as 
landlord and land regulator have greatly facilitated its extensive intervention in land 
use and the operation of land expropriation.  
 
                                                 
1
 Most of the developers are private, but there are also state-owned estate developing corporations but it is a 
relatively late and rare practice. 
2
  And ‘land in the rural and suburban areas is owned by collectives except for those portions which belong to 
the state in accordance with the law’. Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Chapter 1, Article 10. The 
current version was adopted in 1982, with further revisions in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004.  And only the 2004 
amendment version states citizens ‘lawful private property is inviolable’ but ‘The State may, in the public 
interest and in accordance with law, expropriate or requisition private property for its use and shall make 
compensation for the private property expropriated or requisitioned.’  
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Struggles against land expropriation are common, although unfortunately many 
times they appear as tragedies. One of the most famous cases is that of a Sichuan 
woman, Tang Fuzhen, who burned herself to death to protest forced demolition in 
2009
3
. The residents of Enning neighbourhood, a historical district in Guangzhou, 
have resisted an official regeneration project for six years and many of them are still 
refusing to move (as of March 2014). As a student on urban planning, an activist 
championing for public participation in urban affairs and a person having heard and 
witnessed too many cases of compulsory land expropriation and of neighbourhoods 
demolition, I cannot move my eyes away from the tremendous power  that the state 
exercises and the rhetoric it uses. Most notable here are the roles of the state as the 
landlord and governor of the city, the statutory planning power against which land 
control and intervention are realised, and ‗for the public interest‘ are common 
justifications for the intervention.  
1.2 Research theme  
This research is concerned with the relations, tensions and conflicts between the state 
as an institutional public power, the people congregating as a collective or the public, 
and private individuals. It particularly concerns how these issues are reflected in 
urban land regulation, possession and ownership transfer. The multiple layers of the 
sense of ‗public‘- being put in relationship with ‗private‘- are the most important 
analytic focus.  
The theme is explored in the context of the Chinese concepts of gong and si which 
are in a way comparable to English ‗public‘ and ‗private‘. Land ownership 
reorganisation from the 1950s to the 1970s in the city of Beijing is used as empirical 
case to further investigate the relationships and conflicts between the embodiments 
of gong and si ideas in reality. 
The next section explains why the specific period is chosen for empirical study. 
Main arguments of the thesis will be given at the end of the Chapter. 
                                                 
3
 ‘Tragedy reignites debate on forced demolitions’, China Daily, 08-12-2009, online source 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-12/08/content_9137322.htm [accessed 04-03-2014]. 
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1.3 Situating the research in socialist Beijing 
While a subject applicable to all societies, interrogating it in specific cases in a 
specific society will provide us with more grounded and contextual understanding on 
the issues. My thesis will investigate the topic by examining land politics in Beijing 
from the 1950s to the 1970s. Similar to its counterpart Britain, China experienced 
parallel nationalisation during the 1950s and 1960s and then privatisation since the 
1980s. My studied period covers the three decades from the founding of the People‘s 
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 to the economic reform lunched in 1978. These 
three decades saw several tides of land nationalisation up to the declaration that all 
the land belonged to the state.  This is also one of the most turbulent times in 
Chinese history. The Socialist Transformation, continuous political movements, 
three years of the Great Famine, the split with the Soviet Union, Cultural Revolution, 
Great Tangshan Earthquake… all these not only disturbed the country and people‘s 
life but also differently contributed to the reconfiguration of the city space. The 
current chaotic and confusing state of ownership composition in downtown Beijing 
and people‘s ambiguous and often contradictory understandings about property can 
be traced from these key historical events/moments. In addition, China, especially 
the capital Beijing was highly led by ideology in the time, which offers a great 
opportunity for us to investigate some important ideas and discourses (such as 
‗public‘, ‗private‘, ‗state‘) formed from traditional to communist China.  
With the belief that every society should be understood in its own conceptual and 
cultural coordinate system, I start the thesis by exploring the thoughts around the 
ideas of gong and si in Chinese history from a linguistic perspective, with occasional 
reference to their European counterparts of ‗public‘ and ‗private‘ (Chapter 2). Then 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodological issues involved in the research.  Chapter 4 
and 5 investigate public-private relationship in two empirical cases, that is, the land 
expropriation for the expansion of Tiananmen Square in the 1950s and the 
reconfiguration of land possession and occupation in the Bell and Drum Towers area 
between the 1950s and the 1970s. The Conclusion chapter (i.e. Chapter 6) deepens 
the understanding of gong and si by a theorisation of the relationship between power 
and land, and the tension between the state, collective people and individuals. Main 
arguments in the thesis can be summarised as below: 
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Adopting the Chinese concepts of gong and si, with a reference to their English 
counterparts of public and private, I discuss three dimensions of gong and how each 
of them is related to the idea of si. I argue that it is the multiple senses of gong, or the 
multiple divisions and connections between gong and si that brings about tension, 
conflicts and politics. More specifically speaking, the idea of gong has three layers: 
gong as a universal principle and normative value, gong embodied in the collective, 
and gong embodied in the state. The first layer gives gong idea and its embodiments 
significant moral priorities, which is particularly distinct from the ‗public‘ in other 
languages and societies. Each layer of gong can be connected to si bodies. The 
universality of the value of gong means it is a shared value of all the people. In fact, 
the Chinese believe that it is (private) person who can perceive the spirit of gong and 
therefore judge whether any acts are coincident with gong principle or not. For the 
collective dimension, the collective actually consists of individuals who are the 
smallest si units. In terms of the last layer, the state is considered to share the same 
structure and moral principles with those in the family, another important private 
entity. In reality, the state is the dominant gong/public body that claims the great 
moral and political advantage of gong, which often threatens the interests of si 
bodies and erodes the private sphere. However, because of the intricate conceptual 
connections between si and each dimension of gong, si bodies can also claim their 
intimacy with gong and then attain a kind of moral superiority to resist and even 
overthrow the state.  
In the two cases of land ownership nationalisation in two places in Beijing (i.e. 
Tiananmen Square as an example of gong place and the Bell and Drum Towers area 
as si place), I argue that that the party-state could successfully persuade individuals 
and families ‗not to be restrained in their private interests‘ and to contribute their 
properties to support the construction of the state highly relied on the moral priority 
of gong and the state‘s status as an embodiment of gong. This can be seen from the 
expansion of Tiananmen Square and the Socialist Transformation of the households 
in the Bell and Drum Towers area. However, I also argue that, in the land ownership 
reorganisation in the latter case, private people and the masses played more 
significant role in dispossessing others‘ private property. Especially during the 
Cultural Revolution the masses even overpowered the government. In addition, 
lacking of legal protection and regulation on private property, people and households, 
5 
 
as si actors, took occupation as a main strategy to enlarge their own interests by 
encroaching communal, sometimes private land. These si bodies, at the same time, 
expanded their customary rights to property by connecting themselves to gong (i.e. 
person-Heaven and family-state) and by stressing on the responsibility and promise 
of the socialist state. 
To conclude, it is the multiplicity of the idea of gong and the multiplicity of the 
distinctions and connections between gong and si that result in the complexity of the 
land politics among different gong and si bodies. The most significant feature of the 
Chinese gong is its transcendent, moral and normative sense. This dimension gives 
huge moral priority to those that can successfully build connections to gong, and 
therefore contesting these connections is where the politics resides in. Not only the 
state, but also the collective and si entities (e.g. private persons, households) have 
big potential to be linked to the moral layer of gong. It is the intimacy between gong 
and si, rather than the distinction of the two that produces the conflicts.  
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Chapter 2 Conceptual Framework 
Having outlined the main issues concerned in the thesis, this chapter aims to lay the 
conceptual foundations for developing a framework to understand and interpret land 
politics in the communist Beijing. When talking about concepts, terms and language 
become essential. This chapter, therefore, starts by pointing out that the Chinese 
ideas of gong and si and the division between the two is in a way comparable to 
English ‗public‘ and ‗private‘. Drawing on Jeff Weintraub‘s theorisation of different 
modes of public-private divides in western debates, I will focus on the particularity 
of the Chinese concerns around these two ideas against its specific social and 
intellectual contexts. Then the chapter will move on to a genealogy of gong-si ideas 
in Chinese history, exploring the ‗origin‘, evolution, transformation as well as 
practise related to the two concepts. An interpreting framework applied to the thesis 
will be given at the end of the Chapter.  
2.1 Public-private and gong-si:  a parallel division? 
Language structures and defines people‘s expression, understanding and 
interpretation in a fundamental way. The differences between languages bring 
difficulties and challenges for us to discuss some similar practice and concepts in 
different societies, but at the same time, they also provide diverse perspectives to 
comprehend the issues. Chinese history and thoughts are different from the rest of 
the world. Chinese language, as a special grammar and meaning system distinct from 
all European languages, has not only shaped Chinese people‘s specific understanding 
of the world, but also can serve as a living fossil for us to investigate how their 
understanding has been changing over time.  
In terms of the topic with which I am concerned, it is significant that there is a 
linguistic similarity between the usages of the English words ‗public‘ and ‗private‘ 
(and their cognates in other European languages) and their Chinese parallels gong 
(公) and si (私) 4.  For example, ‗public space‘ is translated into gonggong kongjian 
                                                 
4
 About the language parallel in terms of public-gong and private-si in a more modern sense, see Mary Backus 
Rankin, ‘Some Observations on a Chinese Public Sphere’, and Frederic Wakeman, ‘The Civil Society and Public 
Sphere Debate: Western Reflections on Chinese Political Culture’. Both in Modern China, 1993, Vol. 19, No. 2, 
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(公共空间) in Chinese, ‗public sphere‘ into gonggong lingyu (公共领域) , and 
‗public ownership‘ into gongyouzhi (公有制). Alongside this, ‗private‘, ‗private 
property‘, ‗private ownership‘ and ‗private sector‘ are, respectively, translated into 
Chinese words (or compounds) as sichan(私产 ), siyouzhi (私有制 ) and siying 
bumen(私营部门 ).  Just as there are multiple – and many times conflicting – 
definitions of public and private in English, the meanings of gong and si in Chinese 
are neither very stable nor very clear. For instance, there are no definite boundaries 
between the two fields. In our daily language, a public space like a city square can be 
either owned by public institutions or private holders, while private properties are 
always under public intervention such as urban planning regulation, regardless of the 
regime of a society. Another meaningful ambiguity is the intimate relationship 
between ‗public‘ and ‗state‘. Although there are varieties of theories that place the 
state in an opposite or threatening position to the public, in daily English, a publicly 
owned property usually refers to a property owned by the central or local 
government. In an analogous manner, gongyou ( 公有 , publicly-owned) and 
guoyou(国有, state-owned) are interchangeable in most cases in modern Chinese.   
The resonance of languages in different cultural backgrounds seems to suggest that 
certain social practices related to the ideas of ‗public‘ and ‗private‘ are particularly 
important and meaningful to all of us. In fact, just like the public-private dichotomy 
in the west, the distinction of gong and si penetrates through Chinese history and 
political discourse. Of course, these terms in the two languages develop in different 
trajectories, acquiring a range of meanings independently from each other. In fact the 
origin and evolution of the concepts are deeply rooted in their own historic and 
cultural contexts, thus some unique understanding and usages can only be found in 
that specific language and do not have a straightforward equivalence in another. It is 
undeniable that the import of western terms and theories in the late age of imperial 
China not only bridged but at the same time blurred the distinction of the concepts in 
different languages
5
.  In this chapter, I will outline a primary genealogy of the idea 
                                                                                                                                          
Symposium: "Public Sphere"/"Civil Society" in China? Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies, III, pp. 158-182 and 
pp. 108-138. Also in William T. Rowe, ‘The Public Sphere in Modern China’, 1990, Modern China, Vol. 16, No. 3, 
pp. 309-329. 
5
 Actually many of the words we are using now (just as the compounds with gong and si given in the last 
paragraph) are translated from foreign languages (especially from English and German, in many cases via 
Japanese). Yet people’s understanding and daily usage of them still reserve very strong sense which these 
words/characters imply in Chinese traditions. And more importantly, similar concepts and practice do exist in 
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of gong and si in Chinese history, aiming to place a conceptual context to interpret 
the land politics in Beijing in its socialist period. Before doing this, I would like to 
build some connections to the existing discussions on public-private distinction in 
western scholarship. 
Jeff Weintraub summarises four major ways in which public-private distinctions are 
drawn in social and political analysis in the ‗West‘6. The first one is the classical 
republican-virtue approach which connects ‗public‘ realm to political community 
and citizenship, distinct from both the market and the administrative state. The 
second one, the liberal-economic model sees the separation primarily based on the 
distinction between state administration and the market economy. The third approach 
views ‗public‘ from the perspective of sociability, a sphere of public life. The last 
‗feminist‘ perspective puts the public-private division in the context of the 
distinction between the family and the larger economic and political order. In the 
following section I will explain that, these four models, mainly developed from the 
specific history and intellectual legacy in Western Europe and the US, cannot be 
straightforwardly used to explain the Chinese practice but some connections can be 
built between them.    
Among the four, the first one, ‗citizenship‘ perspective has the longest history.  It is 
also associated with the very idea of ‗political‘. Dated to the ancient time, Weintraub 
analyses two different models of ‗public‘ realm which have largely contributed to the 
ambiguous understanding of ‗public‘, ‗private‘ and ‗political‘ in modern thought. 
The first model, ‗citizenship‘ model, is rooted in the context of the polity of ancient 
Greek polis and Roman Republic, emphasising collective self-determination of a 
political community and an individual‘s participation as a member of the community; 
that is, as a politai in the polis or civis in the republic. The second model originates 
in the Roman Empire, from which we get the notion of ‗sovereignty‘, of a centralised 
and unified apparatus, of a ‗public‘ power ruling over the society composed by 
individuals and granting the rights of the citizens
7
. The two models of politics, the 
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6
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one based on a collective decision making process by collective citizens and the 
other on a type of sovereignty or domination, are interweaved with one another and 
developed many variations throughout the political practice and thoughts in the 
following history of the West.  
The Chinese history and the ideas derived from it are a different story. Never having 
a self-governing polity, the collective of community members is present in another 
way. As I will elaborate in the later part of the chapter, collective ritual plays an 
important role in Chinese people‘s ‗public‘ life since the antiquity. Those rituals, 
rites and ceremonies, including both religious and secular/political ones, display 
integration and harmony, which are based more on the presupposition of a whole 
rather than individuals. This puts an initial difference of the Chinese understanding 
of the collective, private person and political from the west. In terms of the 
dimension of sovereignty, a centralised and dominant ruling power over people has 
existed for long. In fact, since the Qin established a centralised empire in the second 
century BC, China has a centralised political system in most time of its history. 
Accordingly, the Chinese concept of politics (zheng, 政) is primarily centred on 
statecraft, rulership and administration, in which the ‗political‘ based on self-
determination and autonomy is largely absent
8. In addition, this ‗public‘ or political 
realm never disassociates from the private realm. On the contrary, the principles of 
the public realm, of the ‗state‘ are based on and therefore compatible with those in 
the family and small customary communities. To some degree, this is similar to the 
situation in the Middle Age of Europe when the feudal system of rule was based on 
personal dependent ties, blurring the difference between ‗public‘ and ‗private‘ 
authorities. Yet the assuming idea of ‗pre-established harmony‘ between different 
parts and scales of the human world (actually as well as between human society and 
the nature) in Chinese philosophy is significant, although in practice the tensions 
between individuals, collective and the ruling power never cease. 
If deliberately building a connection with the four models of western public-private 
relationship, it is the issues involved in the classical model or the citizenship model 
                                                                                                                                          
Press, 1997. 
8
 See Ames,  Roger T.,  The Art of Rulership: Study of Ancient Chinese Political Thought, SUNY Press, 1994; 
Lindholm, Charles, ‘Kinship Structure and Political Authority: The Middle East and Central Asia’, in Comparative 
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to which my analysis on the case of China is most relevant. In spite of different 
historical contexts and conceptual assumptions, some common debates are shared by 
both China and the West. A very important one is the two different even ‗opposite‘ 
notions about the source of public power: whether public power resides in the 
aggregation of people or comes from a ruling power standing above all
9
. These two 
notions justify public power in different ways and the divergence of the views can be 
found in both theories and practice. These two views also set different backgrounds 
against which the ‗private‘ can be understood, and they plant different moral and 
political implication in the ideas of public, private and their relations. In the case of 
China, the divergence and contests between the two notions are associated with the 
core of the Chinese answer to the question of what is political. However, in the vein 
of Chinese thoughts, the tension between the two interpretations (i.e. authority is 
derived from the bottom/body or the top) is not because the two are totally separate 
in nature, but is rooted in the idea that both of them (i.e. the collective consisting of 
private people and the ruler) can find their particular ways to connect to the highest 
and universal principle of the world (i.e. tianli, ‗principle of heaven‘). I will further 
explain this in next ‗genealogy‘ section.  
Here I also want to draw attention to another two related topics.  The first is the 
dimension of ‗property‘ in the ideas of public and private. For the Romans, res 
(P)publica, literately ‗public things (affairs or properties)‘ is used to refer to both the 
Roman Republic and a type of property. The ‗res‘ here is noteworthy. Res suggests 
the Republic is a substantive or concrete thing opposed to ‗spes‘ which means 
something unreal or ethereal. For the Romans, the Republic is a thing, a property. 
Not having an abstract notion of the state, as what the res in res publica suggests, the 
Romans gave their own name populous Romanus, ‗Roman people‘ to the Republic, 
defining it as the collectivity of Roman citizens, or used res populi Romani, 
‗property of the Roman people‘ of the Republic10. Considering the Republic as a 
concrete property resonates with some early Chinese understanding of gong, a 
concept used parallel to ‗public‘ in this thesis for analytical purposes. In a similar 
way, the Chinese idea of gong or public is not abstract but instead is associated with 
specific belongings and properties in the early time. It even conveyed a more 
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geographical message: it often referred to a type of land or specific sites
11
 owned by 
the master of a community and used for communal activities by all the members on 
certain occasions. With regard to the publica part, it can only be comprehended with 
reference to the idea of privatae, things belonging to individuals and families. In fact, 
there were various scales or types of ‗public‘ things defined by Roman Law: res 
communes (omnium) was used to refer to natural things commonly enjoyed by all 
humans such as air, sunlight and ocean, res publicae to things built and set aside for 
public use by Roman people, such as roads, harbours and market place, and res 
universitatis to things owned by a corporate body such as the municipality of Rome
12
. 
The latter two increasingly overlapped with each other when people in other areas 
were recognised as citizens of Rome. Compared with the ‗common‘, the ‗public‘ 
things were mainly referring to artificial things which were constructed with human 
efforts. They were not something natural or something waiting for labour investment. 
They were built for public use. As constructing public buildings and infrastructure 
required collaboration and coordination, an agency organising the work and on 
behalf of people was then necessary. For me, regardless of the Republic or Empire, a 
sense of authority has been implied in the idea of public property.  
I would like to outline the characteristics of early Chinese public-private ideas before 
continuing the urban dimension. First of all, gong and si, or Chinese public and 
private did not emerge as dual concepts from the beginning: si or private came up 
later than gong and they were used separately for long. Secondly, over history, the 
most significant idea related to gong was about land or land ownership, but it was 
concerned more about agricultural land. This is of course a consequence of the fact 
that China was a rural country for thousands of years and agriculture was always 
given first priority. However, this does not mean cities are inconsequential .On the 
contrary, cities play pivotal roles in governing the country and serving rural areas 
and agriculture. In both practice and thoughts, Chinese cities differ from those of 
Europe.  In terms of city, some comparisons can be made to the ‗liberalism‘ and 
‗sociability‘ theories of public-private division identified by Weintraub.  
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Typical Chinese cities (cheng, 城) in the imperial era were built as seats of imperial 
governments. Commercial activities, which were highly despised by Confucianism, 
flourished in cities for the consumption of the government, aristocrats, officials and 
their families. As the seats of political authorities and the nodes of a centralised 
governing system, cities for administrative purposes were neither freer nor more 
autonomous than rural areas but under much stricter regulation and control. This is 
different from the case of medieval cities in Western Europe that enjoyed many 
immunities and privileges and were relatively autonomous from the central authority. 
An interesting divergence between Chinese and European thoughts then emerged. 
The western liberal-economic model is based on the distinction between state 
administration and the market economy, praising the latter and questioning the 
‗intervention‘ of the former. Yet viewed from the experience of Chinese cities, it is 
hard to say that there has been a nongovernmental field or a well-developed market. 
As a result, neither a ‗free‘ market place in traditional Chinese cities nor the ideal 
free market in theories ever existed in Chinese history. This results in particular 
Chinese understandings related to governmental intervention, on what the public and 
the private are and on the relationship between the two. Undeniably, as the case 
study city, Beijing, due to its capital status, displays the characteristics described 
above more evidently than those commercial towns developed from market 
settlements in southern China in the late imperial age. The situation of Beijing 
therefore should not be over-generalised, just like there is no single model of western 
cities. However, every study must find a starting point, and a more comprehensive 
understanding can only be built on the base of somewhat partial and schematic 
interpretation.  
Besides the different position in a larger economic-political system, Chinese cities 
manifest particular spatial characteristics too. One noticeable feature is that there 
were no typical public spaces such as squares, market places and meeting halls in 
traditional Chinese cities. The history of Chinese city square and park does not 
exceed one century. This is not just a matter of spatial form, but also is consistent 
with the pattern of people‘s social and public life. Existing theories based on western 
political and social culture such as the sociability perspective
13
 in interpreting public-
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private can hardly fit in the vein of the case of China. However, from the early 20
th
 
century, some traditional Chinese cities were experiencing a spatial and social 
transformation; Beijing may be the most predominant in this regard. In fact, it was 
also the time when the modern and westernised concept and practice of ‗city‘ 
(chengshi) or ‗municipality‘ (zizhishi) started to take shape in China. In this way, the 
Chinese cities in the 20
th
 century were more like a hybrid of Chinese tradition and 
western elements. But on a deeper level, as I will argue, they can be better 
understood if we put them back to their own historical and cultural trajectory.  
To summarise, quite a few models and perspectives have been established to 
comprehend the remarkable distinction of ‗public‘ and ‗private‘ in the West. 
However, the fact that these theories are mainly based on the history and intellectual 
tradition of particular societies weakens their power to explain other societies. At the 
same time, intellectual legacies of other cultures have also been overlooked. This 
thesis tries to put the Chinese cases back into its own historical and conceptual 
contexts. In order to do this, I turn to Chinese language for help.  As a living fossil, 
Chinese language records people‘s views on the world from ancient time until now.  
Especially the graphic feature of Chinese characters carries a rich set of messages, 
such as what concrete thing a word referred to when it was created and how the 
understanding of it has evolved over time. Before starting the genealogy of gong and 
si, then, I would like to give an introduction of the meanings contained in the two 
words in daily language nowadays.   
Table 2.1 illustrates the meanings of gong and si in modern Chinese. For gong, there 
are a few meanings overlapping its English counterpart. For example, gong can be 
used as an adjective, meaning ‗public‘ and ‗common‘, such as gonggong, publicly 
accessed, publicly used or collectively owned. This usage has been extended to some 
terms introduced from the West, implying more universal and international standards. 
For example, gongchi and gongjin means ‗meter‘ and ‗kilogram‘, which are distinct 
from Chinese measures, while gongfa and gonghai refer to international law and 
high seas. It can also be used as a verb. For example, the word gongkai literally 
means ‗making public and open‘. As a noun, the single character gong can be used 
as a replacement for the state, government and people‘s official duty. There are also 
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some usages that ‗public‘ does not have, such as ‗universal‘ and ‗fair‘. For example, 
gongli means ‗axiom‘ or ‗universal principle‘, and gongzheng means ‗just and fair‘ 
or ‗justice and fairness‘. Here the moral message gong connotes is noticeable.  This 
characteristic is also one important focus of the thesis. In the ancient time, gong was 
also the title for the duke and then it became honorific title for respectable men. 
When it is put in front of species of animals, it simply means ‗male‘14.  
In the side of si, I have given some examples of its usage as a synonym of English 
private.  Besides this, it can also be used as an adjective or adverb, meaning ‗secret‘ 
or ‘secretly‘; this use extends to words referring to some illegal activities such as 
smuggling (zousi) and lynching (sixing). Parallel to gong‘s implication of fairness 
and justice, si has meanings like selfishness or self-interest, such as in the word zisi, 
sixin. When it is used as a noun, it can refer to personal belongings, personal 
interests, contraband and so on.  
gong 公  si 私 
adj.   1. public;   2. common;   3. 
universal;     
         4. open;     5. fair;           6. metric 
         7. international 
v.       make public 
n.       1. the state;       2. official duty 
 
 adj.    1.  private;    2. selfish;    3. 
secret 
 
 n.       1. something personal 
           2. personal interest 
           3. contraband 
 
 adv.   secretly   
n.       1. Duke;              2. mister (Mr) 
adj.    (of an animal) male 
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2.2 Ideas of gong and si in Chinese history 
2.2.1  Etymology of gong 公 and si 私 
In spite of certain resonance between Chinese and English, Chinese is a distinct 
language system with its own rules. It is the Chinese character (zi, a ‗smaller‘ unit 
than ci, ‗word‘) that is the basic unit of the language 15 .  Each single Chinese 
character occupies a specific space (like an English word); it expresses a group of 
meanings and at the same time is surrounded by a constellation of concepts. In 
contrast to English words‘ more arbitrary combinations of meanings and letters 
(based on how the words are pronounced), Chinese characters, especially those basic 
ones, have graphic significance that is based on the ancient Chinese‘s understanding 
of the objects that the earliest Chinese characters referred to. This divergence (i.e. 
European language-phonology; Chinese- a visual system) is also reflected in the 
difference that western (political) philosophy stresses on (human) logos and speech 
while Chinese philosophy follows an intrinsically distinctive trajectory that 
emphasizes humans‘ ‗natural‘ perception. This difference also contributes to some 
distinct spatial characteristics of Chinese cities and this thread will be developed 
throughout the thesis. Here I start my inquiry with examining the early pictographs 
of gong/公 and si/私, which are the base of the modern forms of the two Chinese 
characters.   
According to the archaeological findings so far, gong (公) appeared earlier and was 
used much more frequently than si (私) in early writing scripts16.  The earliest image 
of the pictograph of gong can be found in oracle bone writings and bronze 
inscriptions dating from the Bronze Age of China (3000-700BC)
 17
. The ideogram of 
gong was expressed by images like  (figure 2.1).  Shirakawa Shizuka interprets the 
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circle (sometimes a square) as the dwelling/palace of a tribal chief, and the  on the 
top are two screens posed in front of the building when there was a tribal ceremony. 
Thus the whole image of gong was the plan of the place where communal 
ceremonies occurred. Shirakawa Shizuka then draws the conclusion that the original 
meaning of gong was the place where ancient community leaders lived and the 
temple where they were to be offered sacrifice after death
18
. This conjecture cannot 
be proved, but indeed in the unearthed oracle bone and bronze scripts, gong (公) was 
most commonly used together with its homophone gong (宫) which now means 
‗palace‘ or ‗temple‘19. Xu Zhongshu20, however, explains the pictograph in a quite 
different way. Xu views as a bowl or jar, symbolising food for the community, 
and the symmetrical structure of  meant ‗sharing equally‘. In fact,  was also the 
ideogram of the character meaning ‗to divide‘ (fen/分 in modern Chinese) 21.  The 
character , therefore, meant dividing the communal food and things in an equal 
manner. Of course, Xu adds, it was the tribal leader who did the distribution. 
According to this explanation, gonggong (公宫) was still the dwelling or temple of 
the tribal chief, but the first gong was now just the name of the building, meaning 
‗people‘s palace/temple‘, implying that it was a place supposed to be commonly 
shared (Figure 2.2).  
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  Figure 2.1 Logograms of Gong/公 in Oracle Bone and Bronze Inscriptions22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An undisputed meaning of the ancient gong was an honorific title for the leader or 
elite of a community
23, somewhat like ‗sir‘ in English, and this use lasted at least 
until the beginning of the twentieth century. From this point of view, gonggong(公宫)  
also meant a chief‘s house, from which still we can find a clue that the word gong 
was associated with someone or something in a social and political dominant status. 
Yet it should be noted that a chief‘s role in an ancient community and his relation to 
the common were different from a king at a later time. The two possible and 
potentially conflicted ‗origins‘ of gong, that is, one related to the leader and the other 
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Gong/ 公 in Bronze Inscription 
 
 
or 
(     - born baby) 
seal script (221-220BC) 
A. unborn foetus 
B. a tool to plant 
Screens for 
ceremony 
House/Temple 
Shirakawa Shizuka 
(1984: 285) 
Divide 
equally 
Bowl/jar 
Food 
Xu Zhongshu (1998:71) 
Zhu Fangpu (1935) 
Figure 2.2 Explanations of Early Logograms of Gong/公 and Si/私 
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to common people as a collective have been preserved and developed through the 
history. In the meantime, the spatial characteristics of the words are also kept. 
 
Given that the majority of the shell and bone scripts recorded royal divinations and a 
few recorded sacrifices, wars, hunting trips and other ‗public‘ events, and that the 
bronze products with inscriptions were also bearing ritual significance (e.g. bells and 
tripodal cauldrons), it is not too surprising that we can find many gongs but no si in 
these scripts. The word si, sharing a range of meanings overlapping with English 
‗private‘, has not been found in any scripts earlier than the Book of Odes (Odes for 
short), the oldest collection of Chinese songs and poems dating from the 10
th
 to 7
th
 
centuries BC. In the seal script version of the Odes
24
, si was written as   or  . The 
picture is interpreted as a drawing of an unborn foetus
25
 or an equipment to plough
26
, 
both of which connote a sense of ‗private‘. In the following part I will use the Book 
of Odes as basic materials to analyse the ‗earliest‘ usage and meanings of the words 
gong and si and the relationship between the two.   
 
Before the analysis, I would like to introduce the status of the Book of Odes. This 
collection of folk songs (305 survived) is considered to be compiled by royal 
officials for the purpose of letting the King know the living conditions and voice of 
common people in different vassal states in the Western Zhou Dynasty (1046–771 
BC). Compared with other contemporary classical texts which recorded the speeches, 
thoughts and discussions of scholars (such as the Analects concerning Confucius‘ 
teachings and his disciples‘ words), the content of Book of Odes was much closer to 
ordinary people‘s life (especially the 105 songs in the ‗Airs of the States‘ section) 27. 
That is the main reason for me to choose this book as a basic text to analyse. 
However, it is also worth mentioning that a considerable proportion of the contents 
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were songs composed by officials, commenting on good or bad government (the 
majority of the 31 songs in ‗Daya‘) or music played in banquets and ritual 
ceremonies (such as 74 songs in ‗Xiaoya‘ and 40 in ‗Odes‘). This may contribute to 
what Mizoguchi Yuzo
28
 has noticed: gong was used far more frequently than si in 
Odes (gong appears 98 times while si just 8). The same case can be found in the 
Book of History
29
 (gong appears 71 times and si just once), a later collection of early 
official documents. 
 
In Odes, the use of gong can be classified into three categories. In most cases it was 
used as a single word or compounded with the name of a vassal state to refer to a 
nobleman. As a matter of fact, gong was the title granted to the noble of the highest 
rank in Zhou Dynasty (c. 1046 BC–256 BC).  In Odes, there were expressions such 
as Zhougong (Duke of Zhou), Qingong (Duke of Qin), Shaogong(Duke of Shao), 
wanggong (princes and dukes), gonghou (dukes and marquises), pigong (the vassals 
or princes) and merely gong (the duke, his lordship). Gongzi (son of a duke) and 
gongsun (grandson of a duke) were another two similar usages
30
.  
 
The second category referred to the places and belongings connected to gong (i.e. a 
duke or other nobleman). For examples, gongsuo (公所) referred to gong‘s house or 
temple; gongting (公庭), gong‘s yard; gongtang(公堂) gong‘s hall; and gongshi (公
尸) gong‘s body. With the exception of the latter, they each had some elements of 
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on Three Schools’ Understanding]. Kong and Wang’s volumes are the sources of the texts adopted in this thesis 
and my understanding on these verses is also greatly influenced by the interpretations in the two books. For 
English translation, I consult James Legge and Arthur Waley’s versions. The editions which I use are: Wang 
Xianqian, Shi sanjia yi jishu, collated by Wu Ge, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987; Maoshi zhengyi (3 Volumes), 
with exegetical notes by Mao Heng, Zheng Xuan and Kong Yingda, in the series of Shisanjing Zhushu (13 Classics 
of China), edited by Li, Xueqin, Beijing: Peaking University Press, 1999; The Chinese Classics volume IV: the She 
King or the Book of Poetry, translated by James Legge, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960; Shih ching, 
Waley, Arthur, trans, London : Allen & Unwin, 1937. 
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public space or common place. The poem of ‗Jianxi‘ said ‗thousands of people are 
dancing in the ducal courtyard (gongting)‘31, and the last verse of ‗The Seventh 
Month‘ (Qiyue) described how serfs went to the hall of their lord to enjoy a 
banquet
32
. It seems that providing a space for the commoners in the community was 
at least one important function of these gong-places. Nonetheless these spaces were 
just open to people on certain occasions (e.g. ancestor worship and harvest 
celebration), and the activities there tended to bear a strong ritual sense. The limited 
‗public‘ nature of these spaces has been kept in the spatial structure of Chinese cities, 
which will be further discussed in the case of Beijing later.  
 
In the last category gong was connected to governmental affairs. Eulogies of Lu was 
a group of poems
33
 praising the state of Lu by celebrating the merits, success and the 
interest in the state of the dukes of Lu. In the fourth poem ‗Ancestral Temple‘34 
(Bigong, 閟宫) there were gong che(公车) and gong tu（公徒） which meant the 
chariots and footmen of Duke of Lu literally but they also referred to the troops of 
the state.  More examples can be found in the poem Fenjuru, in which gong xing
（公行）, gong lu（公路） and gong zu （公族）were all official positions: the 
first two were the title of the superintendent of the ruler‘s carriage, and the last one 
was the title for whom governing the relations within the noble family
35
.  Another 
case directly referring to official affairs is the poem of Small Stars (Xiaoxing, 小星), 
describing how a lower official complained that he worked day and night ‗at gong 
(place)‘ and ‗on gong (affairs)‘ (su ye zai gong 夙夜在公). Here the sense of gong 
had extended from the ruler and his place to the working place and public duties of 
his officers.  
 
                                                 
31
  Book of Odes- Part I Airs of the States (Guofeng)-Book 3 Odes of Bei (Beifeng)-Poem 13 Jianxi （诗经•国风•
邶风•简兮）. For a concordance table to different versions, see The Chinese Classics volume IV: the She King or 
the Book of Poetry, translated by James Legge, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960, pV-XIII. 
32
  Book of Odes- Part I Airs of the States (Guofeng)-Book 15 Odes of Bin (Binfeng)- Poem  10 The Seventh 
Month(Qiyue)（诗经•国风•豳风•七月）: James Legge’s translation: ‘Let us kill our lambs and sheep, And go 
to the hall of our prince, There raise the cup of rhinoceros horn, And wish him long life, -- that he may live for 
ever. ’ in The Chinese Classics volume IV: the She King or the Book of Poetry, translated by James Legge, Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960, p233. 
33
  Book of Odes- Part IV Odes- Book 2  The Praise Odes Of Lu (诗经• 颂• 鲁颂). 
34
  Book of Odes- Part IV Odes- Book 2  The Praise Odes Of Lu- Poem 4 Bigong(诗经• 颂• 鲁颂•閟宫). 
35
  Book of Odes- Part I Airs of the States (Guofeng) -Book 9 The Odes of Wei (Weifeng)- Poem 2 Fenjuru（诗经
•国风•魏风•汾沮洳）. For an explanation of these terms, see Kong Yingda (574-648)’s Chunqiu Zuozhuan 
Zhengyi , interpreting Odes based on the commentary from Du Yu(222-285), Taibei: Tanwan Shufang: 690; and 
Li, Xueqin Maoshi Zhengyi, Volume 2, Taibei: Tanwan Shufang: 2001, p.426. 
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Compared with gong, the early si was used less frequently and covered a narrower 
range of meanings. In the Odes, generally si denoted the people or belongings that 
had an intimate relation with a specific person. To refer to private items, there was 
‗my si‘ (wosi 我私 ), meaning ‗my clothes‘ 36 . In referring people, there were 
expressions like ‗yan si’ (宴私), meaning ‗treating your relatives‘ in a family dinner, 
and in another occasion si referred to a woman‘s brother-in-law37. Besides these two 
cases, si was also combined with ren (person, people), referring to household slaves 
or retainer servants:  the former was to distinguish domestic labours（siren 私人） 
from normal citizens while the latter identified the people who worked for the king.  
In later history, the word siren gradually acquired its modern sense meaning ‗private 
person‘ or ‗those privately owned‘ in contrast with collective-owned and state-
owned enterprises and assets. 
 
The uses of si in the remaining three cases are significant, as it was compounded 
with gong and/or related to land. ‗Yixi (Oh! Yes!)‘ was an ode to praise King 
Cheng‘s contribution of developing agriculture. There was an imperative sentence: 
‗go vigorously to work on your si (‗private‘) fields‘38. Here si was used to signify 
‗private fields‘ of the serfs, although ‗your private fields‘ here was not necessarily a 
declaration on the ownership. With regard to the land system at that time, we can 
find more in the passage of ‗Big Fields (Datian)‘ 
 
‗The clouds form in dense masses, 
And the rain comes down slowly. 
May it rain first on our gong‘s fields (gong-tian), 
And then come to our private (si)!‘39 
                                                 
36
 Book of Odes - Part I Airs of the States (Guofeng) -Book 1 The Odes of Zhou and South (Zhounan) – Poem 2 
Getan (诗经•国风•周南•葛覃). 
37
 Book of Odes- Part III Daya- Book 3 Tang zhi shi- Poem 5 Songgao (诗经•大雅•崧高) and Book of Odes- Part II 
xiaoya- Book 5 Xiaomin zhi shi- Poem 9 Dadong (诗经•小雅•大东). 
38
 Book of Odes- Part IV Odes- Book 1  The Praise Odes Of Zhou (ii)- Poem 2 Yixi  (诗经•周颂•噫嘻). James 
Legge: the mention of the ‘private fields’ seems to imply that there were also ‘the public fields’, cultivated by 
the husbandment in common on behalf of the government; -- contrary to the view of Choo, that in the royal 
domain, in the portion of it here contemplated, the public revenue was derived from a different system. As the 
people are elsewhere introduced, wishing that the rain might first fall upon the public fields, to show their 
loyalty, the king here speaks only of the private fields, to show his sympathy and consideration for the people. 
39
 Book of Odes – Part II Lesser Court Hymns (Xiao Ya) – Book 6 -- Big Field (Da Tian) (诗经•小雅•大田). James 
Legge’s translated gong’s field directly into ‘public fields’.  The Chinese Classics volume IV: the She King or the 
Book of Poetry, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960, p.381. 
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This passage seemed to suggest, first of all, a differentiation between gong‘s fields 
and si fields. Gong‘s field were the lands held by nobles and cooperatively farmed 
by serfs. Along with these big tracts of gong‘s lands, there were small fields allotted 
to the serfs (i.e. wo si, literally ‗my private‘, referring to my ‗private‘ field) in the 
poem
40. Secondly, the song said ‗may it rain first on our gong‘s fields, and then 
come to our private (field)‘. Some scholars contend that the prayer order in the poem 
reveals the privilege of gong‘s land over the private, and this argument can be 
supported by another passage in the song of ‗The Seventh Month (Qiyue)‟:  
 
‗The boars of one year are for themselves (si); 
Those of three years are for our prince (gong).‘41 
 
In fact, due to the limited source, the land system in Zhou Dynasty and before is still 
a highly controversial topic in Chinese history studies.  Regarding gong-field/land 
(gongtian, 公田), there are several different, even contradictory understandings in 
broader literature and archaeological studies. The first one is led by Xu Zhongshu
42
, 
who has done a brilliant investigation on the early land system based on his rich 
knowledge on ancient Chinese scripts and historical geography. In Xu‘s explanation, 
gongtian was the land collectively ‗owned‘ and shared by all the members of a 
community, somewhat similar to the commons in English medieval manors. Under 
the three-field rotation system in Zhou Dynasty, the field lying fallow was called 
gongtian (i.e. common field). According to Xu, during the Dynasties of Xia 
(c.2070—1600BC), Shang (1600—1046BC) and Western Zhou (1046-771BC), the 
Chinese society was built on the basis of ancient tribes and all lands were 
collectively ‗owned‘. Each household worked on the field allocated for them (sitian, 
a word meaning ‗private field‘ in later time) by the community. The earliest Chinese 
logograms meaning field or land were ,  or (‗田‘ in modern Chinese, tian in 
Pinyin) and the crossing lines in these pictographs symbolised the drainage ditches. 
                                                 
40
 On the explanation of gong-field and si-field in the Odes, see He, Ziquan, Zhongguo gudai shehui [Chinese 
Ancient Society], Zhengzhou: Henan People Publisher, 1991, pp.73-76. 
41
 Book of Odes- Part I Airs of the States (Guofeng)-Book 15 Odes of Bin (Binfeng)- Poem  10 The Seventh 
Month(Qiyue)（诗经•国风•豳风•七月). James Legge’s translation, in The Chinese Classics volume IV: the She 
King or the Book of Poetry, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960, p.230. 
42
 Xu, Zhongshu, ‘Shilun zhoudai tianzhi jiqi shehuixingzhi’ [On the Land System and Social Characteristics of 
Zhou Dynasty], Journal of Sichuan University, 1955, no. 2, pp. 51-90. 
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This was a reflection of the fact that the earliest cultivating practice occurred in 
marshland areas near the Yellow River and draining the water out was an essential 
prerequisite for agriculture. Inspired by Marx‘s Miner Asia Production, Xu argues, 
the construction of drainage ditches could only be achieved by the collaboration of 
the whole community, the experience of which has immensely contributed to the 
communist idea and land practice in Pre-Qin Period
43
. From this perspective, sitian 
was actually a sub-type of gongtian since it was assigned and could be reassigned by 
the community. For other scholars, however, among whom Hu Shih (1891-1962)
44
 is 
the most famous one, gongtian in Zhou Dynasty did not mean common field, but the 
king‘s land; the sitian in contrast with the king‘s gongtian was the noble‘s fields 
rather than the peasants‘. Hu supposes that Western Zhou had a feudal system 
similar to that in Medieval Europe. Yet there was a transition of this system which 
bore some similar elements with the enclosure movements that occurred in England 
in the late middle ages. In the following Eastern Zhou Dynasty (c. 1046–256 BC)45 
characterized by the collapse of royal authority, the fields in many vassaldoms were 
institutionalized as the vassaldom‘s lands (i.e. as lands of the duke/vassal state rather 
than as the lands held by  noble and/or peasants granted by the king). For example in 
the State of Lu
46
, peasants used to hold their ‗own‘ fields and work on gongtian (i.e. 
gong‘s land, the land of the duke/vassaldom) in exchange, which was very like the 
situation described in the Book of Ode. Now, however,  besides contributing the 
products from gongtian to the vassal state/duke, they had to pay extra tax (like rent) 
for using sitian (‗private‘ lands) - this change was called chu shui mu (初税亩, 
literally ‗start to levy a tax on si-fields‘) in history. It is interesting that being taxed 
                                                 
43
 In Chinese history study, the Pre-Qin Period (2,100 BC-221 BC) refers to the period preceding the first united 
and centralised Chinese empire called Qin (221-206). The unity of Qin is a very remarkable demarcation in 
Chinese history. For example, The Cambridge History of China narrates Chinese history starting from Qin 
Dynasty. The Cambridge History of China Vol. 1, The Ch'in and Han empires, 221 B.C. - A.D. 220 , ed. by D. 
Twitchett and M. Loewe,  general editors. D. Twitchett and J.K. Fairbank, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986.  
44
 Hu Shi in simple Chinese pinyin. See his correspondence with Liao Zhongkai and Hu Hanmin on ‘well-field 
system’ (four letters), i.e. ‘Jintianbian sipian’, compiled in Collection of Hu Shi Wenji *A Collection of Hu Shi’s 
works] vol.2, Beijing: Peaking University Press, pp.305-326.  
45
 The Eastern Zhou Dynasty includes the Spring and Autumn period (770-476BC) and Warring States period 
(475-221 BC). 
46
 Here I keep the vague term ‘state’ mainly because this age is known as Warring States period (475-221 BC). 
These states were actually fiefdoms of Zhou but after a trend of conquest and annexation in the Spring and 
Autumn period (770-476BC), a few strong vassal states no longer depended on the legitimacy and protection of 
central authority. Qin was one of these states. Finally Qin unified the whole China and built a centralized empire 
in 221BC. Also the bureaucratic system developed and became mature very early. Therefore I think it is not too 
wrong to use ‘state’ here. Chinese concepts of state and nation will be explained later. where 
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here is not considered as an official recognition of the rights on ‗private‘ fields, but a 
claim to the control by the (vassal) state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although contemporary academics debate the land system and the meaning of 
gongtian (gong-field) in the Western Zhou Dynasty, the thinkers and politicians after 
the Spring and Autumn Period (770-476) appeared more assertive about what the 
land system of Western Zhou was like. When being consulted by the Duke of Teng, 
Mencius
47
 (372 – 289 BC) described an ideal ‗well-field‘ system (jingtianzhi, 井田
制)48 based on his understanding and imagination of that in Western Zhou (Figure 
2.3): one unit of land was divided among eight peasant families, and each family had 
its own outlying field around a central shared field (called gongtian ), and all the 
families jointly worked a ninth central plot. Under this system, one should not work 
on their own field until the duty on the gong‘s field had been fulfilled 49 . This 
conceived scheme was misinterpreted as the true situation of Western Zhou and the 
idea was enhanced by a series of later works
50
. It is significant that the ideology of 
                                                 
47
 Mencius lived in the Period of the Warring States (403–221 BC). His talk on ‘well-field system’ that has a 
profound effect can be found in Book V-3 ‘Duke Wen of  Teng and the Taxation of Land’, in Mencius, translated 
by Leonard A. Lyall, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1932, pp.73-75. The texts and exegesis that I use is 
Mengzi yizhu [Mencius the Annotation], vol. I, compiled and annotated by Yang, Bojun, Beijing: Zhonghua Book 
Company, 1960, pp.117-123. 
48
 Or square - land system. It was called ‘well-field system’ because the word ‘well’(jing, 井) referred to field in 
ancient time (and its image reflected the spatial characteristic of fields). The use of well as field is extinct now. 
49
 L Lyall’s translation: ‘If each Well is one mile square, the Well will be nine hundred roods. In the middle are 
the public fields. The eight households have each a hundred roods of their own. They feed the public fields 
between them. The dare not attend to their own work till the public work is done. The is how countrymen are 
divided from others’, in Mencius, translated by Leonard A. Lyall, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1932, p75  
50
 ‘Reform under the cover of antiquity’ (tuogu gaizhi) is a common strategy used to attain the validity of a 
reform in different dynasties in China. Wang Mang and Kang Youwei are the most famous two among this kind 
of reformers. 
Figure 2.3 A well-field system (井田制) described by Mencius  
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dividing fields equally
51
 based on a state ownership system was so strong and many 
reformers have tried to restore this system after the equal-field system (or land-
equalization system, 均田制度) was first realized in the Northern Wei Dynasty (386
－534AD).  
 
To summarize this section: by tracing the etymology and examining the early uses of 
gong and si, we can see that gong and si were used to describe people or things in 
obviously different status: gong was related to both nobility and community, while si 
to some ambiguous meaning that can be developed into ‗private‘. When being 
connected to land, although how gongtian worked in the early age is still debatable, 
people‘s favour on this idea in later time was apparent. So far as it is concerned, the 
division of gong and si has emerged and sometimes we can better understand one 
concept by referencing the other. However, in most occasions they were used 
separately and the strong contrast between the two had not been constructed yet. 
How the potential tension between gong and si was transformed into explicit and 
systematic opposition/dichotomy will be discussed in the next section.  
 
2.2.2  Following history: constructing gong-si opposition 
The first influential interpretation on the relationship between gong and si is from 
Shuowen Jiezi (usually Shuowen for short)
52
, an early Chinese dictionary from the 
Dynasty of Han (206 BC – 220 AD). The author Xu Shen (c. 58 AD – c. 147 AD) 
cited Han Fei (c.280–233 BC), a philosopher of the Legalist School53, interpreting 
gong (公) etymologically as a compound of two simpler characters (one of which 
was si 厶) together, meaning ‗turning one‘s back on si ‘ (bei si/厶, opposite to si/厶) 
(Figure 2.4). This (mis)understanding laid the foundation for the gong/si or ‗public‘/ 
‗private‘ dichotomy throughout the whole later Chinese history54. Regarding si, Han 
Fei explained that ‗si was that which was enclosed‘ and hence owned by someone. 
Xu Shen accepted this explanation and developed it into a more moral sense, saying 
                                                 
51
 As we have mentioned before, the Chinese ideogram of divide implies a sense of dividing equally. 
52
 Literally ‘Explaining and Analysing Characters’. 
53
 The Legalist School is a political philosophy current starting from the Warring States period, emphasizing a 
strong government and strict application of the institution of law. It is usually put in contrast to Confucianism’s 
benevolence. The Legalist thoughts are often compared with those of Machiavelli. 
54
 The notion that the term and concept of gong seems emerge earlier than si is based on the materials of 
modern anthropological excavation.  
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‗those crafty and iniquitous are si‘. Given to the notable change of the writing of si  
from 厶 to 私, with an 禾55, the image of a cereal plant added on the left, Xu Shen 
further defined si (私 ) as ‗the crops under one‘s name‘ 56 (Figure 2.4). As a 
consequence of this (re)interpretation, the sense of gong as commonly owned things 
and thus related to public interests was stressed ideologically, while in social practice 
and people‘s collective (sub)consciousness, its elements directly linked to nobility 
and dominant status also remained.  
 
 
 
 
 
We can imagine that, living at a time when the oracle bones with inscriptions were 
still buried
57
 and a great many earlier books had been burned by the First Emperor of 
Qin (259 BC – 210 BC), Xu Shen probably explained the words more by his own 
and the contemporaries‘ understanding rather than careful etymological investigation.  
Yet precisely because of that, we can observe the change of the understanding and 
the attempts to reconstruct the concepts at that age. Duan Yucai (1735-- 1815) 
viewed the contrary sense of gong and si as a deliberate misinterpretation initiated by 
                                                 
55
  禾(he) was used as a general name for rice and all the grains in literature. 
56
 Xu, Shen, Shuowen Jiezi, in Duan, Yucai (1735–1815) annotated edition, [Online] Available from 
http://www.gg-
art.com/imgbook/view.php?word=%CB%BD&bookid=53&book_name=%CB%B5%CE%C4%BD%E2%D7%D6%D7
%A2 [Accessed 06.04.2013] 
57
 Oracle bone scripts were not discovered until 1899. 
Figure 2.4  Explanation on the Structures of Characters of Gong/公 and Si/私/厶 
(Drawn according to Hanfeizi and Shuowen ) 
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Han Fei and Xu Shen, commenting that the opposition of the two concepts was 
actually a ‗conspiracy‘ penetrating throughout nearly  2000 years history of China58. 
According to Mizoguchi Yuzo‘s examination, the (moral) opposition between the 
two had been well established in the period from Warring States Era (476BC–221BC) 
to Western Han Dynasty (202BC – 9AD), and in the process Han Fei‘s theory played 
a pivotal role. In the following periods, the communist sense of gong‘ and its ethical 
(and therefore political) priority over si were further configured and debated. As a 
result, the relatively pastoral understanding of the two words and the pre-assumed 
harmony between gong and si, like what was displayed in the Book of Odes, was 
gone
59
.  
 
The political system, especially the changing forms of the state have greatly affected 
the evolution of gong-si understandings. In feudal China, mainly Zhou Dynasty (c. 
1046 – 221BC), the king granted land to the nobles who became local lords (called 
zhuhou, like dukes and gong were their honorific title) as well as the rulers of 
different feudal states. Thoese feudal states were called guo which now is used as 
‗state‘ and ‗nation‘. They were also called gong-shi which literally means ‗public 
hall‘. The vassal states were quite independent from the Zhou kings and had their 
own tax and legal systems, currency and unique writing styles of characters. The 
vassal rulers also granted various districts to their own followers, and these sub-
fiefdoms were called jia, of which the word now usually refers to family and home, 
or si-jia, literally means ‗private family‘. Due to the decentralisation of the political 
system, it was the vassals of the ‗public halls‘ and grandees of `‗private families‘ that 
played the most active roles in political ground
60
. This formed the background to 
understand gong-si relationships in feudal China.  
 
The three-layers fiefment structure became unstable in Warring States Era (476BC–
221BC). This was also the age when the implication of si became obviously 
derogative and formed more apparent tension with gong.  On the one hand, within 
                                                 
58
 See Duan Yucai’s comments in Annotation of Shuowen Jiezi , [Online] Available from http://www.gg-
art.com/imgbook/view.php?word=%CB%BD&bookid=53&book_name=%CB%B5%CE%C4%BD%E2%D7%D6%D7
%A2 [Accessed 06.04.2013] 
59
 Mizoguchi, Yuzo,  ‘The Etymology of Gong in Chinese’, in Mizoguchi, Yuzo, Zhongguo de gong yu si • gong si 
[China’s Gong and Si• Gong Si], translated by Zheng, Jing, Beijing: Joint Publishing, 2011, p.230-240. 
60
 Chen, Qiaojian, Public (Gong) and Private (Si): Historical Study and Modern Interpretation, Beijing: SDX Joint 
Publishing Company, 2013, pp.37-8. 
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the vassal states, the grandees‘ ‗private families‘ started to encroach the power of the 
vassals and the interests of ‗public halls‘. As I will show later, to a very large degree, 
the philosophy at that time was mainly political philosophy. Different schools argued 
their own blueprints of good politics and a just society. The disloyal behaviours of 
grandees were considered as morally bad, which contributed to the negative 
implication of si in its political and moral sense. From then on, si was connected to 
being treacherous and against standard hierarchical system, and therefore developed 
the meanings like ‗in secret‘, ‗privately‘ and ‗illegal‘61. On the other hand, some 
stronger state vassals, who used to pay ceremonious homage to the Zhou king, 
gradually disregarded the will of Zhou and declared themselves as kings.  Finally, in 
221BC, having conquered all other Warring States, the king of the state of Qin 
established the first centralised empire as the First Emperor. The decentralised feudal 
system completely collapsed. A lord of a vassal state with the title of gong now 
became the only ruler of the whole empire, the territory of which overlapped the 
former ‗all-under-heaven‘ of the Zhou king. Compared with gong affairs of the 
vassal states, the government affairs of the empire were also much more complicated. 
In a hierarchical but highly centralised political system, people were in more direct 
confrontation with the government. Some of the previous tensions between gong and 
si ideas formed from the relationship between fiefdoms and sub-fiefdoms in reality 
was passed to the gong-si relationship between the centralised state and people.  
 
Indeed, over the long imperial period, more compound words made up of gong, si 
and other characters were created to express new phenomena and ideas. Table 2.2 is 
a selection of the compounds with gong or/and si. These words emerged in the 
imperial age of China but most of them are still in use in contemporary Chinese. 
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 Ibid, p.52. 
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Compounds of gong 
 
Compounds of  si 
related to the official 
n
62
. 
Gong-tang  公堂   –   law court, tribunal  
Gong-an     公案   –   court table 
Gong-han   公函   –   official letters  
Gong-shi    公事   –    government affair  
Gong-chai  公差   –   official business  
Gong-liang 公粮   –  agricultural tax paid by grain  
Gong-wu    公务   --     official duty  
v. 
gui-gong     归公   --   turn in to the state  
chong-gong 充公  --   confiscate 
 
related to the common/public  
n. 
Gong-lun  公论  –  verdict of the masses  
Gong-de   公德  –   public morality  
Gong-fen  公愤  –   public indignation  
v.  
Gong-bu    公布 –   announce, publish  
Gong-kai   公开 --   disclose, to make public  
adv. 
Gong-ren  公认 –   generally acknowledged   
Gong-ran  公然 –  openly  
 
others 
Gong-lu      公路  – road  
Gong-guan  公馆  – mansion  
related to non-government 
n. 
Si-shu 私塾– private school  
Si-jia  私家– private family  
 
 
related to something personal 
n. 
Si-chan 私产  – private estate 
Jia-si    家私  – personal effects 
Si-nang 私囊  –private purse 
Si-ren   私人  – private person 
Si-qing 私情  – personal preference 
Si-chou 私仇 -- personal enmity  
 
 
 
v & adv. secretly  
Si-ben  私奔  -- to elope 
Si-fang 私访 - to make a secrete inquiries 
Si-xia   私下– privately, secretly  
 
 
related to something illegal 
n.  
Si-xing       私刑    – illegal punishment 
Si-sheng zi 私生子– an illegitimate  
Si-yan        私盐     – smuggled salt 
 
 
Related to justice 
n./adj. 
Gong-dao  公道–  justice  
Gong-ping 公平– fair, just, impartial  
related to moral corruption 
n./adj. 
Si-yu   私欲  --  lust, desire 
Si-xin  私心  -- selfish motive 
Zi-si    自私  --  selfish 
 
Idiomatic expressions with gong and si 
Gongkuan siyong   公款私用 -- illegitimate use of public funds 
Jiagong jisi            假公济私 -- exploit public office for private gain  
Gonger wangsi      公而忘私 -- be so devoted to public service as to forget one's own interests 
Gongbao sichou    公报私仇 --  abuse one's authority to revenge oneself on a personal enemy 
                                                 
62
 The lexical categories indicated here are those of the compounds rather than single gong or si. Most gong 
and si are used as adjectives and combined with a noun character to compose a new noun compound. 
Table 2.2 Compounds with gong or/and si 
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From the words above we can find that there were roughly three groups of 
meanings/uses of gong: the first group was related to the government and official 
affairs, which can be seen as a development of one of gong‘s ‗original‘ meanings 
which was connected to the tribal leaders, the prince of vassaldoms and then the 
rulers of the empire
63
.  In the second group gong kept its connection to the masses, 
commoners and community, and in addition a meaning of ‗public‘ as ‗open‘ was also 
developed (such as gongkai, ‗to disclose‘, ‗to make public‘; gongran, ‗openly‘). The 
third meaning of gong was more abstract and remarkable for its moral implication-- 
it conveyed a sense of justice and fairness. This unique ethical dimension made the 
Chinese gong distinguished from its counterparts in other cultures.  
From the side of si, it was used to refer to non-governmental bodies and illegal 
practice, which can be seen as a contrast to gong‘s first meaning group. Si-
compounds related to personal, private or secret things/activities seems to place si in 
the opposite position with gong‘s ‗public‘ and ‗open‘ meaning. The remaining idea 
of si as selfishness, self-interest and partiality can be compared to gong as justice and 
impartiality. So far, the dichotomy between gong and si had prevailed in people‘s 
daily language as well as social ideology.  
It is worth noting that, although emerging later, the third meaning group of gong, due 
to its connection to some basic principles such as justice and fairness became 
essential to comprehend all gong-related ideas and practice.  A question can be made 
here: how was gong linked to justice? As we have known, etymologically gong was 
linked to the idea of dividing and sharing communal goods equally, and equality was 
absolutely essential for the Chinese value of justice and fairness. Besides this, the 
idea of gong was increasingly connected to the imagery of Heaven
64
 (tian, 天) in 
Chinese thoughts, and Heaven was viewed as a perfect model to present the spirit 
and virtue of gong (i.e. justice and impartiality). The idea of Heaven and its 
relationship to impartiality (i.e. wusi, ‗no si‘or gong) can be reflected in the two 
similar classical passages below:  
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 Qin was just one of the seven strongest vassaldoms in Warring States Era (476BC–221BC) and it conquered 
and merged six other vassal states and established the first centralised empire in 221BC. The titles of the ruler 
of Qin were hou(侯, marquis), gong (公, duke), wang (王, prince, king) and huang (皇, 皇帝, emperor).  
64
 The Chinese concept of Heaven is, on the one hand, a naturalistic heaven, a synonym for the sky and nature; 
on the other hand, it is also a mythological and religious heaven, i.e. a place where the ancestors reside and 
from which emperors drew their mandate to rule.  
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 ‗Heaven overspreads all without any partiality (si), and so 
does Earth sustain all.‘65  
 ‗Heaven covers all without partiality; earth bears all up 
without partiality; the sun and moon shine on all without 
partiality; the four seasons alternate without partiality. 
Each bestows its power, and the myriad things attain 
thereby mature form.‘66 
Precisely because of its impartiality, the principles of Heaven were supposed to be 
the model that should be followed by the rulers to rule the kingdom. Im-partiality, or 
wu-si, (literally no si, no self-interest), or gong was regarded as the spirit of gong and 
therefore the most important character of the king
67
. A dialogue between Confucius 
and his student showed the importance of the virtue of impartiality to the king:  
 
Zi-xia said, ‗(It is said that) the virtue of the kings (who 
founded the) three dynasties was equal to that of heaven 
and earth; allow me to ask of what nature that virtue was 
which could be said to put its possessors on an equality 
with heaven and earth.‘ Confucius said, ‗They reverently 
displayed the Three Impartialities, while they comforted 
all beneath the sky under the toils which they imposed.‘ 
Zi-xia said, ‗Allow me to ask what you call the ―Three 
Impartialities (no si)‖ ‘. Confucius said, ‗Heaven 
overspreads all without partiality; Earth sustains and 
contains all without partiality; the Sun and Moon shine on 
all without partiality. Reverently displaying these three 
characteristics and thereby comforting all under heaven 
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Zhuang, Zhou, ‘The Great and Most Honoured Master’, in Zhuangzi,  translated by Legge, James, [online] 
available from http://ctext.org/all-texts?filter=285289%20-%20n2761 [accessed 07.04.2013] 
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 Lv, Buwei, ‘Dispense with Si/Partiality’, Annals of Lvbuwei, I/5.1, translated by Knoblock, John and Riegel, 
Jeffrey, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000, p.73. 
67
 Sage-king is the ideal ruler in Chinese political thoughts. In legend China used to be ruled by five sage-kings in 
high antiquity. 
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under the toils which they imposed, is what is called ―the 
Three Impartialities‖ ‘68. 
 
In fact, in the imperial period, the Emperor of China was called the ‗son of heaven‘ 
(tianzi, 天子) and was recognized as the ruler of ‗all under heaven‘ (tianxia, 天下, i.e. 
the world) rather than just a kingdom. He gained his kingship and ruling power 
against the ‗mandate of heaven‘ (tianming, 天命) which was seen as the fundamental 
and hence highest principles of the world. His target was to keep the peace of the 
world, just like what heaven and earth did. Peace was considered as a natural state of 
the world and the peace could be maintained if the principle of impartiality was 
followed.  Comparing the governing of the human world to the running of the natural 
world was very special here. There was no separation between human and nature as 
implicated in European understandings. The Chinese ‗politics‘ (zheng 政 ), or 
governance more precisely, was connected to the maintenance or pursuit of peace 
which had been set by nature. The Chinese word to translate ‗politics‘ and ‗political‘ 
(zheng 政 ) was written the same with the word meaning ‗upright‘ , ‗central‘, 
‗regular‘, ‗proper‘, ‗standard‘ (zheng 正) in ancient time69. It assumed harmony, 
standard and rules, the primary principle of which was impartiality (wusi), 
eliminating si, or gong.  The connection between the king‘s rule, gong-spirit 
(impartiality) and peace were expressed in the two passages bellow: 
 
‗In the past, when the ancient sage-kings governed all-
under-heaven, they invariably made impartiality their 
first priority, because if they acted impartially, the world 
would be at peace. This peace was attained by acting 
with impartiality.‘70 
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 ‘Confucius at home at leisure’, in Book of Rites, 29-5, translated by  Legge, James, Sacred Books of the East, 
volumes 27, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1885. 
69
 When being asked by Ji Kangzi, a higher official of the state of Lu, Confucius gave a definition of (good) Zheng
政 or governance: ‘Zheng 政 means zheng 正’. The second zheng is a homophone of the first one and it is also 
the word where the zheng meaning governance or government derives from. Analects-Yanyuan-17. Online 
version from Chinese Text Project, http://ctext.org/mozi/will-of-heaven-i [accessed 05-08-2013]. 
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 Lv, Buwei, ‘Honouring Gong/Impartiality’, in Knoblock, John and Riegel, Jeffrey eds. and trans., Annals of 
Lvbuwei : A Complete Translation and Study, Stanford: Stanford  University Press, 2000, p.70. 
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 ‗When the Great Way/Dao prevails, a public and 
common spirit (gong) will rule all-under-heaven.‘  71 
 
Throughout the Imperial China, the king was the core and the representative of the 
government. With the development of bureaucratic system, the expansion of 
governmental affairs and construction of government-gong connections, the ‗state‘ 
(guo 国), the king (jun 君) and governmental officials (guan 官) were increasingly 
placed in a politically, socially as well as morally dominant position over family 
(jia 家), ministers (chen 臣) and civilians (min 民)72 (Figure 2.5). Obviously, the 
former group was a gong-related category while the latter was si-related. It is not 
surprising to see collective-oriented Confucians to give all priority to things and 
people connected to gong; gong provided the principles of justice for the rulers to 
rule from which everyone would benefit while self-interested individuals and 
families would only act in favour of themselves. This theory gradually legitimised 
the realm of the state
73
 as gong-sphere and justified the priority of the state over 
private affairs, interests and desires. The School of Principle of Neo-Confucianism 
(songming lixue, 宋明理学) in Song Dynasty (960 – 1279AD) pushed this notion to 
an extreme point, suggesting ‗keeping the principles of Heaven, exterminating 
(improper) human desires (cun tianli, mie renyu)‘ 74 . This idea became very 
influential since the School of Principle remained as the mainstream philosophy 
sponsored by the state until the Empire ended in the early 20
th
 century. 
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 ‘The Conveyance of Rites’, in Book of Rites. All citations from Book of Rites used here are James Legge’s 
translation, with changing Grand course into Great Way. The LÎ KÎ (The Book of Rites), Legge, James trans, The 
Sacred Books of China vol. 4, 1885, online source: http://www.sacred-texts.com/cfu/liki/ [accessed 05-08-2013]    
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 For a study on the relationship between the state and family, see e.g. Mitsuo, Moriya (守屋美都雄), Family 
and state in ancient China, HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010 (1968) . 
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 A typical Chinese understanding on their ‘state’ is all-under-heaven (tianxia) rather than a nation-state. 
74
 See Zhu, Xi, Zhuzi Yulei (collection of discussions between Zhu Xi and his disciples), vol. 13, Beijing: Zhonghua 
Book Company, 1981. 
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2.2.3  A revolution?: slippery boundaries between gong and si 
In spite of the constructed gong-si division and opposition, however, the boundaries 
between the two classes were unclear, unstable and sometimes even could be 
reversed.  
As illustrated in the last section, gradually different actors and activities in political 
practice were theorised as either gong or si category.  We can see the tension as well 
as connection between the two categories. One significant example reflecting the 
ambiguity between gong and si was the relationship between the state as a key gong 
embodiment and family as a si embodiment. In terms of state-family relations, 
although ordinarily the state was considered to be apparent as public/gong sphere 
while family was within private/si realm, Confucianism contended an internal 
homogeneity rather than contrast between the two. After the collapse of Western 
Zhou, a strict social structure and codes based on clans also broke down. Yet 
Confucians never ceased to (re)construct the connections between family, clan and 
nation. They argued that a country intrinsically shared the same structure with an 
extended family (jia guo tong gou,家国同构) - the King was to the people what the 
father is to children, and everyone should do his or her devoir in a society just as 
family members did the duty for their families. In fact, the Chinese expression for 
‗country‘, ‗nation‘ and ‗state‘ is guo-jia （国家）which is made up of two characters: 
guo, ‗country‘ or ‗state‘ and jia, ‗home‘ or ‗family‘. This state-family homology 
confused the demarcation between the state, or public domain and domestic domain. 
This feature made state-domestic (or public-private) relationship in China distinct 
from the modern western liberal tradition which supposes a separated and relatively 
autonomous domestic and economic field. 
gong embodiments si embodiments 
State 
King 
Officials 
 
 
Family 
Minister 
Civilians 
 
 
superior to 
homostructure 
Figure 2.5 Relative gong-si relationships between different embodiments 
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Another property further complicating the public-private distinction was caused by 
the assumption that gong was the principle and natural law of the world. In this 
theory, gong-spirit (i.e. impartiality, equality and public ethos, etc.) was something 
that should prevail in all spheres, scales and activities, not just in government affairs 
and the public arena, but also in household and personal behaviours, which literally 
left no space for a pure private realm. To some extent, the omnipresent potential of 
gong makes it theoretically excludes nothing, rendering an ‗opposite‘ si as an 
independent area impossible. As a result, on the one hand, it compromised the 
tension between different public and private bodies. Public interests and private 
interests were more compatible. For example, a private person could only fully 
realise his or her value by contributing to a broader society; for the government, 
certain local autonomy achieved by gentries (e.g. it was common that the local 
gentries rather than local authority built schools, roads and relieved the poor) was an 
effective complement rather than a challenge to its authority
75
. However, in reality, 
the omnipresence of gong and (extravagant) stress on gong-virtue and public interests 
had a risk of eroding private rights and space. Moreover, gong‘s connection to justice, 
fairness, normativity, etc. gave all gong embodiments a moral priority over si 
embodiments. This moral privilege, when used to judge a person‘s motivation and 
behaviours, could be very excessive even dangerous, for it declared a person morally 
wrong and therefore denied his/her whole personality. This moral privilege of gong 
gave gong embodiments such as the Emperor and government extreme advantage. 
The mighty imperial power and the highly centralised state system can be seen as a 
manifestation of this.   
More than a blurred boundary between gong and si, the moral positions between the 
embodiments of the two could be changed and even reversed. This was because all 
the bodies and activities in reality fell within the spectrum between an ideal gong and 
an ideal si as two poles. Gong and si in practice were relative, rather than absolute. 
For instance, while a local community (say, a city) was gong compared to a 
household, it was si to the whole country.  Sometimes one thing might change from 
                                                 
75
 Case study and theoretical  analysis on active local autonomy in late Qing can be found in Mary 
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one side to the other substantially. The king or the ruling group were usually seen as 
gong and ‗public‘ authority, but if they failed to pursue the welfare for all-under-
heaven and fall into partiality, then they were just one ‗self-enclosed‘ family (si), and  
could be overthrown by the people on behalf of gong/heaven (ti tian xing dao, 替天
行道).  
More evolutionary thoughts emerged since the 17
th
 century: si (such as property 
rights) and desire (yu 欲, including the desire to own and to develop, etc., similar to 
but not as strong as ‗right‘)76 were overtly justified. Gu Yanwu (1613－1682AD) 
argued that the king should see all the people‘s si (private interests) together as his 
gong, and further suggested that we should aggregate all the si all over the world as 
the gong under heaven. This bottom-up understanding of gong altered the traditional 
top-down gong theory. It praised everyone (ren ren, 人人) and at the same time 
emphasised the all. As Mizoguchi Yuzo points out, ‗everyone‘ can refer to individual 
and it is also a holistic concept. He contends that the idea that everyone is a part of 
gong and that the commonwealth of people takes precedence over the state was very 
radical, and he believes that this theory has immensely contributed to the revolution 
in the late Qing Dynasty
77
.  
For me, the ‗new‘ understanding of gong-si relationship and its revolutionary 
potential actually resonated with the tension between the two initial meanings of 
gong: gong could refer to the head of a community, but gong was also connected to 
the collectivity of the aggregation of everybody. These two purported ‗origins‘ of 
gong actually reflect two notions of the source and essence of public authority: does 
it reside in the sovereign head or the body of a political community? Or, should a 
sovereign head or the union of the people take possession of public power. The 
debates between the two notions have existed for long, both in theory and in practice, 
both in China and the West. But not until the late imperial China, the value of private 
people and private desire were overtly justified. To be sure, collective and 
collectivity were still important, but more stress was put onto the dimension of 
individuals as basic elements of collectivity now. From this point of view, there was 
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 Yu, Yingshi, Xiandai ruxue de huigu yu zhanwang [Modern Confucianism], Beijing: Joint Publishing, 
2004, p.158. 
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 Mizoguchi, Yuzo, China’s Gong and Si• Gong Si, translated by Zheng, Jing, Beijing: Joint Publishing, 2011, pp. 
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not only a contest between government and collective as two gong embodiments, but 
also private people composing collective attained a kind of political privilege, against 
of which the state authority might be challenged. 
Another challenge from the side of private relied on the intimate relationship between 
private person and Heaven, between innate moral sense and universal principles. The 
School of Mind/Heart
78
, founded by Lu Jiuyuan (1139--1192) and developed by 
Wang Yangming (1472-1529), was a major rival of Cheng-zhu‘s Neo-Confucianism 
(or School of Principle/Li) that approved ‗eliminating selfish desires‘. The 
Confucians in the Mind/Heart School believed that knowledge was intuitive and 
everybody, including sages and common people, knew the difference between good 
and evil. Because of the assumed unity of the mind/heart of humanity and the 
principle of Dao (or universal law), private people with innate moral goodness now 
were directly connected to the highest principle of Heaven and the highest goodness 
of gong. The implication was significant. In this theory, private people could access 
the virtue of the moral and abstract gong without any gong-embodiments like the 
state or a collective as media; human ethical codes were coincident with normative 
gong. This idea not only recognized private people‘s capability to know gong virtues, 
but also gave them the authority to judge whether the behaviours of the state and 
officials were conformable with gong principle or not.  
Undeniably, the evolution of the concepts of gong and si and their relationships was 
influenced by its contemporary social, political and cultural conditions. The 
government of imperial China was a centralised hierarchical system with the emperor 
at the top. The scope of gong affairs related to administration was increasingly 
enlarged and the contents were also more comprehensive. As Confucianism, which 
attches huge importance to morality, was promoted as official ideology in almost all 
the dynasties, the priority of gong in early Confucian thoughts was developed and 
utilised to justify for the enriched gong practice. The other facet of the emphasis on  
gong was debasing the value of si. As has been mentioned in section 2.2.2, the 
School of Principle of Neo-Confucianism getting popular from Song Dynasty (960 – 
1279AD) pushed the opposition of gong and si into an extreme point, exaggerating 
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Given the fact that there was no separation between mind and heart in Chinese philosophy, I translate it here 
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the danger of private interests and private desire (siyu). However, it was not simply 
an ethical battle between the government as gong and normal people as si. It was 
more about moral requirements for officers of the empire. A civil service 
examination system (keju), based on knowledge of Confucian classics, was used to 
select imperial bureaucrats. The Neo-Confucian theory from the School of Principle 
was to cultivate scholar-bureaucrats‘ gong merits: impartiality, fairness, equality, 
dignity, restraining private desire and sacrificing for public interests, but it was 
pushed too far and distortedly employed by the rulers to suppress si aspects. Its 
austere scrutiny on personal morality and motivation also smothered society. 
The influence of the School of Principle‘s ascetic views went into the Ming Dynasty 
(1368-1644) and things began to change. One change was that different perspectives 
from Daoism and Buddhism came to rectify the extremism of the Principlists. One 
example was the Mind/Heart School‘s belief on the connection between the principle 
of the Heaven and each person‘s heart, which revolutionarily brought private person 
with his/her own interests and highest gong together. They also considered si-desires 
could be moderate and justifiable. Critiques and reflections on despotism were also 
increasing. Power was too centralised to the emperor, and the emperor could be very 
nepotistic. Gradually, previous attacks on private desires of normal people and 
bureaucrats now were made more on the emperor. The direct connection between 
private person as si and the Heaven as gong broke the privilege of the emperor as the 
Son of Heaven and challenged the hierarchic order of the imperial system and 
Confucianist tradition. In terms of the models of gong-state, some thinkers openly 
expressed their preference for more even feudal system rather than the centralised 
imperial polity
79
. 
The arising awareness of national states also assisted the evolution of gong-si ideas. 
Although employing many Han officers and following Han political and ritual 
system, the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) was founded not by Han Chinese, who 
composed the majority of Chinese population but by the Manchu people. This was 
seen as a foreign invasion by sinocentrists and there were ongoing rebellions aiming 
at restoring ‗Chinese nation‘ over the long dynasty. From the late Qing, military 
attacks from the European empires shocked the country. The intrusion of other states 
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not only threatened the ruling government but also brought about disasters for normal 
people. The idea that private people‘s interests and collective interests of the nation 
were associated and consistent developed against these backgrounds. Gu‘s bottom-up 
gong model, that is, the aggression of si was gong, was an typical example
80
.  
To summarise, in late imperial China, that the mind/heart of normal people was 
connected to abstract gong and thereby a kind of moral authority, with the idea 
regarding private desire as positive and the notion considering the aggregation of all 
the si all over the world was the gong under heaven (which actually can be seen as a 
development of the Mind/Heart School) together contributed to a bottom-up gong 
model. Compared with the previous top-down understanding of gong, which saw the 
normative principle of Heaven/gong was the starting point and all the gong and si 
embodiments and actors in the world should follow the principle, this new model 
affirmed the value of private people, and brought upward the position of private 
bodies in the moral ladder to the highest gong. However, the change was still within 
the vertical gong-si system. The new understanding enabled private bodies more 
mobility to move upward but did not build new relationship between different 
private bodies. In other words, the connection between private people and Heaven 
did not bring a horizontal collaboration between people, which did not help with the 
formation of a horizontal dimension of gong like ‗the public‘ in English expression. 
A private person in Chinese understanding was living in a family and a state, and 
linked to Heaven and Dao, which was different from the understanding that a man 
lives a political life with his peers in a community.  The gong/public spirit theorised 
from the bottom, might recognise each individual as si body and attach high 
importance to the gathering of individuals (i.e. collective), but it was ultimately not 
based on the ‗horizontal‘ co-existence of different people but the ‗vertical‘ 
connection between each person and Heaven
81
. In this sense, the political thoughts in 
China‘s late imperial period gave the gong-si relationship some revolutionary 
understanding, which has further complicated and confused the demarcation and 
                                                 
80
 Gu, Yanwu & Huang, Rucheng, Annotation of Ri Zhi Lu (Ri Zhi Lu jishi), Shanghai: Shanghai Rarebooks 
Publishing House, 2006, p.148.  
81
 Lan, Hung-Yueh, ‘Dongya zhong de “gonggong” gainian: Lishi yuanliu yu zhankai( “Public” in East Asian 
Contexts: History and Development)’, in Huang, Junjie & Jiang, Yihua, eds., Gong si lingyu xintan: dongya yu 
xifang guandian zhi bijiao (Exploring Public and Private Spheres: Comparing the Perspectives from East Asia and 
the West), Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, pp. 57-84.  
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connection between the two idea groups, but the revolution still happened within its 
cultural and philosophical vein.  
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
From the history of the ideas of gong and si given above, we can see there are 
different even conflicted notions of the two concepts and their relationship, and 
people‘s understanding of them has also been changing over time. However, it is not 
the case that a new understanding totally replaces the old one or this one triumphs 
over the other. Instead, various notions and different layers of understanding 
accumulate, influencing people‘s mind and practices nowadays. This section aims to 
summarise the characteristics of the ideas of gong and si, including the different 
aspects of each concept, the interrelationship of different aspects within each of them 
and the interaction between the two. The general distinction and connection between 
the two conceptual constellations will be used as a basic framework to understand 
land politics in the communist Beijing, and more specific interpreting structures will 
be developed through the two case studies in Chapter 4 and 5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gong 
Universal 
principle 
Collective 
State 
abstract & moral gong 
embodiments of gong 
Figure 2.6  Three main aspects of gong  
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The tension between gong and si and the contest for the moral, normative gong will 
be the focus of my theoretical and empirical investigation. I will argue that the 
tension and the contestation rest on the features of each idea and the connections 
between the two. In terms of gong, three aspects are important: (1) universal 
principle, (2) collective embodiment, (3) embodiment in the state (Figure 2.6). 
Among the three, gong as universal principle, as normative value is unique and 
fundamental to the politics of gong-si relationship. This is also the most abstract 
dimension of gong ideas, implying justice, fairness, impartiality and other gong-
merits and gong-spirit/public spirit. It is this abstract, moral sense of gong that gives 
all gong related bodies and activities moral and therefore political priority over their 
si counterparts. State and collective are two most important gong embodiments. The 
state is in a political advantage position in reality. An ideal state is considered to be 
ruled under the guide of gong and can represent the public interests of all the people 
in the country. Collective can be a community in reality but the Chinese 
understanding emphasises the pure aggregation of people and its superiority in 
numbers over individual persons.  
constitute 
homology 
gong si 
Moral/abstract 
dimension 
Embodiments 
Justice, fairness, 
impartiality, 
normativity, 
universality  
Self-interest, 
selfishness, 
partiality, 
particularity 
Collective 
State 
Private person 
Family 
Vs. 
Vs. 
Figure 2.7  General distinction and connection between gong and si 
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Si also has an abstract and ethical layer, denoting selfishness, self-interest, partiality, 
etc. Private person and family are two major embodiments of si (Figure 2.7). 
Because si is morally flawed, si embodiments are usually in a politically 
disadvantaged position especially when compared to the state that claims all the 
ethical superiority of gong. However, both family and private people can be linked to 
the gong side. For one thing, family and state are considered to share a homologous 
structure, which blurs the demarcation between gong and si. For another, the 
collective embodiment is an aggregation constituted by private persons, which also 
bridges the two parts (Figure 2.8). Even more, gong as the universal principle and 
moral law is connected to the perception and innate knowledge of private person, 
which linked the smallest unit of si to the highest, abstract dimension of gong. As a 
consequence of the private person‘s capability in judging whether something or 
some behaviour is consistent with the gong universal principle, the validity of any 
institutional organisation including the state can always be challenged. This forms a 
reversible relationship between the state and private person as gong and si 
embodiments. In history, it is not unusual to accuse the monarchy or government of 
falling into the private interests of some people, households or groups. In this 
moment, the collective of individuals can claim alternative authority as gong 
embodiments, such as peasant uprisings and revolutions (Figure 2.9).  
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families 
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State 
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Figure 2.8  relationship of gong and si embodiments: model 1 
(state and collective as gong embodiments; individual and family as si embodiments; 
state and family share homologous structure; collective is the aggregation of individuals) 
Figure 2.9  relationship of gong and si embodiments: model 2 
(state may fall into si; individuals have innate knowledge and value of gong) 
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To summarise, there are multiple understandings, tensions and connections between 
gong and si ideas: the abstract and moral meanings of gong and si are contradictory 
to each other; the state and collective as gong embodiments are given moral as well 
as political priority over family and individual as si embodiments; the state and 
family share the same structure while collective consists of individuals, which 
connect the two categories; individual‘s inner connection with normative value of 
gong and the possibility of the state falling into si render the moral relationship 
between the state, individual and collective unsettled and changeable. The 
complicated and intimate relationship among various gong and si embodiments and 
their competition for the normative gong are fundamentally political.  
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction   
The selection of research methods depends on the questions that the researcher aims 
to answer and the possible sources from which the data can be generated. 
Researchers‘ personal interests, values and preference also influence selection of 
research methods. 
Concerned with public control over urban land and the tension between public power 
and private interests, this thesis investigates concepts of Chinese gong-si  historically 
and, in particular, through two land nationalisation cases occurring in Beijing 
between the 1950s and 1970s. In order to achieve this, the research begins with a 
genealogy of gong and si ideas in Chinese history (chapter 2), and then the case 
studies (chapter 4 and 5). The empirical study focuses on the following questions:  (1) 
how the land ownership was nationalised and how the land use was shaped by the 
state in the two cases; (2) what politics between public power and private 
person/family, between different public and private bodies these cases reveal; (3) to 
what extent we can use the gong-si conceptual framework to make sense of the 
politics and discourses displayed in the two cases. 
In this chapter I will explain the selection for certain methods for this project and 
how I come to deploy them. Section 3.2 will discuss the genealogy method or history 
of ideas that I apply to trace the key concepts and the root, use and meanings of the 
terms. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 will then illustrate the approaches that I use in case 
studies for data collection and analyses, including archival study, in-depth interviews, 
etc.   
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the methods of the study and put the 
ontological and epistemological hypotheses and research process under scrutiny; it 
also helps me reflect my cultural and personal positionality in academic inquiries.   
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3.2 Exploring conceptual contexts 
3.2.1 History of ideas and genealogy  
While my concerns and interests are developed from my observation on what is 
going on in our own time, I believe we can gain more proper historical 
understanding of the importance of the issues and how they formed out of the past by 
investigating them in a broader temporal structure. For my research, it is the history 
of ideas or genealogical method that I use to build a historical, conceptual and 
linguistic background for the whole research; and it also hopefully enables me as 
well as readers to enter into a proper context to understand the case studies.  
In regard to the connection between history and present, Foucault, who provides 
perhaps the most significant examples on the genealogical method, remarks that his 
interest is not about ‗writing a history of the past in terms of the present‘, but 
‗writing the history of the present‘82.  Or we can formulate it into a Nietzschean 
question: how did we get here
83
? If I translate this into my own version, the 
questions would be: why is public power so immense and why do people feel that 
they cannot resist land expropriation that is justified by the name of gong, or by the 
discourse ‗for the purpose of public interests‘? How China can manage to maintain 
its special state-owned landownership system? How did we get here? As such, 
genealogy is used as a strategy or a tool to analyse issues identified as problematic in 
the present.  
On the issue that I am particularly concerned, gong and si are two interrelated terms 
and ideas frequently used in daily language, official reports and academic works. In 
order to comprehend what people mean by these two words, and to know how the 
understandings of them have affected practice and interacted with the reality, I 
investigated the evolution of the ideas of gong and si in Chapter 2.  
The ‗history of ideas‘ approach advocated by the Cambridge School, of which 
Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock are probably the most notable  figures,  
provides methodological principles and techniques that I can follow to study the 
                                                 
82
 Foucault, Michel, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of The Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan, New York: Vintage 
Books, 1995, p31. For an analysis on this, see Roth, ‘Foucault’s “History of the Present”’, History and Theory, vol. 
20, 1981, no.1. 
83
 Bartelson, Jens, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.73. 
47 
 
(political) ideas around gong and si
84
. Adopting the notion that we should read texts 
back into the contexts in which they were formed, I try to use the specific words and 
expressions in each historical period rather than those invented in later time, and in 
the meanwhile, the social contexts are taken into consideration to form more 
situational understanding. In short, I try to understand the present historically, and to 
read the concepts both textually and contextually
85
.   
Although gong and si are selected as the key terms to investigate, they cannot be 
seen as two words with well-defined meanings or two unit-ideas. Any concepts and 
ideas are woven into a larger, intricate net of meanings in relation to other ideas. For 
one thing, gong and si are not only used as single words but also combined with 
other characters to form compound words. For another, the usage and understanding 
of the two words are related to other ideas like state, family, individuals, etc. They 
are always used in specific social-political contexts, so the uses and understandings 
are changing over time. These facts increase the complexity of the meanings and 
connotations of gong and si, rendering them two conceptual constellations rather 
than two simple unit-ideas. Skinner disputes the influential thoughts of Arthur 
Lovejoy
86, a pioneer of ‗histories of idea‘ approach, and argues that Lovejoy‘s unit-
idea methodology-- that is, the intention to take the individual concept as a departure 
point-- implies an ideal type of the given doctrine which is presupposed immanent in 
history. From this perspective, ‗the history thus written becomes a history not of 
ideas at all, but of abstractions‘87. Bearing this in mind, I try to avoid presuming any 
‗essential meanings‘ of the two ‗concepts‘ of gong and si in abstraction but to study 
the use of them in different contexts first. It also resonates with the fact that early 
Chinese words with spatial implications were used initially to refer to very concrete 
things and more abstract ideas were later inventions. However, still I need to 
synthesize the use of them into several categories and summarise the ‗meanings‘ of 
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them. This does not mean that I believe there are stable, essential or coherent 
meanings of gong and si; instead, I attempt to show that the uses and understanding 
are complex, contradictory and open to changes and interpretations. I intend to 
demonstrate the multiple facets and rich layers of the meanings and implications of 
the two ideas. These sometimes contested meanings of gong and si emerged and 
evolved over time, but all of them, as the analysis in the case studies will show, have 
left their footprints on Chinese people‘s daily language and understandings 
nowadays.   
However, I must say that, I do not give a complete history of the two concepts, 
though it might be more beneficial. A complete history will become too large a 
project which itself can be the whole topic of the thesis, but the genealogy here is 
just the conceptual context of the research. As I cannot give a full account, I must 
choose the episodes in history or philosophical thoughts that are most crucial to the 
formation of our current understanding.  I have to acknowledge that my selection is 
somewhat arbitrary, as I placed large proportion of my original analysis on some 
very ancient texts. By ‗ancient texts‘ here I refer to the earliest available Chinese 
writing incised in animal bones and casted in bronzes dating from around 1300BC, 
the earliest poetry Book of Song (Shijing), a collection of songs between the 11
th
 to 
the 6
th
 century BC, and political thoughts formed during the Eastern Zhou period (c. 
770-221BC) , just before the centralised Qin unified the country. The last period is 
also known as the period of ‗Hundred Schools of Thought‘ and is considered as the 
Golden Age of Chinese philosophy, since a broad range of thoughts and ideas were 
developed and flourished based on free discussion. Many texts at that time heavily 
influenced the dominant Confucianism later on but the thoughts were more diverse 
and free than the latter. Compared with later scripts, the thoughts in the early ones, 
having not been over-developed or over-interpreted yet, are also more ‗plain‘, closer 
to the ‗natural‘ sense of people living in this culture. Like the Book of Song, a song 
book of which a large proportion is folk songs, many contents reflect more about 
normal people‘s understanding based on their daily knowledge and common sense in 
that specific social background rather than scholarly theorisation. This is what I want 
to reveal. And studying the graphic symbols in oracle bones and bronzes is an 
attempt to explore what these symbols initially referred to. Of course, as Foucault 
49 
 
has expressed, there is no really ‗origin‘ of words88. Yet these early meanings of 
words can be viewed like metaphors, evoking our comprehension of the thoughts 
around them later and now.  
For the following imperial era (i.e. AD 221-1911), I use more secondary literature to 
acquire a very concise account of the evolution of gong-si ideas, with a bit more 
stress on the transformation in the late Qing Dynasty when China and the West 
clashed militarily and intellectually. I give the examples and explanations of the new 
terms and ideas around gong and si by employing certain thoughts reflected in 
dominant orthodoxy and influential thinkers in history as well as some given 
conclusion from contemporary scholarship. This non-exhaustive method can be 
justified by the following reasons. First, the unchangeable orthodox status of 
Confucianism during imperial China in a way simplified the intellectual history. 
Second, genealogy can be exemplary. As Jens Bartelson puts it, relying on examples 
‗does not assume these examples to be transhistorically valid, since this necessarily 
would presuppose a cyclical recurrence of historical events or a cyclical concept of 
time, or both‘, but genealogy does ‗presuppose cyclical recurrence at the level of 
narrative time‘ 89 . What I want to show by the genealogy thus is about the 
accumulation and recurrence of various ideas around gong and si, even though some 
of them are conflicted with each other and some old orthodoxy seems to have 
collapsed.  Again, although I try to keep the coherence of my focus and intend to 
make plausible connections between different examples and ideas, I do not assume 
an ontological coherence inherent in the examples and ideas. Like my attitude to the 
‗roots‘ or the ‗original‘ meanings of the words, I recognise their evocative values for 
our thinking and reflection, but I will leave out the highly disputed normative 
implication of genealogy and etymology. 
As a result, the history or genealogy of the ideas of gong and si is not complete. It is 
also not a Foucauldian genealogy or knowledge archaeology either. One important 
reason is that gong and si, or even English ‗public‘ and ‗private‘, in spite of their 
richness in meaning and understanding, are not like concepts such as state, 
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sovereignty, subject, etc., which have been much better developed and constructed in 
philosophical thinking and political discourses. For those concepts, ideas and 
metastories that have been well-constructed, perhaps a history of the knowledge of 
them, in a Foucauldian sense, will be necessary: so we can proceed to question the 
seemingly timeless and unproblematic qualities
 
of the knowledge
90
. Yet a 
(meta)narrative around gong and si which can render them intellectually debatable 
has not been established. Maybe my efforts are the first step to bring them into the 
academic and intellectual vision. At this stage, I do not aim at discourse analysis on 
some statements and political thoughts in the genealogy, but at explaining the 
philosophical and historicographical backdrop against which I can address my 
academic concerns. However, I am not denying that language and power have 
intimate relationship. In fact gong is a good example reflecting this intimacy and 
discourse analysis will be used as an important tool in my case studies to scrutinize 
political statements as well as people‘s daily language. But in the genealogy part, it 
is not the focus and purpose.  
Another reason I do not fully develop a Foucauldian genealogy is the different 
assumption or inclination of a Chinese epistemology. With regard to the notions that 
everything is socially constructed and that our understanding and society are shaped 
by language, which in turn reflects power relationship. This can be ‗true‘ and I will 
not try to dispute this, but I would like to point out that these understandings are 
based on the particular intellectual trajectory of the ‗West‘ and perhaps also related 
to the more logical linguistic system of European languages. For Chinese
91
, whose 
ancestors directly pictured what they saw onto solid material as ‗text‘ and who 
believe there are universal principles which cannot be changed by human efforts or 
social construction, human‘s language is less powerful92. In fact there is no parallel 
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Chinese history of subject and subjectivity in accordance with what we know of 
Europe; therefore we just do not have that kind of targets to analyse or think 
critically, or we have not constructed a subject yet to reflect and analyse all these.  
Of course, methodologically, we can put all these Chinese thinking ways and 
thoughts under the scrutiny of Foucault‘s knowledge archaeology, and I believe that 
attempt can be proved fruitful. But again, this is neither the target of the research nor 
the means that I want to use in the research. What I intend to exhibit here is that 
certain methods and methodologies are based on particular ontological and 
epistemological assumptions that may not be shared by other cultures. I want to 
show that my research not only displays specific notions on the issues from a 
particular perspective by its content, but also shows a different thinking pattern by 
the methods that it adopts.  
3.2.2 Etymology and semiotics  
My analysis on the earliest scripts focuses not only on the use of the words but also 
on the writing forms of the characters. Etymology and semiotics are employed to 
study the signs and symbols of the key words. Besides gong and si which have been 
studied in Chapter 2, etymological and semiotic analysis will also be applied on 
other important characters/words such as state (guo 国), family (jia 家), politics 
(zheng 政 ), square (chang 场 ), etc. in the following chapters. Etymology does 
suppose an ‗origin‘ of a word although not necessarily in a temporal sense. Here in a 
way I agree with the theory from Martin Heidegger, who believes that we can reveal 
the concealed meanings of words (rather than the past) through etymology
93
. 
Different from the position of Foucault‘s discourse analysis and the Cambridge 
School‘s history of ideas, which doubts an essence of a concept, Heidegger‘s etymon 
is immanent in terms of linguistics. The root of a word may have been concealed by 
our practical, political even philosophical use of the word, but it still exists
94
. To 
Nietzsche, a world of symbols is distinguished from a world of things, and the word 
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masks, kills things; but to Heidegger, the word maintains, evokes and yields things
95
.  
The Chinese language, as I have shown, is significant in its graphic characters. Many 
of them were invented directly to portray a thing or an idea. In this sense, the word 
or language is considered to be linked to the thing and to reveal the thing. When 
people put two or more characters together to form a new word to refer to something 
new or a concept introduced from other languages, the ‗original‘ meanings and 
connotations of the characters do matter. Besides, traditional Chinese philosophy 
does not particularly separate subject from object, word from thing, human from 
nature or essence from phenomenon. Adopting the etymology and semiotics methods, 
therefore, highly depends on the characteristics of Chinese language (and of course, 
also on my personal interest). Just like the depth and transparency of the German 
language and the fact that the feeling for word-roots (radicals, suffixes, etc.) is 
stronger in German than other modern languages (e.g. French), as noted by 
Saussure
96, may contribute to Heidegger‘s etymological method.  
To summarise, given the features of Chinese language and philosophy, I would say 
certain Chinese words are very suitable for etymological and semiotic analysis, but I 
will not try to ontologise the roots or symbols of the words that I study; rather, I keep 
them as starting points to leave and keep the evocative value of them in a 
metaphorical and methodological dimension.  
3.3 Case studies 
3.3.1 Case selection and the focus 
The conceptual paradigm given at the end of chapter 2 is a preliminary and general 
framing of the understanding of the two concepts. This paradigm is about to be 
evaluated, revised and enriched in empirical studies. Here I would like to clarify the 
relationship between the cases and prior theoretical assumptions.  
The core status of gong-si ideas in the research is not because I ‗selected‘ them from 
existing theoretical assumption; it is more the case that they emerged from everyday 
language, from my cases, from the lines of the government reports and the words of 
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my interviewees. I value the richness of daily language more than philosophical texts. 
That is also why I put more efforts on the analysis of the Book of song, a collection 
of folk songs and court songs, than other classics specifically on political thoughts in 
the genealogy part. The genealogy is an attempt to dig into the meanings, 
implications and historical formation of the words and ideas involved in their current 
use and understandings. Concepts, having been extracted from empirical evidence 
and investigated in a more abstract and theoretical level to form a conceptual 
framework now need to return to empirical world, where the vagueness and 
ambiguities in theory can be better understood through case studies.  
I have two case study sites: Tiananmen Square and the Bell and Drum Towers area. I 
choose them for the following reasons. First of all, I planned to choose two different 
types of space to examine public-private/gong-si relations in both spatial and 
political dimensions. The Tiananmen Square area perhaps is the most remarkable for 
its gong or ‗public‘ status: a former palace square with the imperial central 
administrative quarter and a market place nearby, now a magnificent city square and 
a symbolic space of the nation. In contrast, Bell and Drum Towers area is a long-
established ‗ordinary‘ residential neighbourhood filled with courtyard houses, 
winding lanes and some dotted common space. Secondly, both sites are political. It 
is indisputable that Tiananmen Square is probably the most politically sensitive 
space in China, and will of course be familiar to readers outside China. Less well 
known is the Bell and Drum Towers area: here, an on-going regeneration scheme 
situates it within more locally-scaled public debates. That is also the accidental 
chance for me to notice its richness and suitability to be a case, and the fieldwork 
proved that not only it was an interesting place to study but also it was a right time to 
enter into the site and engage intellectually. Another reason is the availability of the 
data sources. Many archives of Tiananmen Square were opened to public access 
several years ago. And there were still many residents who had witnessed (or at least 
heard from their parents) the historical events discussed in this research living in the 
Bell and Drum Towers neighbourhood when I did my fieldwork. It was perhaps one 
final chance to ask them for the details of the events, their life history and their 
opinions, as most of them were elderly and the neighbourhood was going to be 
demolished. I do feel I have the responsibility to record something about the people 
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and the place. In fact, it is worth noting that, as I write this chapter, the 
neighbourhood is being destroyed.  
Besides the sites, I also need to choose my time focus. I deliberately try to distance 
my research from the present.  It is partially because of my interest in history, 
partially involving an attempt to defamiliarise the phenomena and understandings 
that now are usually taken for granted. I am most concerned with the myth of public 
power and the idea of gong, and the communist era is the climax of the superiority of 
gong idea in all its important dimensions: gong as the state, collective and moral 
principles. It is also the furthest time from now about which we can still get 
knowledge from living people. The gap in current academic interrogation is another 
consideration. There have been a range of works on China and Chinese cities 
focusing on the last three decades during which a dramatic process of modernisation, 
urbanisation and privatisation has occurred; perhaps there has even a process of 
neoliberalisation
97
. These works raise many issues that cannot be totally understood 
by merely focusing on the current time. Some confusions, doubts and contradictions 
must be put in a broader temporal context, thus historical investigation is required. 
For the reasons above, I choose the period between 1949, the founding of the 
People‘s Republic of China, and 1979, the year when the economic reform started, as 
my empirical focus.   
In spite of a further and detailed investigation on the same issues, the aim of the case 
studies differs from the genealogy. As we have seen, Gong-si concepts and their 
relationship are complex and multifaceted. One attempt of the case studies is to 
ground it onto something solid. I finally chose land, or more precisely, 
landownership. The boundaries of gong and si are unclear, but the boundaries of land 
and landownership are, at least in principle, supposed to be clearly defined. In this 
sense they are helpful to fix the floating, suspended concepts of gong and si. The 
questions of the case studies then become how the landownership of the two sites 
changed from si to gong, or from private ownership (siyouzhi) to public ownership 
(gongyouzhi).  At the same time, the aspatial, political dimension is also critical: how 
different bodies of gong and si (i.e. the state, city government, collective in the gong 
side; household, individuals in the si side) enable the change and react to the change, 
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how they conflict with each other, and how they strategically utilise gong, si 
discourse. 
3.3.2 Archival study  
The characteristics of the two cases result in different methods for data collection 
and analysis. For the Tiananmen Square case, archival work is the most important 
approach to get the data, with newspapers, magazines, secondary literature and other 
visual material as complements.  
During my fieldwork in Beijing from November 2012 to April 2013, I visited 
Beijing Municipal Archives to collect all possible information for the extension of 
Tiananmen Square in the 1950s. Available sources include: records on the decision 
of the project, the planning documents, reports on the construction progress, reports 
from the city mayor to the central leaders, the texts of the motivating speeches 
addressed to the local residents whose houses were to be demolished, the reports of 
the investigations on the complaints from ‗the masses‘, visual materials like photos, 
maps, plans, etc. 
Besides those records on the extension of the square, there are other official records 
helping me know more about the administration and control over the square, such as 
the records on the big ceremonies happening in the square, the report on the cleaning 
work of the square and the police records on crimes happening in the area and so on. 
The governmental documents beyond the geographical and temporal focus of this 
case also provide rich information about the operation, administration and changes of 
the city. The information from these official documents, together with other 
secondary literature, helps the historical account of Beijing in an earlier period in 
Chapter 4. In addition, records on the Socialist Transition in the industrial sectors 
(changing the private industry into public-private joint ownership), although lacking 
of records of cases in the Bell and Drum Towers area (perhaps the changes of those 
household factories were too small to be recorded), are also very useful for me to 
gain an impression on the political atmosphere and people‘s mentality at that time. 
This helps me understand and analyse the testimony from the interviewees in the 
Bell and Drum Towers case. 
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There are advantages of utilising archival study on the Tiananmen Square case. As 
the information in the records is not influenced by the fact that these sources will be 
used for research, the discourse of the government and their specific perspectives are 
very evident, which is an advantage for me to know the views and rhetoric of the 
government. However, I am also aware that the records may ‗conceal as much as 
they reveal‘98, especially on such a politically sensitive area. It is a pity that I could 
not find any people who were evicted from the area 60 years ago, which makes 
cross-checking the information from the side of the residents impossible.  
Data analysis starts simultaneously with data collection rather than after it. In the 
process of reading the records, I have done both coding and analysis. I paid attention 
to the rhetorical organisation, discourses and ideologies reflected in the official 
documents
99
. I asked the following questions: to whom were the texts addressed? 
And how did this influenced their choice about what to record and what to erase? 
What kind of reality did these texts intend to construct? What definable discourses -- 
especially those around gong, si, state, private family and person -- did the texts 
affirm? How did the authority utilise these discourses to justify their behaviours? 
Were the discourses used in these official documents contested with the versions in 
an earlier time or from other actors? How did the authority deal with them? What 
power relations does the material reflect and reveal?  And if I synthesise other 
sources, including the more ‗private‘ narratives from the other case, what kind of 
conclusion on gong-si relationship can we generate?  
For Tiananmen Square, due to the availability of the source, the case is more like a 
story about a ‗public‘ space based on written, official sources. However, the lack of a 
perspective ‗from below‘, from private, ordinary people can be complemented by the 
other case of the Bell and Drum Towers area.  
3.3.3 In-depth interviews  
Very different from the archival study in the Tiananmen case, in-depth interviews 
are used as the major approach in the case of Bell and Drum Towers.  
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In the winter of 2012, I participated in a survey aiming to collect basic information 
of the residents living in the neighbourhood with other members of an activist group 
called ‗Bell and Drum Towers Area Focus Team‘ (Zhonggulou Pianerqu Guanzhu 
Tuandui). Engaging in the survey and writing the report for the group provided me 
with a preliminary impression on the precinct and offered me some basic knowledge 
about the composition of the population. Our frequent presence in the neighbourhood 
and shared concerns with the regeneration project also helped me build contact and 
trust with the residents. In the spring of 2013, I did in-depth interview on 19 people 
from 6 households, focusing on the stories of their lives, families and property. Most 
of the interviews were semi-structured with a few exceptions using a more 
unstructured approach. These people either participated or witnessed the big 
movements occurring from the 1950s to the 1970s. To avoid unnecessary guidance 
for the interviewees, I did not directly ask questions about their memories of a 
particular event, but let them freely talk about their life experience and saw what 
kind of experience and time structure emerged from their narrative. I visited the 
neighbourhood at least three times per week, and usually stayed there the whole day 
(from 10am to 6pm)
100
, so I had lots of chances to revisit the interviewees and to ask 
more questions. After I returned to the UK and found confusion when doing analysis 
and writing up, colleagues in Beijing followed up further interviews.  
The neighbourhood was not experiencing normal circumstances when I did the 
fieldwork. The local authority Dongcheng Government (literally East District 
Government) had just initiated a regeneration project in the area at that time, a 
consequence of which was that the residents were urged to move out. The first 
deadline to have the reward of the compensation (150,000RMB, about 15,000 
pounds) was the Chinese New Year in February 2013. The personnel of the 
Demolition and Relocation Office motivated the residents from one household to 
another. As the compensation for each meter square and the measure of the area of 
the properties were not transparent, the residents, especially those retired, 
unemployed and self-employed came to the squares, one between the two towers and 
the other north to the Bell Tower, to chat and exchange information. Yet because the 
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contracts between the government and property owners had ‗confidential‘ 
restrictions, the owners could not tell others of the offer that they got. In fact in most 
occasions they did not want to let other people know. This may be because of the 
purported corruption: people who knew or bribed someone working in the 
government gained higher compensation. Thus the atmosphere was somewhat 
strange. People chatted outdoor in below freezing temperatures in the winter, 
exchanging information and rumours, but were still hesitant to talk about their own 
situations or to ask other people‘s.   
In this context, people were sensitive about the questions related to their properties, 
especially after 12 CCTV cameras were installed by the local government around the 
two squares in January 2013. Even in normal time, topics around property and 
ownership are sensitive. This is partly because the ownership of the properties in this 
area is highly complicated and controversial. As I will explain in more detail in 
Chapter 5, many people got their houses from the government or from the previous 
owners in the political movements (e.g. The Cultural Revolution) that caused during 
the second half of the last century. And in this sense, not least, the legitimacy of their 
occupation and possession is highly disputable. For some other people, the shadow 
of history is generated from the fact that they lost their property, and sometimes 
family members, just because they were ‗private owners‘ (sifangzhu). How can we 
expect people experiencing this to talk about their ‗true‘ or genuine opinions on 
property and on the state even though several decades have passed? Also this area 
has a very high proportion of ‗self-constructed buildings‘ (zijianfang)101, the legal 
status of which had not been recognised by the government. They were also the most 
controversial type of property in regard to the compensation caused by the 
regeneration project. For the reasons described above people were not always willing 
to talk about their history or answer questions about their properties.  
Nonetheless, it was possible for me to gain some degree trust from some residents, 
and they accepted requests to my interview them. Although I tried my best to elicit 
their words by unobtrusive and nondirective manners
102
, I realise that the sampling 
cannot avoid being problematic to some degree: Isn‘t there any bias if we just get the 
information and opinions from those who are willing to tell? How can we know what 
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has happened to those who are reluctant to speak out their stories? As Paul 
Thompson has stressed, the self-selected group cannot be fully representative of a 
community
103
. I can, to some degree, fill the information gap by putting together the 
fragmented stories that I heard from other people and that I read from literature to 
form a more complete picture, but I am fully aware that, the cases which I have 
gathered and (re)presented in the thesis are not wholly representative, and these 
individual experiences and the process described by the interviewees may not even 
be typical
104
. 
In acknowledging all these shortcomings, though, the individual and family stories 
are still valuable; their storytelling and explanation about the events, and the 
perspectives and discourses reflected from their words are helpfulin understanding 
the complexity of the ‗facts‘ and opinions105. Furthermore, the story of the Bell and 
Drum Towers area based on the data acquired from interviews is a complement to 
the Tiananmen story that is mainly based on official documents. Somewhat like oral 
history, ‗the interviewing of eye-witness participants in the events of the past for the 
purposes of historical reconstruction‘106, my in-depth interviews attempt to dealt 
with the big events happening in the second half of the twentieth century from the 
lens of normal people‘s everyday life. In fact in many other countries, the second 
half of the twentieth century has already seen a worldwide revival of oral history or 
everyday history. Many of them fill in the gaps of the history: for instance, the 
stories of the survivors of the Nazi regime in Germany, the witnesses of the Stalin 
period in Russia and the participants of the Algerian war in France
107
; Others aimed 
to discover the stories from the ordinary, the subaltern, those ‗hidden from 
history‘108, to build more democratic history109. China even has a much greater gap 
in the reconstruction and representation of the history of the eventful 20
th
 century. 
How to narrate the wars, revolutions and political movements is associated to the 
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strength of the ruling party and government, which renders it never a free field to be 
investigated or discussed. In fact, government organising the compilation and 
writing of history is a practice with long history in China
110
. With this tradition and 
the dominant Marxist perspective on history, historical accounts are highly filtered 
and ideological after 1949. All narrative and interpretation of any historical events 
must be ‗politically right‘. After the Tiananmen Event in 1989, some sensitive events 
and topics are even forbidden to be discussed in the mass media or in academic field, 
which has muted more history.   
However, people never give up writing their history. A genre mixing with history 
with literature emerged in the late 1970s and became popular in China during the 
1980s and 1990s.  These works contain the memory of personal experiences of 
writers, including those of sensitive political events
111
; but at the same time they did 
not exclude fictional elements. Although usually categorised as literature, they can 
be viewed as a special type of historical accounts within a particular political 
atmosphere. I use this type of literature for reference in several places in my research. 
There is also non autobiographical oral history from the late 1980s, the themes of 
which range from the old cadres‘ memory of the former top leaders such as Mao, to 
the Memoirs of famous scholars, to the ordinary people‘s stories of their suffering in 
the political movements
112
. But they are all literature works rather than academic. 
Only at the turn of the new century can an increasing interest be identified in 
academia, especially when the historians and social scientists realise that it is the last 
chance to interview those eye-witness participants of some important events such as 
the Second Sino-Japanese War (most commonly known as the War of Resistance 
Against Japan in Chinese) between 1937 and 1945, the civil war between 1945 and 
1950 and the land reformation in the 1950s.  It is an effort to save private memories, 
which are a part of the national history, to build more detailed accounts of some 
events and to know more diverse perspectives of understanding and interpretation of 
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certain history
113
.  In this sense, in spite of the non-representative sampling, my 
historical study on the landownership transfer based on the stories of some people 
and their families is still useful in revealing the personal and household history in the 
Bell and Drum Towers area, which can help portray the neighbourhood, the city and 
even the country over a transformative period.   
3.3.4 Analysis and interpretation 
In terms of dealing with the data from the interviews and analysing the land politics 
of the Bell and Drum Towers area, I pay attention to the following issues: how 
people‘s understanding on some key concepts are distinguished but at the same time 
influenced by official explanation or dominant ideology; the inconsistency between 
people‘s verbal expression and their practice; different people‘s alternative 
conceptualisations of their understanding and behaviours.  
For the first concern, the words, narratives and interpretation from private person 
form a complementary and also a comparative perspective to the official one 
reflected in the documentary records of the Tiananmen Square case. In coding the 
transcripts, I paid special attention to the words and ideas used by the informants 
associated with gong, si and their embodiments such as state, family, state-owned 
property, private property, etc. By making their discourses recognisable, I tried to 
comprehend not only the specific understanding on particular things from each 
person, but also the connection between the private understanding and the dominate 
ideology. As Luisa Passerini has stressed, it is facile and complacent to think the 
oppressed can be easily made to ‗speak for themselves‘, because people‘s memories 
can be influenced by dominant history
114
. Indeed, in the Bell and Drum Towers case, 
I find that interviewees provide rich details of what has happened, but their wording 
is highly influenced by official statements. Therefore, the private narrative, on the 
one hand, forms a different and sometimes conflicting story to the meta-story 
propagandised by the state, but on the other, is also a part of the hegemonic ideology.  
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The connection and distinction between ideology/discourse, cognition/‗true‘ opinion 
and behaviour are also meaningful. People who grew up or experienced the 
communist era often use some expressions typical in that age. Undeniably, the 
dominate ideology not only affects their thinking but also their behaviours. For 
instance, there are cases like people donating their properties to the state voluntarily. 
It is very difficult to understand the motivation and logic of this behaviour merely 
from the perspective on property or on state-individual relationship in our age. Only 
when we put the behaviours back to its historical background and see the 
interviewees as bearers of a specific culture of a time, can these ‗abnormal‘ 
behaviours be comprehend
115
. People‘s understanding of certain ideas and their own 
behaviours in the past is dynamic too. The interviewees have their own vision of the 
past and they rationalise their behaviours by popular or their own discourses but not 
always in a consistent way. In this case, I do not try to find out a true or coherent 
meaning of the interviewees‘ understanding but try to reveal the ambiguity of 
discourses and ideas and thus figure out how people utilise them strategically in a 
given condition. In addition, the ‗conversational narrative‘ produced in the 
interviews has a ‗performative‘ aspect116, which also requires awareness and analysis. 
Especially when the regeneration project was on-going and the neighbourhood 
attracted lots of attention from the outside, the interviewees‘ had their own interests 
to safeguard and fight for; thus their answers to my questions, even to those more 
about history, could be rhetorical, performative and perhaps even strategic. For 
example, sometimes the interviewee used a discourse similar to the one advocated by 
the government but his or her actual practice might be opposite. In this case, I need 
to carefully study what they did in certain circumstance rather than just what they 
said. One target of the interview process and analysis work is to reveal the 
contradictions between dominate ideology and other discourses, between testimony 
and practice.  
The status of the 6 households and 19 people who participated in the interviews is 
also different. The varieties of visions on the historical events and gong-si ideas 
reflected by different people, especially according to the status of house ownership, 
are also a focus of the analysis. As the political movements affected different 
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families to different degrees, I do not give a full account of the story of each family 
covering all the studied periods; instead, I select a main case study household in each 
period which I think has the richest information to reconstruct a version of the 
historical picture of that time, but at the same time I use the cases of other 
households as a complementary account.   
Because the household is designed as the unit to describe the situation of the Bell 
and Drum Towers area, my analysis and interpretation, although very much based on 
the information provided by individual informants, may not give much emphasis on 
the distinction of family members in different status within a family. For example, in 
the representation of the Bell and Drum Towers case, I formulate the time in a way 
similar to the Tiananmen case: dividing the period into four by the significant events. 
This narrative structure is a ‗masculine‘ one I would say. I find the time perception 
and structuring of female interviewees are different. Female interviewees tend to 
describe time as: when I get married, when I had (sometimes lost) my second baby; 
it should be 1962 because it‘s the year I had a big operation on my stomach; etc.117. 
However, for convenience and to form a coherent narrative style with the Tiananmen 
case, I do not choose a particular feminist pattern, although it can be very interesting 
and fruitful especially in studying public-private relationship; rather, I use the more 
official, masculine and also roughly the preconceived one to formulate the time, 
events and accounts. In a similar way, I use both men and women‘s testimonies to 
reconstruct people‘s conceptualisation and interpretation on some concepts; the 
particular understanding from the perspective of particular genders is important, but 
it is not the concern in this thesis.  
3.4 Other methods and ‘spatial analysis’ 
Apart from the sources and methods illustrated above, I also utilise secondary 
literature, articles in newspaper and magazines, blogs and other internet sources, and 
visual evidence to form a clearer vision on my research objects.  
As a human geographer, I pay particular attention to the spatial dimension of both 
thoughts and reality. Spatial observation and analysis is important in both cases. In 
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the case of Tiananmen Square, historical changes of the landscape of the square will 
be reviewed, from which we can see how gong space changed according to specific 
political, social and cultural backgrounds of the society. For the case of the Bell and 
Drum Towers area, I will illustrate the plans of the ownership and occupation in 
courtyard dwelling units to help with the analysis of the relationship between 
different property holders. In fact, standing in their courtyards, it is not difficult to 
tell the age, condition and builder of the houses (those built by the government are in 
a uniform style); details of how different families utilise, enclose and thereby 
‗privatise‘ the common space tells not only the tension between common interests 
and private interests, but also the conflicts between different private actors.  
As has been already illustrated in the genealogy part, spatial features of Chinese 
characters are significant. The writing forms of the characters reflect the spatial 
characteristics of the things that these words initially refer to. Besides gong and si, 
the symbols of state (guo,国), city (cheng, 城), household (jia, 家), domestic (shi, 
室), land (di, 地), field (tian, 田), square (chang, 场), space (kong, 空), time (shi, 时), 
all of which imply specific spaces, will be examined. Conversely, the real space 
formed in reality also reflects the ideas. For instance, the relevant gong or si space 
and buildings, such as square, palace, official building, market place, temple, 
household, etc. reveal the people‘s idea and understanding of gong and si. This kind 
of discussion will be given along with the two case studies. Space here is used as an 
analytical perspective to bridge the concepts, the abstract and the reality, the concrete.  
Space can also connect the past and the present and at the same time reveal the 
transformation. The historical evolution of related spaces can be seen as changing 
spatial representation of certain ideas in a time. The analysis of the changes of the 
space of Beijing city and Tiananmen Square will show this. Moreover, the spatial 
experience also reshapes people‘s understanding and conceptualisation. For example, 
we will see in Chapter 4 how the spatial transformation of the city of Beijing has 
changed people‘s understanding of the object and idea of ‗city‘, and of the relations 
between state, city and household, etc. 
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Chapter 4    Case Study I:  
Spatial and Political Transformation in the Birth and 
Expansion of Tiananmen Square 
I have two empirical cases: Tiananmen Square and Bell and Drum Towers area. This 
chapter explores the spatial politics of the birth and expansion of Tiananmen Square 
and the gong-si tension by prioritising the view of gong. Section 4.1 introduces 
Beijing as the case study city through an account of its spatial characteristics, 
especially its peculiarity in terms of urban public space. This section forms the 
historical and geographical background for the understanding of both empirical cases. 
Section 4.2 looks at the historical geography of the Tiananmen area before it 
transformed into Tiananmen Square. I argue that it was a typical place of gong. This 
can be seen from its status as a royal square attached to the Palace City, its 
ceremonial use and the surrounding administrative quarter. But all these state-
related-gong features of the place were complicated by the symbolic presence of 
collective people, another type of gong, and the exceptional location of the market 
place nearby, the activities of which are usually excluded from gong category. 
Section 4.3 is about the birth of Tiananmen Square. The administrative 
characteristics of Beijing in both late imperial and republican periods are introduced, 
with an emphasis on the emergence of the city as an important governmental scale, 
and in effect therefore, a new embodiment of gong during the republican era. This 
process also sees a transformation of people‘s understanding of politics and the 
political as well as a shift towards popular political practice. Section 4.4 investigates 
the expansion of Tiananmen Square in the 1950s under the communist regime and 
ideology based on the data gathered from archival work; it discusses how the case 
reflects the party-state‘s triumph over the city, gong over si, and the proliferation of 
intimacies and tensions between the state and private people. Etymology and 
semiotics are deployed as important approaches to ground the analysis of the case 
onto its linguistic and cultural contexts. Key terms like city (cheng), state (guo), 
politics (zhengzhi), political (zhengzhide), etc. are examined to enrich the conceptual 
grid of the research and also deepen the comprehension of the ideas around gong and 
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si. A more concrete conceptual framework of gong-si based on this case study will 
be provided at the end of the chapter.  
4.1 Spatial characteristics of Beijing City: a city without 
public space? 
Since Kublai Khan made Beijing (Dadu or Khanbaliq at that time) the capital of the 
Mongol-led Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368), Beijing has served as the seat of power for 
the Ming Dynasty (1421–1644), the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), the early Republic 
of China (1912–1928) and now the People's Republic of China (1949–present) (for 
the change of the city boundaries see Figure 4.1). The basic spatial structure of the 
Beijing city that we see today was constructed in the Yuan Dynasty and extended 
and enhanced in the Ming.  
As the capital of the empire, the plan of Beijing was based on the prescriptions of 
‗kaogongji‘ (Record of Trades) in Zhou Li (Rites of Zhou), an Eastern Zhou (770-
221BC) text describing the activities of various craftsmen, including builders. Here 
is the famous passage about the principles of building an imperial city: 
The craftsmen (jiangren) construct the state capital (guo)
118
. 
They make a square nine li
119
 on each side; each side has three 
gates. Within the capital are nine
120
 north-south and nine east-
west streets. The north-south streets are nine carriage tracks in 
width. On the left (as one faces south, or to the east) is the 
Ancestral Temple, and to the right (west) are the Altar of Soil 
and Grain (i.e. Altar of the State
121
). In the front is the Hall of 
the King (chao, or State Court) and behind the market place.
122
 
Beijing is the Chinese city built closest to the orthodox model of a capital in Zhou 
Li
123
: the grid of the city roads, the arrangement of gates
124
, and the designated 
                                                 
118
 Guo is the word for the feudal states and the kingdom in the old time. Here guo is used to refer to the capital 
of the state and we can see the construction of the capital was considered as great importance for the country. 
119
 1 li = 500 meters. 
120
 Nine is a number symbolising royalty in China.    
121
 Soil and grain (sheji, 社稷) was a term for the state in many East Asia countries such as China, Japan and 
Korea. 
122
 ‘Kaogongji’ (Record of Trades), in Zhou Li (Rites of Zhou), quoted from Steinhardt, Nancy S. , Chinese imperial 
city planning. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990, p33, with minor changes  
123
 The model of a capital city is also considered as the paradigm of normal cities. 
67 
 
location of the palace, temples and market places were built nearly identical to those 
described in the book. Figure 4.2 is drawn on the Google-earth map of Beijing city 
today and its connection with the guidance from Zhou Li still can be easily observed.  
 
 
Figure 4.1  Sites and Sizes of Beijing City in Different Dynasties (source: based 
on Hou, Renzhi, 1979) 
 
The most striking feature of the old Beijing city was that it contained a concentric set 
of three walled cities, each enclosing the other: the Outer City surrounded the 
Imperial city, which itself contained the Forbidden City (also called the Palace City) 
(Figure 4.2). It is crucial to recognise that, notwithstanding a grand and integrated 
spatial structure of the plan, there was no ‗public‘ space in a western sense (such as a 
classic plaza or a signature square) designed or built in the traditional city
125
. To be 
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more precise, first of all, most of the big open-air spaces in the built area were 
located within the central Palace (and notably ‗Forbidden‘) City. There were big 
court yards in the Palace area where the emperor worked with his ministers and 
resided with the royal family. Many important rites and events (such as coronation 
ceremonies and final national civil servant examinations) occurred in certain yards 
but they were in no way open to the larger public. On the contrary, just as the name 
of the Palace City suggested, it was a ‗forbidden‘ city, where the commoners were 
strictly restrained from entering. Some scholars such as Victor Sit
126
 believes that 
locating the Royal Palace in the central area of the city was based on the model of 
mingtang (明堂, literally ‗a bright hall‘), the prototype of the temple for ancestral 
worship; mingtang was also called gong (宫), a homophone and a suggested origin 
of the gong (公) meaning ‗public‘. The model (a group of buildings in the centre 
with big yard around) was adopted not only for temples, but also for the royal palace 
and then the whole city. This notion has been supported by archaeological findings. 
It is easy to associate it to the etymology of gong (公)：in oracle bone scripts gong 
(公) usually appeared with its homophone gong (宫)  to refer to the dwelling or 
temple of the tribe leader. The temple and yard of gong were also the places where 
community ceremonies occurred. We can imagine that with historic development, 
the functions for ancestral worship, communal ceremonies, government affairs and 
royal accommodation gradually separated from each other and settled in different 
places of the (capital) city. As a consequence, the gong‘s hall that used to treat 
common people and the gong‘s yard where commoners could dance became just 
history (see 2.2.1). Even though common people were banished from the Forbidden 
City, it did not deny that in ‗origin‘ as well as in people‘s mind, the imperial palace, 
including the buildings and the authority that it symbolised, was placed in a gong 
position and was expected to promote  the well-being of people and keep the country 
in peace. The late Qing Empire was considered to have lost its mandate from Heaven, 
one consequence of which was that an important palace yard was (re)claimed by the 
people and transformed into the famous Tiananmen Square in the 1920s.  This 
transformation will be elaborated in the following two sections.   
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Figure 4.2  Beijing: a capital city designed under the guidance of Zhou Li
127
 
(source: drawn by the author based on Google earth map) 
 
Another spatial characteristic of Beijing that I want to highlight relates to its spaces 
for common activities. There were altars and temples particularly for the natural 
gods and the common ancestors of the nation (Figure 4.2), but only the royal family 
could access them. Of course, there were other temples for civilians and in fact these 
temples played a key role in people‘s social and private life. Daily worship, common 
ceremonies and regular fairs were held in and around these temples. Yet usually 
people only appeared collectively in these places for rites (including secular festivals) 
rather than political activities. In the ‗republican‘ understanding of public described 
by Jeff Weinbtraub
128
, the political importance of collectivity is signified by the 
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active participation of people in collective decision making. In this sense, as Hannah 
Arendt
129
 suggests, the public space/realm is a field of action, and politics is citizens‘ 
participation in the process of conscious collective self-determination. But in the 
case of Beijing, the importance of collectivity is connected to its quantity, to the 
notion that a collective is larger and has broader interests than those of private 
individuals and smaller groups. It does not create another quality like collective self-
determination. The aggregation and presence of people do display the collectivity 
and field of gong,  but these happen symbolically and ritually,  and do not 
necessarily lead to real participation and political actions. The ‗non-political‘ trait of 
Chinese collectivity and of the ways that ritual performance and symbolic 
participation have influenced urban space and people‘s understanding of ‗the 
political‘ will be further discussed in the two empirical cases. 
Besides temples, the market places offered another space for common life. However, 
during most of the imperial era, the locations of market places were designated and 
their opening time was strictly regulated by law. In the beginning, these trading 
places were enclosed by walls but this system did not last long. The regulation of the 
market places varied from one period to another, but neither a free market place in 
practice nor a free market in ideology ever existed. Even after commercial activities 
broke the restraint of the designated area and spread to broader streets, no space like 
a public square ever formed in the city.  
The last category to be analysed in comparison with the western public space is the 
tea house. Public tea houses emerged in the late Qing Dynasty and often served as a 
centre of social interaction. Beijing was particularly famous for its lively tea house 
culture from the beginning of the twentieth century. People gathered at the tea 
houses to enjoy tea and food, watch performances, chat, meet friends and socialise. 
But somewhat strangely, and very differently from the cafes and public houses in 
European countries
130
, people in Chinese tea houses rarely engaged in conversation 
on political topics, not to mention criticizing politics and inspiring revolutionary 
thoughts. In Lao She‘s well-known play Tea House131, it was the stereotype of the 
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tea house in early twentieth century Beijing to have a sign on the wall, saying ‗Do 
not talk about state affairs‘ (motan guoshi, 莫谈国事). Here, ‗state affairs‘ were 
considered as typically political topics. State affairs of course were related to the idea 
of sovereignty, but the stress here was not that the state apparatus, or the public 
power, granted and guaranteed rights to citizens, like the understanding inherited 
from the Roman law. It seems the Chinese politics as state affairs was about its scale: 
in or beyond a national scale. It also said ‗do not talk‘. I have explained that political 
actions were absent in the collective presence of people in traditional Chinese cities. 
Here political speech and discussion were discouraged and even banned in the tea 
house. We can say that the talking was forbidden means it is political. However, this 
is an interpretation from a particular western perspective. In Chinese thoughts, 
speech and discussion were not theorised as ‗political‘, and speaking was not viewed 
as something of great importance. We can imagine that the eclipse and humiliation 
experienced by the country (especially its failure to gain respect in international 
dialogue) from the mid-nineteenth century have contributed to people‘s 
disinclination to talk about public affairs and therefore kept political discussion away 
from the tea house. But this aversion to political discussion and the absence of public 
speech can also be read as particularity of the Chinese presumptions on the nature of 
human being. Heidegger understands Aristotle‘s definition of the human as the zoon 
ekhon logon
132
, commonly translated as the ‗political animal‘, or the being that 
speaks. From this point of view, speech, or discourse is central to people‘s approach 
to living together, to engaging in a political community
133
. This notion is absolutely 
alien to the Chinese tradition. In a Chinese version, only the sages speak, and the 
purpose of their speech is to reveal the mystery of the world; the words of the sages 
bridge the mysterious ‗nature‘ and the common people. Moreover, according to 
Laozi, the Dao (also as Tao), that is, the ultimate truth of the universe or the 
underlying principle of the world, is nameless and unspeakable, and is distinguished 
from all the named things
134
.  
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This difference can also be detected from the languages: European words are spelled 
on the basis of their phonetic characteristics and the expressions are more reliant on 
‗artificial‘ grammar, whilst Chinese convey meanings more via the written forms of 
the characters, and the expression is less reliant on grammar. For Aristotle in 
Heidegger‘s translation, the phone semantike, that is the logos, is particular to human, 
and voice and speech are magic talents to distinguish human being from animals and 
make them powerful
135
. Yet for Chinese people, pictographs (re)build the connection 
between human beings and the world/nature to be referred, rather than split the two; 
but at the same time, words and speech have their limits, and to some extent they 
separate human from the ultimate truth which is supposed to be more possibly 
approached by perception, intuition and living. Therefore, theoretically, normal 
people‘s speech and discussion is not something of great importance, is not the core 
or manifestation of the political. State affairs as politics are top-down arrangements, 
which discourage public participation and engagement either verbally or bodily. This 
places a different foundation for Chinese understanding of politics and their practice 
of political space. 
Apparently, the lesser stress on speech and verbal communication in the Chinese 
(political) tradition has a big impact on the types of ‗public space‘ of the cities. From 
the case of Beijing, we have seen that there was no public square where people could 
give speeches to public audiences, and the tea house as a focal meeting point in a 
way rejected open discussion on politics. However, political discussion was never 
extinct. Besides the gong‘s hall, conversation occurred in the chambers of the 
officials‘ houses and in the private gardens of the educated class (public parks did 
not appear until the 1920s). But these two types of place were attached to the 
domestic and usually categorized as private space. It seems that there was no 
normative public space in Chinese cities where people could appear collectively with 
their political property in a western sense.  If this distinction is true, a question needs 
to be asked: how do the Chinese people politically exist in the city? Has the way of 
their political existence changed? They are the questions I try to answer in this and 
the following chapter.   
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In the rest of the chapter, a significant ‗public‘ space in Beijing city will be 
investigated: Tiananmen Square, a space transformed from a former royal yard to a 
city square by the efforts of the new government and collective actions of the people. 
The birth and change of the space reflects the complex relationship between gong 
and si, public and private: the birth of Tiananmen Square was the triumph of the 
gong of the masses over the gong of the government, while the extension of the 
square reflected how the families and private persons in the si side sacrificed much 
to the public interests of the state. It also reveals the changing understanding and 
practice of Chinese politics. Therefore, by studying the spatial and political history 
of the area, not only will the abstract gong-si framework introduced in Chapter 2 be 
developed into more concrete terms, but also a more contextual and diverse 
understanding on the nature and practice of human political society can be advanced.  
4.2 Pre-Tiananmen Square as a place of gong: palace 
square, administrative quarter and market place   
Now Tiananmen Square (Tiananmen guangchang, literally ‗Square of the Gate of 
Heavenly Peace‘) is a massive and symbolic square located in front of Tianan Gate 
(Tiananmen, Gate of Heavenly Peace) in the heart of Beijing city. For the country 
and normal Chinese people, Tiananmen Square is regarded as a symbol of the New 
China, identified with two significant moments in the history of the twentieth century: 
it was on the Tiananmen Tower where Chairman Mao proclaimed the founding of the 
People‘s Republic of China and the emancipation of Chinese people in 1949; three 
decades before that ( in 1919) it was the protest in Tiananmen ‗Square‘ that started 
the May Fourth Movement --the Chinese Enlightenment that has helped radicalise 
Chinese intellectual thoughts, and the protest is also officially declared as a mark of 
the first appearance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Tiananmen Square 
caught the rest of the world‘s attention by the anti-government activities and the 
crackdown that occurred in spring 1989. From then on the name of Tiananmen has 
been bound up with to the violence and suppression enabled by the military power of 
the state. 
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4.2.1 A place dominated by gong functions 
But the square was not a square, even as late as the 1920s. As shown in the last 
section, the original plan of Beijing did not contain any spaces designed for public 
assembly and mass movement. But this does not mean an equivalent absence of the 
Chinese ‗gong‘. On the contrary, as the capital of the empire, the virtue of gong or 
justice was presented by the spatial and spiritual disposition of the city. Following the 
highly ordered Chinese cosmology
136
 and Confucianism, gong‘s land, at that time the 
emperor‘s dwellings and the government, was arranged in the centre, while alters of 
heaven, earth, sun, moon, grain and ancestors were placed around it. People were 
settled in a hierarchical structure from the centre to the marginal area according to 
their social status (for example, only the Manchu people and Chinese high officials 
were allowed to live in the Inner City during the Qing dynasty). The moats, walls, 
gates, fences and compartments constrained everybody, from the royal to commoners, 
to live in a ‗proper‘ place in natural world as well as a socio-political system. The 
order  is spatial as well as political. The empire spared no effort to keep the order, 
attempting to attain the so called ‗heavenly peace‘. 
However, the spatial and ideological order of Beijing city collapsed with the 
downfall of the Qing Empire and the shift of the mentality from Confucianism to 
modern western thoughts at the turn of the twentieth century. Since then, the 
influence of westernisation was gradually imprinted on the governmental and spatial 
structure of the city. Even a tide of public space in a western sense was emerging. 
Shi
137
 describes a ‗public park movement‘ between 1908 and 1926. Since the 
opening of the Altar of Soil and Grain in 1914
138
 (named Central Park then and 
renamed as Zhongshan Park from 1928), nearly all former imperial gardens and 
temples were transformed into public parks within two decades
139
. The movement 
was initiated by the western-minded gentry-merchants of Beijing but did not succeed 
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until getting the support from the republican government, especially from the 
municipal level. We can interpret this loosely as a big si-gong shift in urban space: 
those previously royal private spaces
140
  were now transformed into modern parks 
belonging to the Republic and, by inference, to the people. And now people were not 
present symbolically in these places or just for ritual purpose; they came for leisure, 
social and then increasingly for political participation. Although the admission 
charges of these parks compromised their public nature, these entirely new spaces 
greatly affected the shaping of modern-urban bourgeois lifestyle, the formation of 
city political arenas for mass rallies, and then the spreading of the radical thoughts of 
revolution
141
. Under the influence of the first generation public space and with an 
effort to break its limits, the Tiananmen Square was given birth.  
I would like to introduce what the Tiananmen area was like before its transformation 
into a public square. During the Qing and Ming dynasties, the area that we call 
‗Tiananmen Square‘ now was an enclosed T-shaped imperial ‗square‘ flanked by 
imperial administrative quarters in both east and west sides. Figure 4.3 illustrates the 
plan of this area in the late Qing dynasty before 1900. The east-west road of the ‗T‘ 
ran in front of Tianan Gate (Tiananmen) and ended with East and West Changan 
Gates (Changan zuomen and Changanyoumen). The meridional stem of the ‗T‘ was a 
walled passage called Imperial Way (yudao) linking the Tianan Gate and Great Qing 
Gate. It contained two covered walkways called ‗Thousand Step Corridors‘ 
(Qianbulang) defining the passage used by the emperor between the Imperial City 
and the Inner City.  The whole T-space was enclosed by walls. Behind the walls were 
the central departments of the imperial government, including the Six Ministries (i.e., 
Ministries of Defence, Personnel, Revenue, Rites, Works and Justice) and other 
important central boards (see Figure 4.3)
142
. Yet even the officials working in the 
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administrative quarters could not access the T-square directly due to the enclosure of 
the walls. For ordinary people, of course, it was an extremely exclusive space. 
 
 
The square also played other roles besides an imperial passage. It was the site for 
military reviews and ceremonial offerings before embarking on military campaigns. 
On some occasions the Emperor issued proclamations, which were conventionally 
lowered from the Tianan Gate Tower to the government officers kneeling before the 
Figure 4.3  Tiananmen ‘Square’ in the Qing Dynasty before 1900 
(source: based on Cao, 1971, p21) 
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gate
143
. This imperial courtyard was also the site for celebrations of the selection of 
the country‘s top scholar-officials. Both the Ming and Qing selected their officials 
through an elaborate examination system. The highest national examination, ‗court 
exams‘ (dianshi), was held within the ‗T‘ space in front of Tianan Gate (Chengtian 
Gate at that time) at the beginning ages of the Ming, and relocated to the Hall of 
Protecting Harmony (Baohedian) within the Forbidden City in the Qing dynasty. 
Candidates entered the Forbidden City via the East Changan Gate
144
. After the exam, 
the results written on yellow paper were carried in the Dragon Pavilion (longting) 
through the Tianan Gate and finally posted out of the East Changan Gate to make 
public to the people outside the Imperial City. Thus the East Changan Gate was also 
called ‗Dragon Gate‘ (longmen) which conveyed an auspicious meaning. On the 
contrary, the West Changan Gate was related to death and punishment. A high court 
was held inside the gate to review death sentences twice a year. Because the accused 
was brought in and out of the Imperial City via the West Changan Gate, the gate 
acquired its nickname ‗Tiger Gate‘ (humen) 145.  
From the functions of the Tiananmen area, we can see that it was predominantly a 
space of gong.  First of all, it was a space associated to ‗state affairs‘, including 
military, national examination, high court and the central government. As a state-
gong space, it excluded ordinary people; it was used by the emperor and was 
surrounded by highest administrative institutions. Theoretically, however, it was 
supposed to be separated from the private interests of the emperor, royal family and 
any particular political groups. It symbolised the public interests of the nation. 
Furthermore, designated as a gong space, it unavoidably contained gong‘s moral 
implications. Judging the cases in the high court or the theses in the national 
examination especially required the merit of impartiality, a merit of Heaven (tian) 
and gong. The exclusive use of the Imperial Way (Thousand Steps Corridors) of the 
emperor was connected to his role as the one who took the mandate of heaven: the 
emperor used the Way to go to the Temple of Heaven in the south of the City to pray 
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for the country to be blessed and to get a ‗heavenly peace‘, which is also the meaning 
of the name of Tiananmen. The moral and abstract dimension of gong was 
represented in the space in a very symbolic and ritual means; even the common 
people, who were excluded from the space physically, could also be interpreted as 
having been included in the gong spirit of the place in a symbolic sense.  
Therefore, the royal square, the precursor of Tiananmen Square in the late empire 
was highly enclosed, exclusive and ritualised. It was not a contested space but rather 
a space presenting privilege, supremacy and unchallengeable authority of gong and 
its state embodiments. This is not just the history of Tiananmen Square, rather the 
history of all Chinese city squares. The Chinese word used to translate ‗square‘ is 
guangchang (广场) which literally means a ‗wide/big ground‘ or ‗open place‘. The 
second character chang (場 in traditional Chinese, 场 in simplified Chinese, usually 
translated as ‗ground‘ or ‗square‘) combines a 土 (tu), meaning ‗land‘ or ‗soil‘ and a 
昜(yang), meaning ‗ to disperse‘, ‗to scatter‘ or ‗to spread‘. It originally described a 
ground used for winnowing grain out of chaff, which implies filtering, separating and 
purifying. Guangchang also referred to occasions when people gathered, which was 
associated to people in collective, like the connotation contained in ‗the public‘146. 
The word did not attain its modern sense (i.e., as a ‗public‘ square) until the 1920s. 
Urban spaces physically analogous to a square in traditional Chinese cities were: first, 
the space in front of a government office building, which usually excluded normal 
people not to mention mass rallies; second, the ground in front of a temple, used for 
religious activities, folk festivals and as regular play arena. Both types of these 
‗squares‘ echoed the etymology of gong, the Chinese ‗public‘: in ancient time a 
typical gong-space was either a place attached to the building of the ruler or a field 
out of a temple (which was built for the rulers after they died). The Tiananmen T-
square can be seen as a result of the evolution of the former case. In fact the word for 
the building of the ruler and temple, gong (宫), now translated into ‗palace‘ was also 
another name of the Forbidden City (zijincheng, 紫禁城, literally ‗purple forbidden 
city‘147) : Palace City (gongcheng, 宫城)148.  
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4.2.2 Si (market & market place) as a part of gong  
Indeed, the Tiananmen was a space of regulation, taming, rites and performance. It 
reflected an ambition to control people, physically and mentally. It attempted to rule 
all activities, including the presence and absence of certain people. This spatial 
control was also the aim of the whole city. However, exception always exists. Space 
and functions in the realm of si survived and even flourished under the domination of 
gong.  Just in front of the gate of Great Qing, the south end of the Imperial Way was 
a market place called ‗Chess Board Street‘ (qipanjie, 棋盘街). As described before, 
according to the orthodoxy of the plan of an imperial capital, markets should be 
placed in the north of (‗behind‘) the palace and the king‘s halls. But the Chess Board 
Street was a market place ‗in front of‘ the imperial palace and central government 
departments. The formation of the peculiar market place owed to several factors. 
First of all, it was a crucial cross connecting the east and west of the Inner City. As 
the Imperial City occupied the core area of the Inner City, normal people could only 
travel between the east and west through three roads. Jiangmi Lane (jiangmi xiang, 
江米巷, literally ‗Lane of River Grain‘) was one of the three and the Chess Board 
Street was located in the intersection of Jiangmi Lane and the north-south axis of the 
city. This rendered the place a trade area convenient for people from both the east 
and west city to buy daily goods. Secondly, as illustrated in Figure 4.3, there was the 
Imperial River  (yuhe, 御河) nearby.  Revenues in the form of grain were transported 
into the capital via the Imperial River and downloaded in Jiangmi Lane; that was why 
the street got its name Jiangmi, literally ‗river grain‘. The whole Jiangmi Lane was 
prosperous for grain transport; and because of its status as the entrance of the West 
and East Jiangmi Lane, the importance of the Chess Board Street was consequently 
enhanced. Last but not least, the administrative quarter made this intersection space 
more prosperous. Wealthy officials consumed and exchanged their treasures there. 
Moreover, the civil servants working in the central departments and the examiners for 
the annual national examination in the Forbidden City composed the main consumer 
group, and they nurtured the Chess Board Street as a famous book market
149
.  It is 
also worth mentioning that partly influenced by the commerce of Jiangmi Lane and 
Chess Board Street, the adjacent area immediately out of Zhengyang Gate (also 
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called Front Gate, Qianmen, the central south entrance from the Outer City to the 
Inner) gradually developed into one of the most flourishing commercial streets in the 
capital and also served the whole country as a financial centre in middle and late 
Qing
150
.  
The Chess Board Street as a significant market place adjacent to the Tiananmen area 
provides an interesting perspective to understand the situation of economic activity, 
which is considered as private domain in the liberal-economistic model and as si-
behaviours in Chinese gong-si framework, and its relation to public power and state 
administration. As described above, the location of the market place followed the 
principle of convenience and market economy. It broke the orthodoxy of the plan of 
the capital, challenging the spatial domination of public/gong power. It was a space 
for private people and their exchange between one another; these economic activities 
were under jurisdiction of individuals rather than public power. Although the state 
intended to control all space and activities, and although private interest and 
commence were seen as inferior, the operation of the city had to allow activities for 
business that might happen not in the designated market places. The Chess Board 
Street also eroded the class boundaries. It contained people covering a wide range of 
social status: civilians, merchants, scholars, high officials and the nobility. This was 
very rare in the city. Usually middle and high officials were forbidden to enter the 
market places even those established by the government (e.g. the one in the Bell and 
Drum Towers Area). It is a pity that not much literature recorded the activities and 
interactions between people from different classes in the Chess Board Street in detail. 
But undoubtedly this market place disturbed the strict discipline over space, activities 
and people. 
Nevertheless, the market forming in the Chess Board Street relied on the gong-
related institutions and functions nearby. In fact, this is a common characteristic of 
Chinese ‗administrative cities‘: these cities developed because they were the seats of 
governments, and the flourishing of industry and commerce was highly dependent on 
the consumption of the governments, aristocrats, officials and their relatives. In 
addition, the regulation was still powerful. Not only would all the stalls and people be 
                                                 
150
 See also Hou, Renzhi & Tang, Xiaofeng eds, Beijing Lishi Dili [Historical Geography of Beijing], Beijing: Beijing 
Yanshan Press, pp233-234 and 237-238; and Gao, S. F., Historical changes in Markets and their location in 
Beijing, Chinese Geography and Environment 3, 42-60. 
81 
 
cleared when the emperor needed to use the Imperial Way, but also coffins (even 
empty ones) were banned from the Chess Board Street.  
Later, the T-shaped square, the Chess Board Street and a part of the administrative 
quarter composed the area covering the current Tiananmen Square. In the process of 
transforming it into a public square, the May Fourth Movement in 1919 played a 
pivotal role
151
. Even before the May Fourth protest, many changes in the city had 
emerged.  
4.3 Birth of Tiananmen Square and emergence of an 
integral city: foreign force, municipality, police and the 
people 
4.3.1 Geopolitics of Tiananmen area 
Tiananmen area experienced several significant changes in the first two decades of 
the twentieth century. The year of 1900 is a turning point for the city of Beijing. 
Although the hierarchical spatial system itself had already started to break down with 
the disintegration of the Qing Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century, it 
was the foreign armies who shook the Tiananmen and, in doing so, openly 
challenged the spatial order of Beijing for the first time. In the summer of 1900, the 
military force of the Eight-Nation Alliance 
152
 invaded Beijing to protect their 
legations threatened by the Boxer Uprising
153
. In the military conflicts, the 
Tiananmen Tower was damaged and the Thousand Step Corridors were burned. But 
they were repaired and restored immediately after the war. From 1900 on, all the 
foreign legations in Beijing were concentrated in the southeast corner of the Inner 
City, displacing part of the administrative departments west to the trunk of the T-
shaped square. Furthermore, they walled the Legation Quarter and governed it 
independently from the Qing government, forming the fourth ‗city‘ of Beijing 
(Figure 4.4). Some of their buildings even broke the monopoly of the palace on 
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height
154
. To some extent, the big compound of the Legation Quarter greatly 
challenged the authority and controlling power of the Empire, in both political and 
spatial senses. The presence of the foreign force also made the adjacent Tiananmen 
area a more sensitive, political space.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Geopolitical environment of Tiananmen in the early 20th century  
(drawn by the author based on Map of Beijing, 1921) 
 
The new transport structure of Beijing also helped the Tiananmen area to gain a more 
prominent status. After the 1911 revolution, Beijing ended its history as the imperial 
capital. The Republican government sought to establish a more modern spatial design 
to adapt to city development in the twentieth century. Following the opening of 
Tianan Gate and the administrative quarters, Changan Avenue opened in 1913. It ran 
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in front of Tiananmen Tower, extending the east-west wings of the ‗T‘ to make a 
thoroughfare through the city. As a consequence, the formerly private palace square 
was now completely open to the public, and the spatial importance of Tiananmen 
Gate was enhanced by its location as the intersection point of the north-south axis 
and the east-west artery. In addition, the wall surrounding the Imperial City was 
demolished in the years between 1917 and 1927, which further improved the 
accessibility of the Tiananmen area.  
4.3.2 Urban space, public sphere and municipality as a new 
embodiment of gong 
Another factor contributing to the birth of Tiananmen Square as a political space was 
the emerging public spaces and a public sphere that had been cultivated. As described 
before, many royal gardens and temples were transformed into public parks in the 
late Qing dynasty and early republican period. The Central Park, north-west to the 
Tiananmen, was the most prominent park since its opening in 1915 (Figure 4.4). In 
addition to its recreational, cultural and social functions, this former sacred and 
access-limited altar for state ceremonies now was a foremost political space: not only 
was it a venue where intellectuals gave public speeches for educational purposes and 
political activists held their meetings, it also served as a place for mass rallies
155
. For 
example, more than 3,000 Beijing citizens gathered in the park to protest the Twenty-
one Demands of Japan and the compromise by the Beiyang government in 1915
156
.  
In fact, in the decades of political turmoil, city space, including parks, universities 
and streets became unprecedentedly political. By lecturing, leafleting, public forums, 
demonstration and other activities in these places, the intellectuals and students 
attempted to educate the commoners, to awaken people‘s self-consciousness and to 
promote the public‘s concerned with public affairs 157 . A public sphere in 
Harbemassian sense was burgeoning
158
. In the past, public-spirit or gong-virtue had 
been associated with Confucian elites. But in this period, the public spirit was 
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intimately connected with the mobilisation of the urban popular, the city public
159
. In 
this process, we can see remarkable development of civic activities and a ‗united‘ 
city (municipality) emerging as a unit bearing gong interests and values. 
The autonomy of civil society grew significantly. When talking about the 
proliferation of a variety of self-governing organizations (zizhi tuanti), professional 
societies (fatuan) and guilds (huiguan), Shi
160
 declares that civic activities in the 
1910s and 1920s were ‗unparalleled in their diversity and pluralism by any other 
period in twentieth-century China‘. Actually, the Central Park was chiefly funded by 
private sponsors and managed by a consortium of private citizens and merchants 
under the supervision of the city government. Even as early as 1906, a local gentry-
merchant organisation called the Inner City Municipal Assembly for Public Welfare 
(Neicheng Shizheng gongyihui) had actively championed for a public park in 
Shishahai
161
. As Mary Rankin and William Rowe
162
 have pointed out, the weak state 
in the late Qing and early Republic created a vacuum that could be filled by private 
gentry groups in the name of public interests, which nurtured the growth of the civil 
society.  
One profound institutional change related to this phenomenon was the creation of the 
Beijing Municipal Council in the early republican period. This was the first time 
Beijing had a single government at the municipal level. In the imperial era, Beijing 
was the capital under the direct control from the central but was by no means one 
united city unit. The Forbidden City (i.e., Palace City), Inner City and Outer City 
were dominated by multiple bodies and governed in different ways. Beijing never 
existed as ‗one‘ city, as there was no single local government of the whole area. In 
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terms of administrative zoning, Beijing was co-governed by the counties of Daxing 
and Wanping (split by the axis of the city), two of the twenty-one counties under 
Shuntian Prefecture
163
. But at the same time most of the administrative and juridical 
power of Beijing was exercised by other institutions appointed by the central 
government or directly by specific ministries and central boards. The Manchu Qing 
made its seat in Beijing in 1644, a post with immense power named Nine Gates 
Infantry Commander (bujun tongling jiumentidu, 步军统领九门提督) was created, 
in charge of the traffic control of the nine gates of the Inner City and the safe 
guarding of the capital (of course primarily the safety of the Forbidden City). The 
Nine Gates Infantry Commander also had other judicial responsibilities, including 
night patrol, fire fighting, security checking, criminal arresting, prison keeping, etc.  
This position was always held by Manchu ministers, commanded directly by the 
emperor. Along with the Nine Gates Infantry Commander, there were Eight Banners 
governors in charge of the military and administrative affairs of the Inner City. Eight 
Banners governors could be Manchus, Chinese and Mongolians but all under the 
command of the emperor. For the Outer City, which was also within the 
administrative zone of Daxing and Wanping county governments, was further 
divided into five districts (called wucheng) supervised by five censors (wucheng 
yushi, 五城御史) dispatched by a central board the Censorate (duchayuan,都察院) 
on a yearly basis.  The censors administered a range of works concerning supervision, 
juridical administrative, public security, civil affairs and others.  But their juridical 
power was only limited to the civil cases of minor offenses; those related to 
imprisonment and higher punishments were handed over to the Ministry of Justice. In 
both the Inner and Outer Cities, cases involving the retainers working for the emperor 
and his family  would be transferred to the Imperial Household Department (neiwufu, 
内务府), and the suits involving the royals were judged by the Court of the Imperial 
Clan (zongrenfu, 宗人府) (Figure 4.3 shows the locations of these central boards)164. 
All these diminished the autonomy of Beijing. Only the surrounding rural areas, the 
two Capital Counties, Daxing and Wanping, had relatively complete power on 
administration and jurisdiction. 
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To summarise, the imperial Beijing was administered by a complex network of 
overlapping and redundant bureaucracies.  As David Strand
165
 puts it in Rickshaw 
Beijing, ‗imperial practice, as a general principle, denied cities, including the capital, 
political status as integral units and encouraged overlapping jurisdictions‘.  Moreover, 
the governance power was highly centralised due to Beijing‘s capital status. During 
the imperial period, Beijing was by no means an autonomous or self-governing city. 
It was even not a city, as the idea of a city  as an administrative unit was still a totally 
alien concept at that age. The word for traditional Chinese ‗city‘, cheng (城), referred 
to settlements surrounded by walls from the beginning. That was why Beijing was 
seen as the capital with four ‗cities‘ with four sets of walls: the three concentric cities 
of the Palace City (i.e., Forbidden City, gongcheng), Imperial City (huangcheng) and 
Inner City (neicheng); plus the Outer City (waicheng) (see figure 4.2). Each city 
(cheng) had its city walls (chengqiang) for defence purpose. The word for modern 
Chinese ‗city‘ as an administrative unit is chengshi, adding the character of shi (市), 
which referred to the market place, to the walled settlement cheng. In the old time, 
the settlements developed from trading and commence were called zhen (镇, like 
‗town‘) or shizhen (市镇 , ‗market town‘), rather than cheng. Before the new 
administrative system was introduced in the republican period, no Chinese city had 
ever formed a governmental unit or an autonomous community.  
Inspired by western experience of municipal administration, the republican 
government founded the Municipal Council of Beijing (shizhenggongsuo) in 1914. 
Compared with previous governing bodies that made security maintenance the most 
important task, the newly established Municipal Council concentrated more on 
‗urban‘ affairs, such as infrastructure construction and city facility modernisation. 
Many local affairs that had formerly been dominated by gentry and merchant groups 
were now controlled by the municipal institutions. In practice, as I mentioned in 
previous sections, the Municipal Council made great efforts to modernise 
transportation and urban space. Many gates, city walls and fortress towers were 
demolished; roads were widened and extended. They also built public parks, public 
bathrooms, city library and museums.  The Municipal Gazette (shizheng tonggao), an 
official publication of the Municipal Council, campaigned for urban public space. 
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Tramways and buses were also developed in the 1920s
166
. In discourse, the 
Municipal Council deliberately distanced itself from the institutions set up by the 
imperial government, and focused on city residents‘ rights and public interests, as 
evidenced by the frequent reference to ‗public money‘ (gonggong  zhi  jingji, 公共之
经济 ) and ‗public welfare‘ (gonggong  zhi  leli,公共之乐利 )‘ in the official 
reports
167
 . In rhetoric and to some extent in reality, the city had become a unit for 
administration and limited self-government. Also for the first time, the city was 
viewed as an important embodiment of gong-related interests and activities. The 
concerns of the politics (zhengshi) were not just state affairs, but also local city 
affairs.  
To summarise: in republican Beijing, a public sphere in a Habermasian sense was 
developing. For example, the public forum, political discussion, emerging mass 
media, voluntary associations and popular protests sprouted in the city. Meanwhile, 
the city also became an important governmental unit and a new embodiment of gong. 
The relation between city/municipality and gong-ideas is reflected in the language. 
The Chinese expression of ‗municipal council‘ (or city government) at that time was 
shizheng gongsuo (市政公所). The word for council/government was gongsuo (公
所), literally ‗public place‘ or ‗public hall‘, referring to the government building but 
also conveying a strong meaning of ‗of the public‘ and ‗for the public (interests)‘. In 
the section 2.2 I introduced the earliest recorded use of the word gongsuo in the Odes. 
It said ‗…with bared arms he (Shu) seizes a tiger, and presents it in gongsuo‘168.  
Gongsuo in this verse referred to the duke‘s house, but now the word was adopted by 
the republican government to refer to municipal government. Its connection to the 
ruler remained, but a new sense linked to ‗urban public‘ was added. Therefore, the 
spirit and value of gong was not only present in a tribal community, the nation, the 
kingdom, all-under-heaven or a group of people without a territorial definition, it 
now also existed in the city, a municipality, a specific spatial and governmental area.   
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4.3.3 Policing, city order and the penetration of state power 
Beijing was also a policed city. During the imperial era, among the multiple 
governance institutions, the gendarmerie (or ‗Military Guard‘ used by Sidney 
Gamble
169
) under the Nine Gates Infantry Commander guarded the Inner City, and 
the sensors of the Five Districts (wucheng) administering the Outer City functioned 
as pre-modern bureaucratic policing
170
. The difference was that the former was 
essentially a military force while the latter was a mix with juridical power. But both 
of them focused on the security of the city and public order among other more 
general governmental duties. The gendarmerie continued to function until 1924, 
twelve years after the collapse of Qing; and a considerable number of the former 
gendarmes were absorbed into the new-established professional police team
171
. 
During the Boxer Uprising, the trained police introduced under the Japanese 
occupation in the northern part of the Inner City provided an inspiration for the Qing 
government to create modern police force in the capital
172
. Finally in the New 
Policies (or Late Qing Reform, Xinzheng, a reform program between 1901 and 1911), 
a new police system was established in the Inner City in 1902 and extended to the 
Outer City three years later
173
. This marked the separation of the police power from 
military. But the modern police inherited the very broad understanding of ‗order 
keeping‘ from the old gendarmerie. With the idea of ‗preventive policing‘174, they 
regulated all manner of economic, cultural and political activates beyond crime 
prevention. Strand notes 
In displacing the gendarmerie, the Beijing police seem to have 
absorbed their predecessor‘s taste for a broad-gauged approach to the 
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maintenance of order. Policemen enforced hygiene standards in the 
food businesses, made sure that public toilets were cleaned regularly, 
gave licensing exams to medical practitioners, regulated the storage in 
temples of coffins awaiting shipment back to the deceased‘s 
hometown or village, and tried to prevent the indiscriminate dumping 
of toxic or contaminated waste. Policemen censored public 
entertainments and political expression. They supervised a variety of 
institutions designed to administer and control the city‘s poorest 
residents…. 
Gamble
175
 comments that the police were ‗responsible for most of the work done in 
the city and touch almost every side of the life of the people‘. The wide range of the 
duties of the police weakened the function of the Municipal government. The Capital 
Police Board (jingshi  jingchating)
176
 was directly supervised by the central Ministry 
and was not under the control of the Municipal Council (which was reorganised as 
the Beiping
177
 Special Municipal Government in 1928 and Beijing Municipal 
Council in 1937). Compared with the Municipal Council, whose work majorly on 
city construction and development, the police played a more comprehensive role in 
terms of city administration and management. Even the property tax (fangjuan)
 178
, 
the most important local tax, was levied by the policemen and specifically used for 
the expense of the Capital Police Board
179
. In fact, the Police Minister (xunjingbu) 
established in 1905 became the Ministry of Civil Affairs (minzhengbu) in 1906 and 
later the Ministry of the Interior (neizhengbu) in the Republic. As the name change 
suggests, the police system was responsible for domestic administrative affairs.  Even 
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after the Capital Police Board was incorporated into Beiping Special Municipal 
Government as the Public Security Bureau (when Beijing was not the capital any 
more) in 1928, it still controlled much administrative power along with its security 
duties, and it was not uncommon to see the head of the Public Security Bureau also 
serve as the mayor of Beijing municipality
180
. What I want to stress here is that, 
although Beijing was a special city for many reasons, the combination of its police 
power and governmental power was not an exception, but instead revealed the nature 
of state power. In Max Weber‘s famous definition, the (modern) state is the entity 
that detains ‗the claim of monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the 
enforcement of its order‘181.The force was primarily exerted by the military and 
police, both of which were precursors (even the essence) of the modern 
government
182
 in the Beijing case.  
If we go back further to an earlier, broader and also more positive presumption of the 
idea of the police in Europe, we can find more in common. Nicolas Delamare's Traité 
de la Police (Treatise of the Police) published between 1705 and 1738 treated the 
object of the police as ‗the general and common good of society‘.  Mark Neocleous 
comments that from the beginning, police was ‗a form of governing rather than the 
exercise of law‘ 183 .  In the conceptualisation of the German Polizeiwissenschaft 
(Science of Police), the police also had an economic and social duty, including public 
health concerns, town planning, surveillance of prices, etc
184
. For the 'free-born 
Englishman', although disliking the term as well as the idea of ‗police‘ (more 
precisely, French military police)
185
, they established their civil police force in 1829 
in London
186
 and empowered them to apprehend the suspects who disturbed the 
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‗public Peace‟187.Behaviours such as lying and loitering in the public place at the 
‗wrong‘ time were seen as ‗public nuisances‘, the idea of which extended from 
people‘s manners and behaviour to built environment at the end of the 19th century: 
those buildings failing to reach the health standards were to be demolished, and at the 
same time, new construction should only occur in designated places. One remarkable 
case is Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.in the US in 1926, in which a lawyer 
and planner, Alfred Bettman, argued that zoning was a form of nuisance control and 
therefore a reasonable police power, which explicitly declared the kinship between 
the town planning and police power, drawing an Anglo-Saxon legal history
188
. In 
addition, another significant state power, the compulsory purchase power in the UK 
or eminent domain in the US, was also intimately connected to town planning power 
and therefore police power.
 
 The administrative history of Beijing and the two land 
expropriation cases in a way echoed all these. The city, on the one hand, had its 
public order and peace to maintain, and the government of Beijing was historically 
connected to police power. This power, on the other, was not a power within the city; 
in contrast, it indicated the state power beyond the city, implying the penetration of 
the state into the city.  
To summarise, around the year 1919, some important changes can be seen in the city 
of Beijing, showing the disintegration of the former political and spatial order and the 
emergence of a new one
189
. The intervention of the foreign force not only built their 
enclosure in the core of Beijing but also served as an impetus for the Chinese to form 
their understanding of the modern nation-state. Although still fairly weak, the 
municipality/city started to emerge as a new scale in city governance and in people‘s 
daily life, which can be found in the development of varied municipal facilities and 
public space and in the police that regulated people‘s illegal and selfish (zisi) 
behaviours and kept public peace. All these institutional features  inevitably affected 
people‘s thoughts, perception and practice. The newly-emerging vertical (e.g. state, 
city, body) and horizontal (e.g. city space) dimensions had opened up more political 
possibilities for the Beijing people as both individuals and as collectives. The May 
Fourth Protest, which gave birth to the Tiananmen Square, was one prominent case.   
                                                                                                                                          
private and public security. 
187
 Metropolitan Police Act 1829, section 7. 
188
 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, Supreme Court, 1926.  
189
 For another account on this, see Shi, Mingzheng, ‘Rebuilding the Chinese Capital: Beijing in the early 
twentieth century’, in Urban History, 1998, 25 (1), pp. 60-81. 
92 
 
4.3.4 The May Fourth Protest and the people emerging as a bearer 
of gong 
The May Fourth Protest (or May Fourth Movement for the broader event) was a 
student demonstration held in the ‗empty space‘ in front of Tianan Gate in 1919. The 
movement was sparked by the dissatisfaction over the Treaty of Versailles at the end 
of World War I. The Treaty awarded Qingdao (historically known as Tsingtao) in 
Shandong Peninsula, formerly under the control of Germany, to Japan instead of 
giving it back to China. This diplomatic failure of China, known as the ‗Shandong 
Problem‘, generated public anger towards the Beiyang government190. The Chinese 
people suspected that the government made a secret deal with Japan for a big loan 
and thus did not stand firm in defending the interests of the nation in the Conference. 
The movement started in Beijing and then spread to the major cities of the whole 
country. Given the domestic pressure, the Chinese delegates refused to sign the treaty 
on 28
th
 June, 1919, which was viewed as a primary victory of the Movement
191
.   
While examining the process is not the main target here, I would like to outline the 
events of the May Fourth based on the narrative of existing literature, and then I shall 
analyse the political and spatial implication of the birth of Tiananmen Square by 
putting it in a broader political and cultural context of Chinese understanding on 
‗politics‘. Nelson Lee‘s paper192 depicts why and how the ‗empty space‘ in front of 
the Tiananmen Square was chosen for the protest. It was not a natural choice. Usually 
students from Beijing and from other provinces tended to choose New China Gate, 
the entrance of the Middle and South Seas where the Beiyang Government was 
located, as the destination of their petitions. For example, on the 21
th
 May, 1918, 
more than 2,000 students gathered there to protest the signing of the Sino-Japanese 
Military Mutual Assistance Convention. Although there was a kind of connection 
between the New China Gate and the empty space of the Tianan Gate-- those 
planning to demonstrate outside New China Gate would gather at Tianan Gate first-- 
it was doubtless that for both the government and the public, Tianan Gate was of 
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secondary importance. That was why New China Gate was under much stricter and 
closer police surveillance, which increased the difficulty to access the site.   
The intent of the May Fourth demonstration organised by the students was to attract 
the attention of the general public and to mobilise them into political action, after 
which they believed they could exert pressure on the government. Wakening the 
public and educating the commoners were also the themes of the lecturing activities 
usually held in the Central Park, a regular space for people‘s political actions193. 
However, there were constraints on a rally in the Central Park. One was the entry fee. 
Although not very expensive, the admission charge still prohibited the lower-class 
people, who were the focus of the students, from using the park. A common strategy 
was to buy tickets and distribute them to the participants for free
194
, but this was 
unaffordable for the students. Another problem was the permission to hold a public 
gathering. Notwithstanding that the park was managed by a consortium of private 
citizens and merchants rather than the government, social organisations still had to 
seek permission from the Capital Police Board to have an assembly, which gave the 
authority a chance to deny the application or to seal the park in advance
195
.  
Given its secondary importance and no entry fee, the Tiananmen space was therefore 
considered a better place to have the demonstration. Moreover, it was located exactly 
in the centre of the city and was the intersection point of the north-south and east-
west axial roads, rendering the place equally accessible for the citizens from all areas 
of Beijing. In addition, the Tiananmen space was very near to the Legation Quarter. 
To petition the embassies of the Western powers to win their sympathy and help with 
regard to the ‗Shandong Problem‘ was one important purpose of the demonstration196. 
On the afternoon of May 4, 1919, over 3,000 students from 13 universities in Beijing 
gathered in front of Tiananmen, shouting slogans such as ‗Struggle for the 
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right/sovereignty of the nation externally, get rid of the national traitors at home‘ 
(waizheng guoquan, neicheng guozei) and ‗Refuse to sign the Versailles Treaty‘ 
(juqian ershiyitiao). The initial plan was to march to the Legation Street and then to 
the Chongwen Gate commercial area to enhance their exposure to the public: but the 
demonstrators were led to the residence of an official who was accused of being a 
collaborator with the Japanese. After burning the official‘s house and beating his 
servants, student protesters were arrested, jailed, and severely beaten
197
. The next day, 
students in Beijing as a whole went on strike and over time, students, patriotic 
merchants, and workers in other larger cities joined in the protests. From June, the 
movement‘s centre of gravity shifted to Shanghai, the most industrialised city with 
great number of workers and businessmen at that time. After the May Fourth, almost 
all large-scale public gatherings in Beijing were held in the space in front of Tianan 
Gate. For examples, a protest against Japanese militaristic activity in Fujian province 
gathered around 30,000 students on November 29, 1919, and on December 7, more 
than 100,000 citizens demonstrated there against the Fujian Incident
198
. In the 
meantime, the government began taking action to recapture the space. A 
reconstruction scheme for Changan Avenue, facing Tianan Gate, was implemented in 
late 1919, and in 1925 and 1926, the ground of the Square was paved and trees were 
planted to reduce the space for gathering
199
. But public assemblies and 
demonstrations were still happening there from time to time (e.g. the one in June 
1925 against the Fujian Incident, and another demonstration on March 1926). 
Tiananmen eventually became a public square, a space where the power of the state 
and the people were contested. 
On the relation between the May Fourth protest and the formation of Tiananmen 
Square, Lee adapts an Arendtian approach, arguing the case reflects how action 
precedes public space (not vice versa), and that it was the concerted action of people 
that created and maintained the public space. This perspective does shed light on the 
connection between people‘s action and the making of political public space. 
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However, I would like to interpret the May Fourth Movement and the birth of the 
Tiananmen Square by referring to the broader historical and cultural contexts. This is 
also the background to understand the bizarre stories happening later. 
Through collective action and by making the space public, the Chinese model of 
political participation shifted. In the past, typical political or public affairs were the 
concerns of the elites, especially the emperor, ministers and scholar-officials. Popular 
movements or mass politics changed this traditional notion that only certain groups 
or a class of people could engage in politics. Since the Sui dynasty (581–618 AD), 
civil servants were selected by an imperial examination system (keju); those who 
passed the examinations, regardless of their bloodline, would be appointed as 
government officers in a hierarchical system and govern the affairs of the kingdom 
with the king and the aristocracy. Yet once entering the bureaucratic system, these 
scholar-officials became shi (士), a class separated from other ordinary people and 
therefore they divorced from the class backgrounds that they were born into. Of 
course, as Confucian scholars, they had their specific ethical-political philosophy and 
values. Statecraft was the core of their study; teaching the rulers especially the king 
the statecraft was perhaps the highest duty of shi. This was similar to the aims of the 
‗mirrors for princes‘ in Europe. Governing and politics were nothing related to the 
grassroots. But the May Fourth Movement represented for the first time that scholars 
and students set the common people as the targeted group that they wanted to 
enlighten. Phrases like ‗going to the masses‘ and ‗educating the commoners‘ were 
their slogans. Having been disillusioned with the traditional Chinese culture, the May 
Fourth intellectuals resorted to western values, especially ‗democracy‘ and ‗science‘, 
leading a revolt against Confucianism. This was the cultural facet of the May Fourth 
Movement, by which its name of ‗New Culture Movement‘ (xinwenhua yundong) 
was attained. In the political aspect, the alliance between the scholar class and the 
lower class city dwellers not only changed the history, but also marked a fundamental 
shift of the Chinese understanding on ‗political‘ and ‗politics‘.  
4.3.5 A transformation of Chinese politics (zhengzhi) 
This section will discuss the transformation of the understanding and practice of 
politics implied by the mass movement of the May Fourth Protest. As noted, political 
engagement, used to be the governing activities of the officials and elites, now turned 
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to ordinary people, to the masses. The people emerged from popular movement in the 
square, becoming an important gong embodiment and forming a bottom-up 
perspective on politics. In the process, they disrupted the previous harmonious and 
ordered picture of the world.  Political struggle now was considered necessary and 
important for both the people and the state. This changed the understanding of the 
nature of politics. Before a further discussion on this transformation, I would like to 
introduce the ‗traditional‘ understanding of the Chinese ‗politics‘.  
When translating ‗politics‘ into Chinese, people could not find an existing term with 
an equivalent meaning. Sun Yat-sen
200
, the founding father of the Republic of China, 
suggested to combine two Chinese characters,  zheng (政) and zhi (治) together to 
form a new word to refer to ‗politics‘. In Sun‘s explanation, zheng is ‗affairs of the 
multitude (zhongren) ‘, and zhi is ‗to govern‘; therefore zhengzhi means ‗to govern 
affairs of the multitude‘. That is his and also many of his contemporaries‘ 
understanding of politics
201
. Although not a compound before, zheng and zhi had 
been used separately for a long time
202
. In early historical literature, Zheng referred to 
the institution and order of the kingdom (e.g. ‗[Huanchen] greatly disturbed the 
Song‘s zheng‟203), a means of rule and governance (i.e. one of the ruling tools among 
rites [li], music[yue], punishment[xing] and zheng
204
) or more commonly, the 
governmental activities of the sovereign and his officials. The term zheng conveyed a 
strong sense of top-down governance. Mozi (or Micius, c. 470 BC - c. 391 BC), for 
example, believed that governing (also zheng) could only operate in a top-down 
method, rather than the opposite
205
 . In W. P. Mei‘s version of the chapter ‗Will of 
Heaven I‘ in Mozi, the verb zheng is translated into ‗to give the standard‘ or ‗to make 
                                                 
200
 Sun is bilingual. He was sent to Honolulu in the US for school education from 1978 to 1883, and studied 
Western Medicine in Hong Kong College of Medicine for Chinese (the forerunner of The University of Hong 
Kong) between 1897 and 1892. 
201
 Sun Yat-sen,  Sun Zhongshan Xuanji (A Collection of the works of Sun Yat-sen), vol.2, Beijing: Renmin 
Chubanshe (The People’s Publishing House), 1981, p661. 
202 Encyclopedia of China• Political Science, Beijing The Encyclopedia of China Publishing House,1992, 
p482. 
203
 Zuo Zhuan (Chronicle of Zuo)- Duke Xiang 17
th
 Year- 558BC: ‘Huachen, who not only rode roughshod over the 
royal family (zongshi), and also disturbed the zheng of the state of Song, must be expelled’. Zuo Zhuan is 
traditionally attributed to Zuo Qiuming, as a commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu). The 
Chinese version I use is Chunqiu zuozhuan xiudingben (Revised Version of Zuo Zhuan of Spring and Autumn 
Annals), complied and annotated by Yang, Boxun, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1990, p.1032; for English 
translation, I consulate Legge, James, The Chinese Classics, vol. 5, reprinted by Hong Kong University Press, 1960.  
204
 Zhouli (Rites of Zhou)- Yueji (Records of Music): ‘…Thus rites is for expressing the intension/aim, music is for 
harmonise the voice, zheng is for unifying the behaviours, and punishment is for preventing the corruption’. 
205
 Mozi- Book 7- Will of Heaven I- 3.  
97 
 
the standard‘. Here is a key text talking about zheng, in which the character appears 
as many as 17 times: 
Moreover, righteousness is the standard (zheng, n.). A standard is 
not to be given (zheng, v.) by the subordinates to the superior but 
by the superior to the subordinates. Therefore, while the common 
people should spare no pains at work they may not make the 
standard (zheng, v.) at will. There are the scholars to give them the 
standard (zheng, v.). While the scholars should spare no pains at 
work, they may not make the standard (zheng, v.)  at will. There 
are the ministers and secretaries to give them the standard (zheng, 
v.). While the ministers and secretaries should spare no pains at 
work, they may not make the standard (zheng, v.) at will. There 
are the high duke and feudal lords to give them the standard 
(zheng, v.). While the high duke and the feudal lords should spare 
no pains at work, they may not make the standard (zheng, v.) at 
will. There is the emperor to give them the standard (zheng, v.). 
The emperor may not make the standard (zheng, v.) at will (either). 
There is Heaven to give him the standard (zheng, v.). That the 
emperor gives the standard (zheng, v.) to the high dukes, to the 
feudal lords, to the scholars, and to the common people, the 
gentlemen (junzi) in the world clearly understand. But that 
Heaven gives the standard (zheng, v.) to the emperor, the people 
do not know well. Therefore the ancient sage-kings of the Three 
Dynasties, Yu, Tang, Wen, and Wu, desiring to make it clear to 
the people that Heaven gives the standard (zheng, v.) to the 
emperor, fed oxen and sheep with grass, and pigs and dogs with 
grain, and cleanly prepared the cakes and wine to do sacrifice to 
God on High and the spirits, and invoked Heaven's blessing. But I 
have not yet heard of Heaven invoking the emperor for blessing. 
So I know Heaven gives the standard (zheng, v.) to the emperor
206
. 
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From the passage, besides the top-down governance connoted in the character/word 
of zheng, standard and order was also involved. It was a typical Chinese notion of 
political practice. Zheng, understood as the standard ultimately from Heaven and a 
practice to pass the standard from the superior to the subordinate implies something 
like ‗proper‘, ‗upright‘, ‗fair-minded‘, ‗orthodox‘. In the Analects, the collection of 
the discussion of Confucius and his disciples, zheng was an important topic and 
viewed as the art of governance or statecraft in most cases. When being asked by Ji 
Kangzi, a higher official of the state of Lu, Confucius gave a definition of (good) 
Zheng 政: ‗Zheng 政 means zheng 正‘207.  The latter zheng 正, a homophone and the 
left part of the former Zheng 政, is usually used as an adjective, meaning ‗upright‘, 
‗central‘, ‗regular‘, ‗pure‘, ‗proper‘, ‗standard‘, etc. It can also be used as a verb with 
meanings like ‗rectify‘, ‗renovate‘ and ‗correct‘208. But here Confucius did not mean 
that governance was to rectify the ruled, but stressed the importance of the self-
regulation and self-rectification of the rulers. ‗If you (Ji Kangzi) behave in a proper 
way, who else dare not?‘ 209  Confucius and Confucianism advocated governing 
people by virtues, by acting as a model for people to follow. An ideal authority 
should combine the sovereignty with the power of virtue. The requirement of 
morality here is as obvious as that of gong. In later history, the two characters, zheng 
政 as ‗to govern‘(v.) and ‗governance‘(n.) and zheng 正 as ‗standard‘ (adj.) and 
‗correct‘ (v.) were increasingly used separately and the former became the main 
sphere of the Chinese ‗political affairs‘, that is,  the activities of the governors. Its 
association to top-down governing is also reflected by other zheng-compounded 
translations; concepts in western political science such as government (zheng-fu), 
policy (zheng-ce), party (zheng-dang), politician (zheng-ke or zhengzhijia), regime 
(zheng-quan), etc. are all translated into words with the character zheng.   
The other character, zhi, in Chinese ‗politics‘ also reflects the top-down approach and 
the concerns about order and peace. Zhi in classic texts was used as a verb in tackling 
floods (zhi-shui)
210
, administering and governing the kingdom or its people
211
, 
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training horses
212
, managing property
213
, curing illness
214
, punishing offenders
215
 and 
interrogating a case or a question
216
. It was also used as an adjective, describing a 
peaceful and stable state of a country under good governance, the state of which was 
usually understood as the contrast of a chaotic state or a war-like state (luan). For 
example, in ‗Will of Heaven I‘ in Mengzi (also known as Mencius), it says that ‗with 
it (righteousness) the world becomes orderly (zhi) and without it the world becomes 
chaotic (luan)‘ 217. Zhi also can be a noun, used to refer to the place of the seat of a 
county or prefecture. Therefore, similar with zheng, zhi also had a strong relation to 
top-down management and at the same time connoted that a good result of the 
governance was possible. It is also worth noting that the normative sense of standard, 
uprightness, order and peace, etc. of zheng and zhi had strong moral implication. In a 
way, it created a non-political sphere that was closely  associated with the private 
realm and seen as inferior and less desirable. 
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In comparison with European political thought, there was something absent from the 
Chinese ‗politics‘ zhengzhi. Although invented to introduce new concepts, politics 
and political translated as zhengzhi
218
 inevitably lost some meanings that the Chinese 
political tradition did not afford and could not convey. Significantly, the idea that 
politics is connected with normal citizens and citizenship was lost in the Chinese 
zhengzhi. The ancient Greek πολιτικός (politikos) meant amongst other things ‗of, for, 
or relating to citizens‘, ‗belonging to the polis‘, in turn from πολίτης (polites), 
‗citizen‘ and that from πόλις, polis219. Aristotle's work Politics (Politika, Πολιτικά) 
was on the governing and governments of the polis, a natural political community, 
and for the democratic polity of Athens, all citizens had an equal chance to perform 
the governing role. Thus politics was not only related to the status and affairs of 
citizens, but also was practiced by citizens. Although in later history the association 
between politics and more centralised government and state greatly increased, the 
idea of politics and being political as something related to citizen and citizenship 
were kept. For China, in contrast, before the twentieth century, the bodies supposed 
to be eligible to engage into ‗politics‘ were just the elites, and governance from the 
rulers
220
 was the most important part of, if not the entire politics (zheng). ‗Political‘ 
was considered as a virtue that should be achieved only by a minority, excluding the 
commoners.  
Traditional political thoughts and the transformation were also reflected in the space 
of the city. Aristotle wrote in the Politics, ‗a citadel (an akropolis) is suitable to 
oligarchy and one-man rule, level ground to democracy‘ 221 . Aristotle imagined 
citizens in an equal, horizontal plane
222
. Beijing was built on a plain, but it used a 
concentric structure and walled system to show the dominant status of the rulers and 
to distinguish the sacred and non-sacred, the rulers and the ruled. The spatial change 
in the first two decades of the 20
th
 century and the May Fourth event in Tiananmen 
Square marked a shift from this political tradition. The former sacred spaces, 
including the palace, imperial court yards, altars and imperial passage were not 
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sacred and hence not exclusive any more. The failure of the late Qing and Beiyang 
governments and the acceptance of western political theories meant that the Chinese 
people (mainly the scholar class) did not grant the government the singlular power to 
lead and to provide (good) governance. It called for a broader ‗public‘; more diverse 
groups should be included. Young students stepped into the streets, parks and squares, 
engaging in political activities, and they invited lower class people (first the working 
class, then the peasants) to join in political actions.  This drastically enlarged the 
spectrum of people involved in political participation; the creation of ‗the people‘ as 
gong embodiment and the practice of mass politics have changed Chinese history. 
But there was a hidden danger. Once the movement politics
223
 become normal or is 
even used as a main approach in daily politics, the result could be catastrophic. That 
is exactly the lesson of the Socialist Movement in the 1950s and Cultural Revolution 
between 1967 and1976, which will be discussed through the lens of land politics in 
the Bell and Drum Towers area.  
The attempt to adapt western ideas and the emerging mass politics, however, did not 
simply lead to any existing mode of westernisation and modernisation, but rather 
made the distinctiveness of China more remarkable. Specifically, the Chinese 
experience did not display the vigilance of the citizens against the state, nor a strong 
tension between the state and society. On the contrary, we see an intimacy between 
the state and the people, between interests of the state and those of citizens. The first 
time the mass taking took political action was not to struggle for ‗private‘ interests or 
to guard their independence against state intervention, but rather to struggle for the 
interests of the nation, for a stronger state. Before the May Fourth, the foreign 
invasion had tarnished idea of a harmonious ‗all-under-heaven‘ (tianxia). The 
awareness of China as a nation-state among other parallel state powers narrowed the 
over-broad boundary of gong from ‗all-under-heaven‘ down to the national scale. 
Demonstrations in front of Tiananmen showed a simultaneous process of the 
formation of political citizens and the formation of state awareness. More accurately 
speaking, the salvation of China was the real goal of these political actions; the 
shaping of the people and the masses was just a means, a by-product.  The specific 
situation of China (i.e., under the threat of the imperialism) rendered the survival of 
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the individuals and the strengthening of the state fused into one, which actually fitted 
into the traditional model of the homology of private person, family and nation (guo 
or guojia). This intimate dependency between the individuals/citizens and the idea of 
the state was unique. To some extent, state affairs as the most important theme of 
political life were never suspended. And as a consequence, emerging political scales 
such as city, community and guild became of secondary importance and were in the 
shadow of people‘s strong concerns about the state. From this point of view, 
Tiananmen Square was born as a national symbol rather than a municipal square. 
However, the tension between the state and the people as a whole still existed. The 
assembly of the people in the Tiananmen Square was an embodiment of the theory 
that the aggregation of the individuals was the ultimate legitimate power for gong, 
was the declaration of being the public interests and was the supposed origin of 
public power. This potency of the presence of collective people was an apparent 
challenge to any existing government power. Thus in the following history, the 
authority had to show their alliance with the people (gong) and at the same time tried 
to disband the organised collective into scattered individuals, and hence si again.     
4.4 Expanding Tiananmen Square: party-state, city, 
household and private persons 
In this section I will focus on the expansion of Tiananmen Square in the 1950s, 
especially the gong-si or state-family/private people relationship reflected in the 
process. Before entering into argument, I would like to shortly outline what had 
happened on this area between the May Fourth movement and the expansion scheme. 
Japanese occupation in 1937 ended all large-scale protests since the May Fourth in 
1919 and introduced the modern police system to the city. In 1945 Chiang Kai-shek, 
the leader of the Kuomintang Party and the President of the Republic of China, 
celebrated the defeat of the Japanese at the forecourt of the Throne Hall of Supreme 
Harmony in the Forbidden City. Then the Communist Party (CCP) defeated the 
Kuomintang, and on the 1
st
 October, 1949, Chairman Mao stood atop the Tiananmen 
Tower and declared the founding of the People‘s Republic of China to the tens of 
thousands of Chinese cheering on the Square. The simultaneous presence of the 
highest leader and the people was very different to the previous ‗symbolic‘ contact 
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between the emperor and his subjects in the Imperial era
224
. Mao also openly 
proclaimed himself as a follower of the May Fourth legacy and laid great stress on 
the power of the masses
225
. Since 1949, the Gate and the Square have been 
symbolically associated with Mao, the Communist Party and at the same time the 
people. Beijing also regained its capital status in the People‘s Republic era. In the 
following decade, one major aim of the Communist Party and the newly established 
central government was to transform the post-imperial city into a socialist one. This 
intention has greatly changed the urban space of Beijing and its residents.  
4.4.1 Communism, the masses and gong 
The People‘s Republic of China between its establishment in 1949 and the economic 
reform in 1978 was usually described by westerners as a communist state, which was 
rarely used by Chinese people. The ruling Communist Party defined the period as a 
transformative time toward socialism, an early stage of communism; the country 
then was building and working for a socialist state. However, the ideal of 
communism have shaped not only the practice of the state but also the ideology of 
the whole country, including the understanding of gong-si ideas. 
‗Communism‘ and ‗communist‘ are translated into Chinese as gongchan dang and 
gongchan zhuyi respectively. Gongchan literally means ‗common ownership of 
property‘, which is actually quite close to what communism means in western 
political thoughts (e.g. Marxism). Gong (共) in communism is a homophone of the 
gong (公) for ‗public‘.  The former conveys meanings like common, communal, 
joint, mutual and altogether, which can be seen as a layer of the intricate meanings of 
the latter gong. There are both common ownership （共有制）and public ownership 
(公有制) in Chinese; they have the same pronunciation and both are latinised as 
gongyouzhi. Like the confusions of the two concpets in their English expressions, the 
two terns are sometimes used interchangeably. But if we distinguish them more 
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precisely in Chinese contexts, 共有制 (common ownership) is joint ownership by all 
individuals in a society or collective ownership by all members in a community,  and 
公有制 (public ownership)  can be either common ownership or state ownership. 
This resonates with the two senses of gong/公: gong from bottom and from top, or 
gong embodiments as collective and state.  
The success of the Communist party relied on their alliance with peasants and 
workers, or in their own words, ‗the masses‘. ‗The masses‘ were common people, 
normal people, but it referred to commoners in a collective way, rather than just the 
individuals. Once connected to collective, it gained a gong quality and therefore all 
related moral power. In a way, the success of the bottom-up method of the 
Communists was an expression of the idea ‗the aggregation of si is gong‘ in reality.  
After the Communist Party came into power, like all previous governments, the 
party-state proclaimed itself on behalf of the interests of the whole country. But here 
the validity of the Communist government was not from Heaven but from the masses, 
from the people. The government then combined the superiority of the communist 
gong status as the aggregation of commoners as well as the gong priority as the state. 
We will see how this dual status endued  the party-state huge moral power in the two 
empirical cases.  
Besides cleaning the ‗residue of Kuomintangs‘ and developing economy, the most 
important task of the new established governments was to ‗socialise‘ the resources 
and means of production, among which land was a key focus. By socialising or 
nationalising land ownership, collective ownership and state ownership were 
constituted in the rural areas and the cities respectively. The two cases studies are 
about the transformation of the ownership of urban lands in Beijing, from which the 
conflicts between gong and si embodiments and the gong-si relationships in the 
socialist period can be investigated.  
4.4.2 Conflicts between the state and the city in a hierarchical gong 
system 
There has been a certain amount of literature to describe the planning of Beijing and 
Tiananmen Square in the 1950s
226
. I will not repeat the process but just make one 
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point which has not been explicitly stated in previous research: that is, the triumph of 
the state/party over the city. As explained in 4.3, in spite of strong intervention from 
the state and foreign powers, the city had become an important container for 
governance, civic activities, and political participation in the republican era. After 
1949, however, Beijing regained its capital status and the power of the city in 
governance and construction was reduced again. In the case of the expansion of the 
square, the power of the central state thoroughly penetrated into the city, resulting in 
the situation that private people directly confronted the state, without the city in-
between either as a gong power or a scale of an aggregation of private people and 
their interests.  
The planning of Tiananmen Square has reflected the conflicts between the central 
state and its Soviet assistant planners on the one side and the municipal professionals 
and experts on the other. Due to the fact that the success of the Chinese Communists 
owed much to the support of the Communist Party of the USSR, three batches of 
Soviet town planners and construction experts were invited to take part in the 
planning of Beijing between 1949 and 1957
227
. There were wide divergences and 
long debates between the Soviet experts introduced by the central government and 
local architects of the Municipal Planning Commission
228
. Finally it was the Soviet 
experts‘ plan as well as their methodology and ideology that won the battle and 
dominated the post-War construction of Beijing
229
. Having abandoned the famous 
‗Liang-Chen Proposal‘ that intended to develop a new city out of the old core, the 
official plan located the new country‘s administrative centre within the old city and 
set Beijing as not only the political and cultural centre but also an industrial city. This 
spatial overlapping of state institutions and the city of Beijing laid the foundation of 
the following land conflicts between the state and Beijing residents.  
Tiananmen Square area, as the very heart of Beijing and the symbol of the 
revolutionary history of the Party, understandably became the most important focus 
of the post-war (re)construction. The plan and construction of the Square were under 
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powerful control and intervention from the central party-state.  With regard to the 
Monument to the People‘s Heroes, the first building deemed to be built on 
Tiananmen Square, a special Construction Committee of the Monument was 
established. The special Committee led by the Party Secretary of Beijing was actually 
a ‗national‘ committee and hence independent from the planning work of the 
Municipal Planning Commission
230
.  The design of the rest of Tiananmen Square was 
organised by the Municipal Planning Commission. They produced 14 designs in 
1954 and another 11 in 1955, but could not decide until getting the concrete guidance 
from the central authorities231. The outline of the plan of the Square was roughly set 
in 1957, and at the outreach session of the meeting of the Central Politburo of the 
party in October, 1958, the expansion of Tiananmen Square was confirmed as one of 
the ‗Ten Grand Projects‘ to celebrate the 10th  anniversary of the establishment of the 
Republic of China. The final plan was settled around one month before construction 
began, and the square, the Museum of Revolution History and the Great Hall of the 
People were built with incredible efficiency and succeeded to complete by the 
National Day on the 1
st
 October, 1959.  
4.4.3 Conflicts between the state as gong and private person and 
household as si 
There is literature on the planning and construction of Tiananmen Square, including 
the participation of the Soviet experts, their conflicts with local architects, the order 
from the senior leadership and the details of the design and construction of each 
building on the square. Yet nearly all the existing literature seems to treat the space 
as a blank canvas, as though the expansion of the square did not require any further 
land or the ground was empty
232
. But this is far from the reality. 
In 1952, Beijing government demolished Changan West Gate and Changan East Gate 
to facilitate the traffic of Changan Street, especially to make sure the grand parade 
would not be blocked
233
. After removing the two walls confining the trunk of the ‗T‘ 
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shape in 1955, the size of the square reached 12 hectares; in the expansion starting 
from the end of 1958, New China Gate was first demolished, where the Chairman 
Mao Memorial Hall was located from 1976
234
.  Due to the historical value of these 
buildings, the three demolitions sparked heated debate within and outside the circle 
of heritage preservation. In contrast, the decision to demolish a large number of 
‗ordinary‘ houses around the T-shaped square seemed to cause no controversy, or at 
least it can be hardly found in either official records or news reports.  
According to the records of the Beijing Municipal City Construction Committee
235
, 
10869 rooms were demolished to give way to the project of Tiananmen Square
236
, 
including the building of the Great Hall of the People (i.e., the parliament house) at 
the western edge of the Square and the Museum of the Chinese Revolution and the 
National Museum of Chinese History (merging into the National Museum of China 
in later age) at the eastern edge. The removal of the people and demolition of the 
houses were achieved in merely one month, from 10
th
 September to 10
th
 October in 
1958:  an unbelievable speed. 
During the short life the Republic, the former imperial administrative legations 
flanking the T-shaped square had been partly transformed into residential area. By 
the end of the first decade of the People‘s Republic, the institutions of the public 
sector still occupied most of the buildings of the eastern side; in the area immediately 
west to the square, there were schools, official buildings, state-owned companies, 
street commercial buildings as well as courtyard residential dwellings. But in 
socialist Beijing, many people were living in the houses allocated by the government 
via their employers such as government departments, state-owned enterprises, etc. 
(called danwei, usually translated as„work unit‘). A portion of these state-owned 
estates were previously ‗public properties‘ (gongchan) taken over from the 
Nationalist government, and some of them were reclaimed by the Communist 
government from private hands for various reasons
237
.  
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In a report from the Demolition and Resettlement Office of the Tiananmen 
Expansion on the 20
th
 October, 1958, the ownership of these affected houses can be 
observed
238
: in the emptied 56.06 ha area 16365.5 rooms were torn down
239
, covering 
floor area as much as 240642.7 square meters. A bit more than 65% of the buildings 
were under public ownership (gongfang) and the rest (4781 rooms) were private 
(sifang)
240
. Half of the demolished buildings were offices of public institutions, 40% 
were residential, and the remaining 10% were industrial, commercial and school 
buildings.  
Mobilizing the masses was a key ingredient in the Communists‘ revolutionary 
victory. The strategy continued to be used in the (re)construction period. When 
preparing for the Founding Ceremony in 1949, the government demanded that all the 
trucks leaving Beijing should carry some rubbish accumulating in the city. At that 
time the Tiananmen space was full of wild plants and waste, some of which were as 
high as the ‗red walls‘ of the Imperial City241. It took three months to remove all the 
wastes, and then the student volunteers helped with further clean-up
242
. In the 
expansion project of the square, the government also mobilised the citizens to help 
with the demolition. This proved very efficient, although 269 rooms were torn down 
by mistake
243
.  
With regard to the resettling of the residents, the policy was: for those working for 
public institutions, such as government departments, army, schools, social 
organisations and state-owned enterprises, the institutions or the higher bodies that 
they were affiliated were responsible for the new office and housing their employees; 
normal residents were encouraged to solve the housing problem by themselves, such 
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as asking help from relatives, friends or employers; only for those unable to sort out 
some other way, the government would try to allocate them in public housing in 
other areas or new-built houses for the resettlement. The authority also mobilised 
private property owners in the whole city to ‗fight against the (housing) drought‘ 
(kanghan)‘244. Owners were required to contribute their ‗redundant‘ rooms to help 
accommodate people moving out from Tiananmen area. Finally in the 7732.5 rooms 
of 157239.5 m
2
 for relocation, 83.3% (in area) was provided by public sector; this 
was mainly distributed to public institutions as both office and housing; the rest 
16.7% of 26259m
2
 was sort out in private way
245
. Those who found new 
accommodation by themselves got no compensation for losing their houses except 
for a small resettlement allowances. Some residents refused to accept the allowance.  
It is difficult for us to understand this if we fail to see the mechanism in the 1950s 
and the culture in which the regime was rooted. Socialism, as the first stage of 
communism, was the dominant ideology at that time. Similar to the welfare states in 
the west of Europe, there was a tide of nationalisation in both enterprises and 
property ownership, but in a more radical way. One marked feature was its attack on 
private ownership. In rural areas, the Communists had delivered their promise of 
(re)distributing the lands of the gentries to the landless poor. This was undertaken in 
a sometimes quite brutal and violent way. In the cities, the government claimed to 
protect private owners when the Communist Party came into power in 1949. On 1953, 
however, a movement called ‗Socialisation Transformation‘ (or Socialist Transition, 
shehuizhuyi gaizao) was lunched, in which the state (both central and local) ‗bought 
out‘ private enterprises. Because there were a great many household factories (as we 
will see in the Bell & Drum Towers case) and many residential spaces were actually 
attached to industrial or commercial buildings, a large numbers of properties were 
transferred into state ownership. The land expropriation of Tiananmen area in 1958 
occurred in this socio-political atmosphere.  In bargaining with the government, the 
status of private owners and holding property were not advantages at all. On the 
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contrary, private owners occupied an inferior position.  The disadvantage of ‗private‘ 
has deep cultural roots as explained in 2.2. Si (private), been viewed as inferior and 
deficient, and was interpreted as selfish, self-obsessed and lacking of selfless gong 
spirit. The idea that private is deficient does not only appear in traditional Chinese 
thoughts. In the Greek contrast between idia and demoisa, idia, usually translated as 
‗private‘, means self-obsessed, separate, ignoring the outside community. It is also 
the word from which we get ‗idiot‘246. The Latin private is evident in some English 
words like deprive, deprivation, privation. The derogatory tincture of these words is 
evident. While the inferior status of the European ‗private‘ was largely reversed by 
modern liberal thought, its Chinese counterpart had a different fate. The moral 
inferiority of private was pushed to the extremes under the Communist ideology. 
During the socialist era, all things relating to private, including private property, 
private enterprise, private owner and the market economy, were viewed as wicked 
capitalism and thereby the enemy of socialist China
247
. Under these circumstances, 
the taking of the properties in the Tiananmen area did not meet much resistance from 
the private part. Even more, the private owners were eager to be integrated into the 
realm of gong, and contributing to the new construction provided an available 
approach. 
Mr. Xu was one householder of the properties to be removed. He refused to accept a 
small amount of money offered by the government for reallocation. When being 
asked why, he said:  
‗We are just one family. Small families (xiaojia) should give way to big 
family (dajia). The interests of the state have all priorities. Personal 
interests are limited and must be subordinated to collective ones, the 
interests of the part to those of the whole. We are conformable to 
majority. I support the decision of the government.‘248  
Here the interests of a person or a family were considered as limited and particular, 
and therefore ‗private‘. In contrast, the expansion of Tiananmen Square was 
connected to collective interests, overall interests, public interests. The distinction of 
quantity (i.e. small vs. big, part vs. whole) was also the distinction of quality (i.e. 
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particular vs. universal, private vs. public).  Personal and private interests were 
inferior. Justifying for them would render people into the same (morally) inferior 
position.  
The socialist ideology enhanced the ethical implications of public and private bodies 
and practises. In gong-si framework, the state was a gong-agency on behalf of public 
interests, and household was a container of private interests. Compared with gong 
and the state, si and its embodiments were subordinate and imperfect. But from the 
Communist view of socialism-capitalism dichotomy, private ownership was 
capitalist and wicked. The aim of Tiananmen project was to expand the square, not 
to ‗eradicate capitalism‘, but as what we will see in the case of the Bell and Drum 
Towers Area, the socialisation movement targeting directly at private property and 
private owners were more radical, and caused more fierce conflicts.  
4.4.4 Intimacy between the state and people, between gong and si 
In the communist propaganda, as well as in the minds of many Chinese people, the 
doom of the Qing Empire and the Kuomintang government showed the mandate of 
Heaven. Now the state, the communist government and the Party
249
 gained their 
status as the representation of gong. They were also directly connected to the ‗nation‘ 
(minzu, 民族), the Chinese people united as a community, the People‘s Republic. 
The state as gong realm worked in both practical and psychological dimensions. Like 
the European welfare countries, the Chinese state provided housing, health care, 
work opportunities and other social welfare for city residents. But the speciality of 
China was that the state was also necessary to make the survival of the nation as a 
whole possible. People believed that Mao and his party brought the independence of 
the country, and that the founding of the PRC saved the nation and Chinese people 
from doom. The intimate relation between the survival, the sustenance and the living 
of the people and the shaping of the state was a historical consequence and was 
further enhanced by the official rhetoric and people‘s daily experience. This has 
immensely influenced the interaction between the state and people, between the 
public authority and private individuals. Individuals and ‗small families‘ (xiaojia) 
were required to make a contribution or sacrifice for the maintenance and 
construction of the ‗public family‘ (gongjia), a nickname for government institutions. 
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A mobilising speech from the chief-mayor Mr. Feng to the ‗progressive‘ residents 
involved in the projects commemorating the 10
th
 anniversary of the founding of the 
PRC in the Labour‘s Cultural Palace (former Imperial Ancestral Temple) in August 
1958 clearly showed this logic: 
‗All the Party members, League250 members, activists and comrades 
with leading minds present at the meeting have very high communist 
consciousness and enthusiasm on socialist construction. I believe 
most of you will understand the temporary difficulties of the 
government, follow the call of the Party, conform to the collective 
interests, overcome difficulties, bear the inconvenience, and perform 
the leading role and the backbone. You should actively collaborate 
with each other and lead your neighbours to achieve this task of 
combat with great honour...‘251 
In the speech, ‗communist consciousness‘ was equal to conforming to ‗collective 
interests‘, and sacrificing for collective interests was very honourable, from which 
the priority of collective, an embodiment of gong and its connection to communist 
ideology was apparent. The chief-mayor also personalised the government: 
requiring the residents ‗understand the temporary difficulties of the government‘. In 
this way, he not only laid stress on the state‘s status as an agency dealing with 
collective interests, but also made the gong-si ethics more perceivable by private 
persons by personalising the embodiment of gong. The combination of  the 
personalisation and ethicisation of the government, increasing the intimacy between 
the state and people.  
When talking about the moving of thousands of households, Mr. Feng put it as it 
was such an easy thing:  
‗Due to the emergency of this big task, the government didn‘t get 
enough time to prepare sufficient houses for resettlement. Thus the 
main resolution is to rely on all of you. Please just take the 
accommodation that you can find. Please do not mind the crowdedness 
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(of the living condition)… For those who can‘t find any other solution 
we will try to solve it by some newly built housing….‘ 252 
Here again, the govenremnt needed to be understood like a person and the residents 
should be considerate. The relationships between the government and individuals 
and households were not only formal, institutionalised relations, but rather like 
ethical relations, like those between family members. Many of the duties and rights 
of the two sides were not clearly stated in formal contracts like the law, but very 
flexible and relying on situations and understanding. We will see the residents of 
the Drum and Bell Towers areas also require ‗understanding‘ from the state.  
Ethics is true politics. Having been linked to gong interest, the construction of the 
capital had overwhelming moral superiority, compared to which, all private 
interests were too slight to be cared about. This logic made the same sense even 
from the perspective of the residents. Mr. Hou, a director of a residential 
committee,
253
 used to live with another 8 family members sharing 3 rooms, but now 
he and his family just got one room. When being asked why accepted this, he used 
the word ‗politics in command‘ (zhengzhi guashuai), meaning the political standing 
point was the centre of all gravity. In fact, both the government and normal people 
often used the expression ‗politically right‘. Politics became a moral requirement. It 
was not just a realm, but covered everything. It could define the ethical quality of a 
person.  
Especially for the people living in the Socialist era (i.e. from the 1950s to the 
1970s), politics was about right or wrong, left or right, friend or enemy; actually 
Chinese politics was always about ‗standard‘ (zheng 正) and morality. For the 
propertied class, the ‗bourgeois‘, it took longer to accept the idea and practice of the 
‗proletarian‘ Communist. Mr. Zhang, an independent personage254, had a three-
person family and owned 12 rooms. The government had tried for years to persuade 
him to let some rooms to the people who were in need but never succeeded. Yet this 
time, he made four rooms available to the families moving out from Tiananmen 
area. This story was recorded in a report on the removal work of the project. They 
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also noted down some ‗bad‘ examples. One was Mr. Bai, who owned more 
properties than average but set eight hard rules to resist the call for ‗fighting against 
the (housing) drought‘:  
‗hiring a nanny is not allowed; putting a division is not allowed; visitors 
are not allowed; cooking at home is not allowed; washing in the courtyard 
is not allowed‘, and  he would not let the rooms to ‗those with children, 
those who could not bear his wife‘s curse or those without a health 
certificate‘255. 
The report commented that ‗the trash of the propertied bourgeois has not been 
swept‘256. From the political-ethic point of view, being a harsh landlord was not just 
morally flawed, but also politically wrong. It was connected to the division between 
capitalism and socialism, between approving the government or not. With the 
upgrading of the battle against private properties and the predominance of 
equalitarianism, more and more people ‗voluntarily‘ handed over their properties or 
enterprises to the government
257
. The details of the process will be reviewed in the 
case of the Bell and Drum Towers area.  
From the case of the Tiananmen Square expansion, we can see that, on the one hand, 
it was a process by which the ‗public‘ space encroached upon the private, and a 
manifestation that the public power intervened into the domestic sphere. But on the 
other hand, it also reflected the particular cultural psychology and the private 
people‘s anxiety to gong. Gong was more like a complement or a promotion to the 
defiant si, rather than an opposite part or an enemy that private people needed to 
look out. Si was not regarded as a positive realm that should be guarded, but a self-
enclosed selfishness which should be opened up and an inferior human condition 
that needed to be salvaged. The cultural psyche to be in line with gong was so deep 
that people lost their critical eyes when the state or the party declared to be the 
representative of gong-interests. In a sense, the Chinese gong and si did not exist as 
two horizontally separated spheres, either in idea or in practice. The picture was 
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 Report on the Removal and Relocation of the People in the Expansion of Tiananmen Square and other 
Projects (Kuojian Tiananmen Guangchang dengchu gongcheng chaiqian gongzuo baogao), 20.10.1958, 
Demolition and Resettlement Office of the Tiananmen Expansion of Beijing (Beijingshi kuojian Tiananmen 
guangchang chaiqian bangongshi), Beijing Municipal Archives, 047-001-00061. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Beijing Municipal Archives kept many application letters from owners and entrepreneurs who required 
contributing their properties or factories to the ‘state’. Such as 022-010-01245, 022-010-00875, 004-010-00514. 
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more like that the higher and larger gong realm floats onto the area of si, with its 
shadow casting onto the si scope. It is even hard to say if si had a specific sphere. It 
seemed that si was just scattered fragments, and once they gathered or united into 
one, they automatically converted to a kind of gong and hence the status as si would 
dissolve. A Habermasian private realm separated from the public one, either a 
purely domestic domain or an autonomous society based on commodity exchange, 
did not exist in Chinese thoughts. The critical-political public sphere residing in the 
separation and conflicts between the public and private, that is, the battlefield in a 
letter world between the public authority and educated bourgeoisies did not exist in 
this case either, even though it might have emerged temporally during the short 
republican period
258
. In terms of theorisation, unlike the case in the west that both 
public and private have highly conceptualised and theorised, in Chinese thoughts 
gong has been much more discussed than si – it is common to see that si is only 
touched as a reference or contrast of gong.  We can see the priority of gong idea 
over si in theory, political discourse and reality.  What was happening in the 
communist era showed us exactly how gong triumphed over si in reality.  
Yet consolidating the victory was not easy. Although having been implanted in 
people‘s mind by Confucian education before, the spread or omnipresence of gong 
was still more like a moral ideal or a social utopia. Once being forced into practice, 
especially in such a radical way, it would destroy many people‘s living space. This 
might succeed temporally in an abnormal period, but could not be sustained long. 
When the government revisited half of the removed households, many of them 
complained about the new living conditions
259
 like crowdedness, poor sanitation, 
long commuting distance and schooling. Under the specific political atmosphere at 
that time, it was not common to speak about their dissatisfaction on the 
government‘s work260. Yet the sense of moral superiority could not help with the 
difficulties confronted by the people in their daily life. In these circumstances, the 
government still continued trying to ensure people believe that they were part of the 
state (re)construction and national symbolic space. After the 10
th
 Anniversary 
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 Habermas, Jürgen, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, translated by Burger, Thomas with the assistance of Grederick Lawrence, Polity Press & 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1989. 
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 5.1% of the sample. But as we can imagine, this figure should have been underestimated.  
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 Review on the Resettlement of the Households of the Anniversary Project (guoqing gongcheng chaiqian zhuzu 
anzhi qingkuang fucha baogao), 25.11.1958, Beijing Expanding Tiananmen Square Office, Beijing Municipal 
Archives, 047-001-00061. 
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Ceremony, 1620 families were invited to visit the Great Hall of the People and 1604 
representatives made the trip. ‗They dressed their best costume and everyone 
looked very excited…‘, ‗they were very moved about the comment that their 
cooperation was the first support to the construction‘ and ‗the removal and 
relocation actually made the relation between the Party and the masses even 
closer….‘261. Although the propaganda in the report was very apparent, we can 
detect the particular mentality of the people then. It seemed that even just being 
temporarily and symbolically admitted to be a part of gong could compensate 
people‘s cost in their private interests. This psychology had helped strengthen the 
power of the state and private rights and interests were further encroached. 
Compared with the Tiananmen Square, the case of Bell and Drum Towers discussed 
in the next chapter also reflected the penetration of gong into si realm, but in a 
different form. This time, not the public authority but the masses composed by 
private people violated other people‘s private property in the name of gong. The 
backwash of the gong‘s invasion into si can be observed too. To survive, the private 
space finally overspread common space, rendering the shared space between private 
people in real danger.  
4.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, the case of the birth and expansion of Tiananmen Square provides 
concrete contexts and texts for us to understand the ideas of gong and si and the 
relationship between the two. More specifically, the birth of Tiananmen Square and 
the republican Beijing displayed a new system of gong bodies (Table 4.1): the 
imperialist invasion led to disillusionment of the ideal of a harmonious world and a 
peaceful ‗all-under-heaven‘ shared by all the people; the significance of the state as 
an embodiment of the public interests of the nation was enhanced by the 
international tensions and wars; with the introduction of the municipal system and 
the forming of urban public space, the city emerged as a united entity bearing gong-
interests and conducting governance; and at the same time, we also see a 
transformation in the understanding and practice of politics. The shift was fuelled 
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 Report on Organising the Households Moving out of Tiananmen Area to Visit the Great Hall of the People 
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by popular politics and mass movements then, and the protest giving birth to 
Tiananmen Square was one of them.  
The expansion of the square in the 1950s shows not only the tension between gong 
and si, but also the conflicts between different gong embodiments (Figure 4.5). The 
powerful communist state claimed its great political and moral supremacy over the 
lower gong bodies such as the Beijing municipal government as well as over the 
households and private people in the si side. This was reflected in the planning of 
the square and the removal of the residents involved. Notwithstanding the conflicts, 
still we can see a kind of intimacy between the state and people which was formed 
especially from the theory of the homology of state and family, the co-survival and 
co-existence of the state and people in that extreme time and also from the political 
discourse and propaganda.    
Changes of the understanding of gong in the case of the birth of Tiananmen Square 
Dimensions of gong Changes reflected from the birth of 
Tiananmen Square 
Gong as normative value and universal 
law 
Almost unchanged 
Gong 
embodiments in 
different scales  
All-under-heaven 
(tianxia) 
All-under-heaven as a scale of gong broke 
down because of the intervention of the 
foreign force 
state The idea that state as the most important 
embodiment of gong interest was enhanced  
city City emerged as a new governmental body, 
container for gong-interests and arena for 
political actions 
collective Playing an important role in popular politics  
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Framework of the case of the birth of Tiananmen Square 
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State 
City 
Household  
Private person  
over  
over  
Embodiments of si  Embodiments of 
gong  
Figure 4.5  Politics in the expansion of Tiananmen Square 
analogy/kinship  
intimacy  
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Chapter 5 
Case Study II: Property Struggle in the Bell & Drum 
Towers Area 
5.1 Introduction 
Unlike Tiananmen Square area, which has been intimately connected to the state 
power and state space, the area around Bell Tower and Drum Tower was and now 
still is a residential quarter mixed with certain commercial functions (Figures 5.1 and 
5.2). In this sense, the case of the Bell and Drum Towers (B&DTs) area is an 
interesting comparison and complement to the case of Tiananmen Square. Having 
investigated the gong-si tension in a significant gong-dominated space, this chapter 
examines the issue through the lens of property disputes between gong-bodies (i.e. 
the state and the mass) and si-bodies (i.e. family and individuals) in a neighbourhood 
with more si-related-elements. 
In this chapter, I will first introduce the situation of the neighbourhood; it was under 
a regeneration project which generated many controversies over property ownership. 
By investigating the land ownership reorganisation and struggle from the 1950s to 
the 1970s, I will elaborate how the Socialist Transformation in the 1950s, the 
Cultural Revolution between 1967 to 1976 and the auto-construction activities 
(especially after the Tangshan Earthquake in 1976) gave birth to three types of 
controversial properties: government-managed-and-let houses (jingzufang), Cultural 
Revolution properties (wengechan) and self-build houses (zijianfang).   
The gong-si relationship, especially its representation in terms of property, is a 
constant focus of the chapter. I will make the following key arguments: the mixed 
economic and domestic functions of the household in the B&DTs area assisted the 
state intervention and the nationalisation of private properties in the 1950s; the 
complicated and reversible moral and power relationship between the state, the 
masses and private person can help to explain some extraordinary phenomena in the 
Cultural Revolution that seem incomprehensible now; the public involvement in the 
legislation of the auto-constructed buildings by private people reveals another type 
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of the politics between gong and si, displaying the difficulty of transforming the 
customary rights generated by occupation to formal property rights in the new state 
law and regulation system.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 The neighbourhood in 2012, viewed from the Bell Tower to the north  
(source: author) 
Figure 5.1 Two Towers and the neighbourhood in the 1920s  
(source: Zhonggulou) 
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5.1.1 The regeneration project 
When I did my fieldwork in 2012, the B&DTs area was experiencing the powerful 
intervention of the state. The local authority, Dongcheng District (dongchengqu, 
literally ‗east city precinct‘) government launched a new regeneration scheme, 
Renovation Project of the Bell and Drum Tower Squares (zhonggulou guangchang 
zhengzhi gongcheng), from 2011. The claimed purpose of the project was to recover 
the environment around Bell Tower and Drum Tower, especially the two squares, 
one north of the Bell Tower and the other  between the two towers (Figure 5.3 and 
5.4), to its appearance in Qing Dynasty under the reign of Qianlong Emperor (1736-
1795). This was also an effort to help ‗the traditional axis of the old Beijing‘ 
compete for UNESCO World Heritage status. Although the government purported 
that the aim of the project was to renew the two squares, which just needed to 
expropriate some properties immediately next to the squares, many more properties 
and households were involved in the expropriation plan. As shown in Figure 5.5, 
houses in red colour were under ‗compulsory purchase‘ for renovating the squares; 
those in yellow were the redeveloped zone, which meant the residents could choose 
whether to sell their properties to the government or not. But in practice, the 
government ‗encouraged‘ the residents to move to give way to the redevelopment. 
The project involved 66 siheyuan (courtyard house units) and 136 households, 
covering more than 4,000 square meters.  
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Figure 5.3 The Bell Tower and the 
north square (source: author) 
Figure 5.4 The Drum Tower and the 
south square (source: author) 
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The project brought many controversies. One was about the complicity of the 
occupation and ownership of the properties.  
The format of the residences here is vernacular courtyard dwellings (siheyuan, 
sometimes translated as Chinese quadrangle) linked by hutong (lane) system.  
Compared to the ‗standard‘ courtyard houses unit, which tend to be occupied by 
single (extended) families, the courtyards in this area are much more cramped and 
Figure 5.5 Expropriation plan of the Renovation Project of the B&DT Squares 
(source: Dongcheng District Government, official notice,2012,No.40) 
 
Bell 
Tower 
Drum 
Tower 
124 
 
overcrowded. Most of them were shared by up to 20 small families. The complex 
composition of the population is primarily because historically it was an inferior 
living area, but it is also a result of the influx of new residents and the displacement 
caused by several political movements since the 1950s. The displacements of the 
residents in the political movements created legal problems when the law and 
policies changed. For instance, many families owned properties, but they were 
expropriated by the state or the owners gave up their properties in the previous 
political movements (mainly the Socialist Transformation and Cultural Revolution). 
The government has admitted that some expropriation was illegal and people can 
have their property back if they can prove that they owned the property
262
. However, 
in practice, people may have problems proving ownership. One common case is that 
they just do not have the land ownership certificate, which may have been lost or 
handed over to the ‗government‘ in the political movements. Some people have 
regained the title of their lost properties, but because the government still allows the 
tenants of public houses to continue living there, the previous owners still cannot 
hold their properties in reality
263
. In the regeneration, all these affect the entitlement 
to compensation. 
Many private owners who think they are the owners of the property believe that they 
should have compensation for both the properties that they own now and properties 
that were confiscated previously. Public tenants often consider the houses they are 
living as their own property because they were allocated the housing in the socialist 
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 The relevant policy from the central and municipal governments includes: ‘Guanyu chuli jiguan budui jizhan 
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period, when housing was considered an essential aspect of welfare that they 
deserved. Those people believe this feature of the houses should not change, even 
though the old socialist system has been abandoned. By contrast, the government 
only compensates one owner for each square meter. This different understanding on 
the ownership and rights of the properties cause many disputes and conflicts in the 
expropriation stage of the regeneration.  
Another property issue is related to self-constructed houses. Many houses in the area 
were built by the residents without a building license. But under specific 
circumstances, the government acquiesced in the construction and even supported it 
at that time. However, they are recognised as illegal buildings now and the owners 
cannot get compensation. This has caused considerable discontent and many 
complaints, and it slows the progress of the project. In addition, many residents feel 
the compensation standard offered by the government is too low; with that 
compensation, they cannot afford to buy a property to house the whole family, even 
in the suburbs of Beijing
264
. Besides, the purported corruption also brings the project 
more controversies. From the outside, the most high profile debate is around 
preservation. For the activists, including students, architects, planners and experts, 
etc., the problem was that the government did not follow a legal procedure to initiate 
the project and the scheme was in contravention of many laws, regulation and upper 
city plans. The support for Beijing hutongs preservation is always very strong. 
According to the activists‘ report, the B&DTs area was ‗the last precinct on the 
traditional axis of Beijing left for ordinary people‘, since all other places on the axis 
were initially designed as or had been later transformed into grand public buildings 
or national symbolic space (among which Tiananmen Square is a significant 
example); the fabric of the area, which was dated from Yuan Dynasty, was also 
considered to be part of ‗authentic‘ Beijing265.  
The champions for preservation have generated heated debates on the internet, but 
the debate did not really influence the government‘s decision. The traditional mass 
media in Beijing was controlled by the government and content verged on 
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propaganda
266
. As it was the Dongcheng District Government that launched the 
project, activist groups complained to the municipal and central departments that the 
law was violated, but they did not get a reply. Instead, the government continued to 
urge people to move out and to demolish the emptied houses. In early 2012, the 
activists wrote letters to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) and submitted a report, stating that the B&DTs area, which 
was within the buffer zone of the World Heritage Site Forbidden City, was under 
threat (see Figure 5.6). UNESCO replied and said they would send somebody to 
investigate, but did not take any actions.  When I left Beijing in April 2012, about 40 
households had signed contracts with the government and moved out. By July 2014 
all the houses immediately adjacent to the towers and squares had been demolished.   
 
 
 
 
5.1.2 B&DTs area in history: city towers, market place and 
residential precinct 
The B&DTs area is famous for the two towers. The current Drum Tower was built in 
1539 and the Bell Tower in 1745. In fact, when Kublai Khan made Beijing (or 
Khanbaliq) the capital of Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368), he located the first Drum 
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 Beijing is a very extreme case. In the cities in the south of China such as Guangzhou, the traditional media 
like newspapers is much more independent and very critical to the government. The civil society there is also 
much stronger. All these make the preservation champions and protests there are much more fruitful than 
those in Beijing.     
Figure 5.6  B&DTs within the buffer zone of the Palace City  
 (source: Brief Report about the Recent Situation in Bell and Drum Towers 
Square Area and Its Impacts to World Heritage Site, 2013) 
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Tower, known as the Tower of Orderly Administration (qizhenglou)
267
, at the very 
heart of the capital, and the Bell Tower a little bit north to the Drum Tower (see 
Figure 5.7). Since then, although reconstructed several times, the two towers did not 
change their locations and served as the official time-keeping and time-telling centre 
of the city during Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties, until they were replaced by the 
western-style clockworks in the early twentieth century. Because of the height and 
central location of the towers, they were also used to monitor the city and for 
emergency alerts
268
.   
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source: drawn on ‘Conceived Map of Khanbalik City’, 
http://www.chinabaike.com/article/1/78/445/2007/20070526115002.html [Accessed 20-11-2013] 
Figure 5.7 Locations of the Bell Tower and Drum Tower in Yuan Dynasty269 
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As illustrated in Chapter 4, the plan of the Chinese cities has a ritual significance. 
Bell and drum towers were essential elements to compose traditional cheng, those 
walled cities built as government seats. The capital cities of the country, province 
(sheng or fu) and prefecture (zhou) must have both a bell tower and a drum tower, 
and a county seat just had one of them
271
. Originally as court musical instruments, 
bells and drums were connected to rites and ceremonies. Since the Han Dynasty (206 
BC-220), they have also been used for telling the time. There is a Chinese idiom 
called 'the morning bell and dusk drum', describing their functions of telling time and 
governing city: city gates were opened at the toll of the bell early in the morning and 
closed with the strike of the drum in the evening
272
; the proverb also connotes the 
flowing of time, and enlightening words making people alert and sober. To serve the 
whole city, the towers were usually built in the central place of a city
273
. In the case 
of Beijing, the Drum Tower was the exact central point of Yuan Beijing city, and as 
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 Chu, Jin, Research on Spatial Pattern of Bell & Drum Towers Historical Site in Historic Cultural City, master 
thesis, Xi’an University of Architecture and Technology, 2011, p.8. 
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 The time-telling system of bell and drum is also used in temples. 
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 Usually the bell tower is located in the east while the drum tower west, but Beijing is an exception. 
Figure 5.8 Locations of the B&D Towers and 
the city axis in Ming and Qing Dynasties 270 
Figure 5.9 Locations of the Bell Tower and Drum 
Tower based on the map of current Beijing (drawn 
by the author based on Google earth map) 
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the city moved and expanded towards south over time, the two towers became the 
north end of the axis of the old Beijing city until the government extended the axis‘ 
north end to the Olympic Park in 2008 (see Figure 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11). 
Undeniably, the prominent visual effect and public function of the two towers, and 
the symbolic meaning of them as either the centre of the city or the ending of the 
axis, gave the two buildings significant gong features. The city blocks around the 
two towers, however, were in a very different situation.  
 
 
Figure 5.10 Axis of Beijing (south part, from the perspective of Tiananmen Square) 
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Figure 5.11 Axis of Beijing (north part, from the perspective of the Olympic Park) 
 
The area around the two towers was a living area for lower classes, especially small 
merchants and craftsmen, dotted by lively markets selling small commodities. The 
lake east to the area was the end of the water transportation from the south of China 
to the capital, which contributed to the flourishing commerce of the area nearby, 
including the Drum Tower Street (gulou dajie) and  Di‟anmen (literally ‗Gate of 
Earthly Peace‘, pairing with Tiananmen, Gate of Heavenly Peace) (see Figure 5.8). 
When I visited the B&DTs neighbourhood, people often mentioned a common 
saying ‗Dongsi, Xidan, Gulouqian‘ which were the names of the three busiest market 
streets in old Beijing and Gulouqian literally means ‗in front of Drum Tower‘. As 
illustrated before, Chess Board Street in front of the Tiananmen space was not a 
designated market place. Market places, according to the orthodoxy, should be 
located ‗behind‘ the imperial palace, that is, in the north. The Bell Tower Market 
was one of these markets. But compared with other commercial streets nearby 
specialising in things like tea, silk and jewellery, the market here served the lower 
class and sold daily necessities and particularly specialised in rice, flour, cloth and 
hats
274
. Now there is still an indoor market at the north side of the square north to the 
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Bell Tower. Therefore, the B&DTs area, in terms of its residential and commercial 
status, is a place connected to ordinary people rather than the aristocrats and the rich.  
The idea that north is inferior also contributed to this. With an inauspicious sense, 
the north wall did not have a gate in the middle like another three directions, so that 
there was no main road from the north straight to the Forbidden Palace (Figure 5.8). 
That is also why the axis ended at the Bell Tower rather than reached the city wall
275
. 
Living ‗under the north wall‘ was unfavourable.  In the imperial era, many wealthy 
businessmen lived in Shichahai, near to the lake and northwest of the study site, 
while high officials and aristocrats lived in the area south to the Drum Tower, which 
was closer to the Imperial City. As illustrated before, the socio-spatial structure of 
Beijing was a horizontally hierarchical system. The more centrally people lived, the 
higher classes they were likely to be. As a consequence, most of the inhabitants in 
the neighbourhoods in the vicinity of the two towers were urban lower class such as 
craftsmen, small business owners, rickshaw drivers, street acrobats and buskers, etc. 
In the early twentieth century, an informal ‗labour market‘ (renshi) was at the open 
space attached to the Drum Tower, where masons, woodworkers, casual labourers 
and unemployed, etc. waited to be hired; it was also a place where rickshaws 
gathered
276
. After 1949, most of the people migrating into the area during the 
political movements were also socio-economically disadvantaged groups, which 
complicated the composition of the population and property ownership, but the 
area‘s status as a lower class inhabiting place did not change. All these seem to have 
shaped this case study site a si place; that is, a residential space predominated by 
domestic and small economic activities, detached from the state and the political 
realm.  
However, all this changed during the 20
th
 century, a century of revolutions. 
Especially after the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the B&DTs area became a 
battleground not only between public power and private households, between gong 
and si, but also between different households, that is, within the realm of si. It is this 
history that resulted in the ownership ambiguities and land disputes that have been 
uncovered in the process of the government-led regeneration scheme. In the 
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following section, I will outline three key periods/events contributing to the land 
ownership conflicts, and also highlight how they can be analysed within the gong-si 
framework.  
5.1.3 Key events of the land conflicts and struggles 
The social and spatial shifts of the neighbourhood started from the 1950s. I will 
follow the thread of time and focus on three key events happening between the 1950s 
and the 1970s that led to the current complicated property situation of the area.  
The first event is the ‗Socialist Transformation‘ (shehuizhuyi gaizao) in the 1950s. 
Despite a movement primarily targeted at ‗socialising‘ private enterprises and 
industry, a great number of household properties were nationalised or municipalised 
in the process. Courtyard houses of B&DTs area, for their mixed domestic, industrial 
and commercial functions, were reorganised, economically, socially and spatially in 
this transformation. Adopting the gong-si framework, we can see the powerful 
penetration of gong into si, of the state into the domestic realm. In this socialisation 
movement, not only private properties were expropriated by or handed over to the 
state, but also nearly every aspect of people‘s life was integrated into the state 
governance and welfare system. The realisation of the socialisation was not just 
because of the powerful party-state and the ideological wind at that time, but was 
also facilitated by the long-standing recognition of the priority of gong over si. In 
socialist China, the selflessness and impartiality virtue of the gong-spirit was 
reformed in the guise of communism and egalitarianism. With regard to property, 
private property and the real estate market were demolished and a public ownership 
system (gongyouzhi, 公有制), an ideal since Mencius277, was taking shape. 
The second period addresses the redistribution of property ownership during the 
Cultural Revolution (1967-1976). In the Socialist Transformation, it was the state 
that socialised (i.e., nationalised and municipalised) private properties and 
redistributed them to the employees of the government and state-owned enterprises. 
Yet in the turbulent decade of the Cultural Revolution, it was collectives of 
individuals, rather than the state, that occupied the private properties left after the 
Socialisation Movement. As I will explain, the stories of the B&DTs neighbourhood 
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reveal chaotic conflicts over the property between the masses as gong embodiment 
and private owners of si-interests; it also shows the inherent tension among different 
si bodies (e.g. different individuals, households) in spatial contests. 
The third focus is about the self-building activities after the Cultural Revolution. To 
house newly independent family members, there was on-going self-building of 
houses. But after enormous buildings were destroyed by the Great Tangshan 
Earthquake on the 28
th
 July 1976, this area saw an even bigger surge of self-build. 
These constructions were allowed and supported by the government at the time. The 
common space of the yards and some open spaces beside the lanes and squares were 
occupied for private use. This spatial privatisation was somewhat a revenge of si. 
With the reestablishment of the order of the state and society, spatial contests 
between households in everyday life became increasingly significant, and occupation 
or ‗quiet encroachment‘ turned into a key strategy for people to hold a property 
against the background that ownership was neither well-defined nor well-
protected
278
.  
The gong-si and si-si relationship in each period will be illustrated by specific stories 
of households and properties happening in the B&DTs area. In the last section of the 
chapter, I will try to link what was happening in the events back to the property 
issues uncovered by the regeneration project. In fact, these three periods give birth to 
the three types of properties in ownership dispute nowadays: government-managed-
and-let-properties (jingzufang ), Cultural Revolution properties (wengechan) and 
self-constructed buildings (zijianfang). To a large degree, it is the ambiguities and 
conflicts displayed in current practice that helps me identify the key historical events 
shaping the present. In this sense, these stories of the past of the neighbourhood are 
actually a journey to discover the relation between the past and the present.  
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5.2 Socialist transition of the household in the 1950s: 
domestic realm and the state as an embodiment of gong  
5.2.1 ‘Socialist Transformation’ 
This section addresses the changes of the domestic realm, including private property 
and personal life, in the ‗Socialist Transformation‘ movement (shehuizhuyi gaizao). 
The ‗Socialist Transformation‘, targeting industrial and commercial sectors at the 
beginning, did not involve household property. However, due to their mixed 
economic and residential functions, many courtyard houses in B&DTs were 
‗socialised‘, that is, handed over to the government. This empirical study will show 
how the household space and ownership were reorganised, and how the relationships 
between the state, families and individuals have changed in the process. 
Between 1953 and 1956, a campaign was launched by the Party to realise the 
‗Socialist Transformation‘ of capitalist industry and commerce. This was a part of 
the country‘s march to socialism. Before this, under the Agrarian Reform Law of 
1950, the properties of rural landlords had been confiscated and redistributed to poor 
peasants by coercion. Many landlords were punished and persecuted in the rural 
Land Reform
279
. In the city, the principle of socialising industry and commerce was 
claimed to be voluntary
280
. In March, 1954, the CPC Central Committee issued a 
document entitled ‗On the Gradual Transformation of the Capitalist Industries with 
More than Ten Employees into Public-private Ownership‘ 281  to guide the 
transformation, whereby the state would buy the enterprises from private hands and 
leave a certain percentage profit to the previous owners. Amid the revolutionary 
atmosphere, in January 1956
282
, business and factory owners in Beijing collectively 
appealed to implement public-private partnership (gong-si heying, 公私合营) onto 
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all industry sectors, and many of them ‗donated‘ their properties to the state. State 
capitalism was considered as the ‗only road‘ to realise the socialist transformation of 
private industry and commerce
 283
. Therefore, the state, including both central and 
local governments, eventually became the major (public) partner of the previously 
private enterprises. The route can be illustrated as the diagram below (Figure 5.12).  
 
 
 
 
Here the ultimate target was to transform private ownership (siyouzhi) of the 
enterprises into public ownership (gongyouzhi), or enterprises owned by and serving 
for all the people of the country. Private capitalists were condemned for their 
‗profits-before-everything‘ mentality. Being associated with private, profit (which is 
usually called sili, meaning ‗private profit‘ or ‗private interest‘) was considered 
derogatory. The state here was seen as trustee for the public to control the commerce 
and industries on behalf of the people and for the public interests, and it collaborated 
with private owners to form public-private partnership, the first stage of the 
transformation. From September, 1969, without any legal procedure, the state 
unilaterally stopped paying the fixed rate of interest to the private partners, which 
completed the nationalisation of industrial and commercial sectors started in the 
1950s. This is the outline of the Socialist Transformation of private industry and 
commerce
284
. The story of private houses is very similar to this, although whether it 
is a part of industrial and commercial transition or an independent movement is still 
debatable.  
Before discussing the fate of private household property, I would like to introduce 
the situation of previous public property in the 1950s.  In the Republican time (1912-
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1949), ‗publicly-owned land‘ (gongyou tudi) was a legal term, encompassing the 
land owned by the state (guoyou), province (shengyou), municipality (shiyou) and 
county (xianyou)
285
. Here the state, province, municipality and county were seen as 
collective entities, and the hierarchical governments were the ‗governing agencies‘ 
(guanyou jiguan) of the publicly-owned land. ‗Government-owned property‘ 
(guanchan) also appeared in official documents, referring to the buildings officially 
used by the governments. This term, often used with ‗publicly-owned property‘ 
(gongchan), suggested that it was a different type of property from those like roads, 
bridges and the open spaces of the cities. There was also ‗publicly-used land‘ 
(gongyong tudi) which was held by public or gong-related organisations other than 
the governments. One example was the property owned by religious institutions. The 
area around the two towers used to be very diverse in terms of religious expression. 
There featured a Daoist temple (guan) and an Islamic mosque within the researched 
area, with a temple of worship of the God of Fire (huoshenmiao) and a Confucian 
college nearby.  Before the nationalisation of private enterprises, the Communist 
Party, having seized control of Beijing in early 1949, had taken over both the 
‗government-owned property‘ and ‗publicly-owned land‘ from Kuomintang 
government. However, at the beginning of the new PRC, the private and corporate 
ownership in the city was recognised and remained, although many private 
properties of Kuomintang members were confiscated
286
.  
At the early stage of the ‗Socialist Transformation‘ that aimed at nationalising 
industry and the economy, household property was not the target. But many 
household spaces were not merely for living but also mixed with economic activities, 
and thus were involved in the socialist transition. That was the case of the Ms. In 
1958, a movement targeting private properties for renting was initiated, transforming 
the fate of enormous households
287
, among which Mrs H was a typical example. In 
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the meantime, citizens were integrated into the socialist system, which further 
changed the private realm.  In the following two sections, I will use the stories of the 
Ms and Mrs. H to give a picture of the domestic transformation in the socialisation 
movement, in order to investigate the changes of the relationship between the state, 
families and individuals in the specific course of property ownership transfer. 
5.2.2 Story of the Ms: how gong penetrated through si 
The Ms, including Mr. M, Mrs. M and their two sons Mr. M1 and Mr. M2, owned a 
large courtyard (more than two times of an ordinary courtyard dwelling unit) in the 
1950s in the B&DTs area (Figure 5.12). In contrast to most people who tended to 
build as many houses as they could afford on their land, Mr. M, the father of my 
interviewers Mr. M1 and Mr. M2, used his courtyard as a coal ball factory
288
. It was 
a household factory with a big ground in the centre, where the coal balls could be 
produced and dried. The family lived in two houses (six rooms), with another two 
simpler storage houses that were used to store the coal balls (Figure 5.13). Mr. M‘s 
whole family, including Mr. M, Mrs. M, and their two sons (i.e. M1 and M2) relied 
on the profit of the factory before the Socialist Transformation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
suspended in 1958 when many of other cities had completed the stransition. An article on the 5
th
 August, 1958, 
entitled ‘A Talk on the Socialist Transformation of Urban Private Property by the Director of the Central 
Responsible Department’ (Zhongyang zhuguan jiguan fuzeren jiu chengshi siyou fangwu de chuzu de 
shehuizhuyi gaizao gongzuo fabiao jianghua) from an official newspaper of the Party and government, People's 
Daily, urged to begin the transformation. Then the private property socialisation of Beijing was advanced very 
rashly.     
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In the 1950s, the newly established national industrial system was a hierarchical one, 
including national, municipal, district and street (jiedao, the smallest unit in the city 
administrative system) levels. Which level‘s joint-partnership or state-owned factory 
a private factory should join depended on the size of the factory. The Ms‘ household 
factory was incorporated into a district-level coal ball factory with another two coal 
ball factories in the area. As a consequence, the land used for production (i.e., the 
empty ground of the courtyard dwelling and two storage houses) in the yard became 
the government-owned factory‘s property (Figure 5.14) and Mr. M and Mrs. M 
became its employees. Young M1 and M2 were also transferred to a new school in 
the district where the new joint factory was located
289
. 
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According to the policy, the work unit (danwei, here the factory) was supposed to 
not only pay the labour but also provide housing, health care and child education for 
the employees
290
. Given the fact that the Ms already had their own house, the factory 
did not distribute them new property, but arranged for another two families of Mr. T 
and Mr. L, both of whom were also working for the joint factory but possessing no 
properties, to live in the two storage houses previously owned by Family M. 
However, although the yard belonged to the factory theoretically, it was still used by 
the M Family at least until 1961(Figure 5.15). In the interview, Mr. M1 told about 
how the family survived during the Three Years of Great Famine between 1959 and 
1961, during the time of which millions of the Chinese starved to death. They grew 
cereals and vegetables in their big yard to feed themselves when getting no food 
allocation from the government.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The occupation of the yard had its first significant change when Mr. T, one of the 
tenants of the government-owned factory, built a new house for his eldest son in the 
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early 1960s. As mentioned above, housing the employees was seen as the 
responsibility of the government. However, considering the reality that the city 
government and the factory had very limited housing resources and there were too 
many people on the waiting list before him, Mr. T built the house himself on the land 
of the state-owned factory; that is, the yard that belonged to the M Family before
291
. 
Mr. T‘s behaviours were permitted and encouraged by the factory. In fact it was a 
common model to solve the housing issue then. Mr. L, another tenant did the same 
when his son reached the age of marriage. Mr. M, the previous owner of the whole 
estate did not build any new houses, but instead gave each of his two sons two rooms 
to set up their families while keeping another two rooms for his wife and himself
292
. 
In the following years, the factory and the city government also started to build 
houses in the yard to accommodate more families. From then on, the yard was used 
and perceived as the government-owned factory‘s property (gongfang) but occupied 
by individual families (Figure 5.16). Both in title and reality, the Ms had lost the 
control of the estate except their two houses. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The case of the Ms reveals the complexity of the gong-si relationship and of the 
private-public transition. In the first place, the space and activities of production and 
of living were highly mixed within a typical si space in a pre-industrialisation age. In 
other words, si realm and space at least contained domestic and economic two 
interrelated aspects. As a result, the socialist transition aimed at transforming the 
economy and industry could not avoid affecting the living space. In the Ms‘ case, the 
courtyard and the surrounding houses were at the same time used for living and 
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producing functions. It was impossible for the state only intervening into the 
production part while leaving the other untouched.  Furthermore, the state did intend 
to transform the domestic and personal realm too. By integrating people‘s work, 
housing and education into the national socialist system, the relative autonomy of 
household and personal life was destroyed. These two changes, that is, state 
intervention into both economic and domestic realms, reveal a deep penetration of 
gong into si.  
Why could this happen? As has been explained, the si related-activities were 
considered as morally negative during this period. Private economic activities, 
including household industry, in pursuit of profits and private interests (si-li) were 
not only seen as morally inferior in the traditional sense, but also interpreted as 
exploitation from the Marxist ideology promoted by the communists. Socialism 
fitted in the morality and spirit of gong, advocating selflessness and egalitarianism. 
Even more, in its blueprint, socialism did not truly deny economic and industrial 
activities, but organised them in a specific way, that is, through public ownership 
(gongyouzhi or guoyouzhi). It also recognised people‘s needs for work, education, 
housing and other necessities, but again, with the expectation that they should be 
coordinated by the state planned system. In fact, fulfilling these needs was explicitly 
claimed as the responsibility of the government for the first time in Chinese history. 
Mrs. M1 talked about how the whole family became members of the ‗gong-family‘ 
(gongjia, referring to administrative institutions and state-owned factories and 
companies): 
‗They (the District Government) took over the factory, and my parents-
in-law worked for the new established joint factory. When you worked 
for gong-family, you got the welfare from the state. They changed 
primary school for the two children (M1 and M2). After graduated, they 
worked for the joint factory too. I married M1, and the District 
Government also arrange me a job. I worked for a street-level factory, 
making paper works. Just a few minutes walk from home. It went 
bankrupt later. I could work for another factory, but because of health 
issue I didn‘t. I applied for early retirement. My husband‘s waist got 
injured before he retired, and he got industrial injury compensation. If 
you don‘t work for state‘s factories, who will pay medical fee for you? 
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Impossible. Both of us have retired now and are paid the state pension. 
Not much but better than nothing….‘ 
When being asked ‗if the factory was kept private, would the family live better‘, Mrs. 
M answered ‗very difficult‘, and ‗following the state policy is safer‘. Here, public 
ownership and a welfare state were seen as good because they could sustain 
economic and domestic functions. The state with its great power was even 
considered more capable to take these functions than private ways. In other words, 
the superiority of these gong embodiments resided in the notion that they went 
beyond the limit of si and at the same time could take care of si. By incorporating si 
realm into gong, the state as a gong-embodiment could also become legitimised in 
these everyday senses vis-à-vis work, family and lived spaces, etc.  
However, in reality, this gong system (i.e. public ownership and state intervention) 
could not cover everything nor completely eradicate people‘s spontaneity in 
organising their domestic and private life. That is why the self-construction of 
Mr.T‘s and Mr. L‘s happened and were accepted. In a sense, there was always space 
for private activities that primarily focused on the private actors‘ si-interests. Public 
power penetrated through the household realm, but did not erase it. The tension 
between the two was still there; the boundary between the two changed, but the 
ambiguity remained.  
5.2.3 Story of Mrs. H: socialisation targeting private property 
The expropriation of the M‘s household property in the Socialist Transformation of 
the urban commerce and industries was because of the production function involved, 
but there was parallel movement in particular targeting private residence. This was 
the ‗managing and letting‘ (jingzu) movement. 
Urban proprietors, especially landlords living on the rent from letting their properties 
were seen as part of the exploiting class. In 1956, the CPC Central Committee 
drafted a document, Opinions on the Current Situation of the Private Properties in 
the Cities and Their Socialist Transformation, proposing that the state should 
‗manage and let‘ (jingying and zulin, or jingzu for short) private properties by paying 
the owners ‗reasonable interest‘293. In June 1958, Beijing enforced a policy, applying 
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the socialist transformation unto those with private properties over 15 rooms (jian) 
or over 225 square meters
294
.  
Mrs. H, who inherited 37 rooms from her husband, was asked to hand over her 
‗surplus‘ properties to the Real Estate Management Bureau (fangguansuo, REMB) 
of Beijing, and the latter promised to help her let and maintain the houses and also to 
share the rent income with her. Considering that all her children were serving in the 
army out of Beijing and worried whether she could manage the estate by her own, 
Mrs. H agreed. Consequently, the REMB took over 25 rooms from Mrs. H, and she 
kept the remaining 12 rooms. As many other owners, Mrs. H got 40% of the rent 
paid by the tenants and the REMB got 60% until the start of the Cultural Revolution 
in 1966. After the Cultural Revolution, landlords did not get payments from the 
tenants any more
295
. Strangely, Mrs. H did not feel losing control of the property in 
the Socialisation was very unfair: 
‗Their (REMB‘s) attitude was good. They treated me well, perhaps 
because I was a widow. They agreed to pay for the maintenance of the 
houses and I could share the rent income. That would be good for me. I 
didn‘t have anybody to help me. My sons were all in the army, far from 
Beijing. It‘s hard for me to manage all the properties.... They (REMB) 
did what they promised. They also repaired the houses I was living in.‘296 
When talking about losing the 40% rent profit in the Cultural Revolution, Mrs. H 
was a bit more resentful:  
‗They just stopped paying me. The country was in great chaos at that 
time. You didn‘t know how things happened. Private owners could say 
nothing. Can you say anything? I was lucky because I was always very 
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cooperative. I was always in line with the Party and government…. 
The state admitted mistakes afterwards.‘297 
But the government did not restart pay the 40% rent to the Mrs. H after the Cultural 
Revolution: 
‗They (REMB) said they spent too much in repairing and rebuilding 
the houses. I still had my part. The children had their place to live as 
well. The government said they could repair my houses together with 
the public part. It‘s not too bad.‘298 
During the period when a free property market was abolished, people in the cities 
were housed by the government and property letting and exchange could make 
money as much as usual. When the economic lose of handing over properties to the 
government was not great, we did not see strong resistance from the landlords. Many 
interviewees expressed they were ‗content‘ because they still could maintain their 
own life with the remaining properties. In fact, due to rigid ideological control and 
various ‗movements‘ (yundong) initiated by the party-state, surviving in the new 
regime was even an issue. To be safe gained the highest priority and economic 
consideration was rendered secondary. Politically right was always important, but at 
that extreme time it was especially crucial for life safety. In this context, the purpose 
of the ‗transaction‘ between the state and private owners were not according to 
economic fairness, but a part of the highly ideology-ethics-oriented ‗socialisation‘ 
movement.  
From the words of Mrs. H, she accepted her identity as a ‗private owner‘ and the 
derogatory meanings and inferior social status this identity carried. This kind of 
expression appeared in her interview several times: ‗I can‘t do that. I am a private 
owner (sifangzhu)‘, or ‗that‘s impossible for proprietors‘. It seemed ‗private‘ was a 
mistake, a sin. Solialist Transformation was to correct the mistake and to save people 
from the sin. In the name of public interests and gong agency, the government 
controlled and managed private properties like Mrs. H‘s.  
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However, the ownership was unclear and vague. ‗Managing and letting‘ and the 
60%-40% rent division were not a complete ownership transfer. The ownership of 
these houses after socialisation was neither full private nor full public. It was in-
between. The government controlled 25 rooms of Mrs. H‘s, but the previous tenants 
continued to live there, although later more government tenants were arranged in. 
The state intruded into private and domestic realm but not simply wiping it out 
(which is impossible); instead, the state built up new relations with people and their 
families and life. This means made the Socialist Transformation of household 
properties more feasible, and it also in a way promote the moral sense of the state 
behaviours in residents‘ perception. Many of REMB‘s promise were just oral and the 
specific arrangements were negotiable. The procedure and flexibility were actually 
very ‗informal‘, but this not necessarily let residents feel more unsafe. Mrs. H and 
many other interviewees said they ‗believe(d)‘ the government/ state/ Party. The 
state as a moralised gong actor, its personalisation in the daily contact with people 
and the ethical sense and belief all these caused together assisted the property 
ownership reorganisation in the Socialisation.  
 
Mrs H‘s story is actually a typical story of the fortune of private property of the 
neighbourhood in the 1950s. Among all the courtyard houses units that I visited in 
2012, about one third of them were privately owned, one third owned by the 
government and the rest were of mixed ownership (see Figure 5.17)
299
. All the 
houses currently owned by the government were privately owned before 1949 and 
the changes started from the 1950s. Those privately owned properties involving 
industrial and commercial functions, like the case of the Ms, were transferred 
directly into joint ownership or public ownership (gongyou), meaning collectively 
owned by all the people of a society. The public ownership (gongyou) enterprises 
and properties changed into guoyou, that is, state-owned in 1966 without a proper 
legal procedure
300
 and nowadays these two words are often interchangeably used. If 
the houses were just used for residential functions, like the case of the Ms, the rented 
spaces were usually handed over to the government for management in the 1950s 
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and many owners not only lost their sharing of the rent, but also lost the remaining 
properties for self-living during the Cultural Revolution.  
 
 
 
5.2.4 Property in the context of state-family analogy 
As explained in the genealogy in Chapter 2, gongyouzhi, or public or collective 
ownership of land, has been a social ideal for a long time (see 2.1.2). There were 
many land reforms in different dynasties aiming to establish a non-private land 
Figure 5.17  Ownership composition of the studied 
courtyard houses (draw by the author based on the map 
provided by the Beijing Urban Planning Department ) 
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system in which the state owned all land and divided them equally to households. 
The slogan of Xinhai Revolution in 1911 that overthrew China's last imperial 
dynasty also claimed ‗to distribute land equally among the people‘301.Yet almost all 
these land equalisation schemes were concerned with agricultural fields, for China 
was primarily an agrarian society. Only with the onset of the Republican era did 
urban land and housing become an issue for the authorities. The Republican 
government did not really nationalise the land as Sun Yat-sen initially planned; 
instead, they created ‗land tax‘ to guarantee the public interests in private properties. 
As a matter of fact, in spite of an ideal for some politicians and thinkers, the public 
land system was never fully realized. The private ownership system was deeply 
rooted in ordinary people‘s minds. This was also one reason why the Republican 
government could not actualise their goal of ‗distributing land equally‘. However, 
state intervention in urban land and private ownership was significant. The land tax 
was just one example. The republican government not only held a great amount of 
urban land like a private owner, but also limited the amount of land that individual 
private owners could hold. In some cases private people also tried to put pressure on 
the authorities to intervene in private property and housing issues. For example, there 
were ‗lowering rent‘ movements in many big cities in the republican era; people 
struck and urged the government to control the unaffordable rent increasing between 
the two World Wars
302
.  
In the Socialist Transformation under the Communist government, the traditional 
understanding of the privilege of gong and admiration for collective ownership 
together with the newly introduced socialist ideology served as philosophical 
premise for the reorganisation and redistribution of land ownership. The 
Communists‘ practice was much more cautious in the cities than rural areas. In rural 
areas, landless peasants were allowed to try and to persecute their landlords as well 
as to distribute the lands by themselves. This led to serious violence and deaths. Yet 
in the cities, it was the government that dominated and implemented the land 
redistribution. At least in the early stage, confiscating private properties without 
compensation was not seen as valid. Like the case of Mrs. H, the government got the 
                                                 
301
 The complete version is ‘to expel the Tatar barbarians, to revive Chinese nation (Zhonghua), to establish a 
Republic, and to distribute land equally among the people (quchudalu, huifuzhonghua, jianliminguo, 
pingjundiquan). 
302
 ‘Reducing rent mobilisation’ (jiandi fangzu jinri qi zongdongyuan), Shun Pao, 17-06-1934. 
149 
 
40% rent at the cost of maintaining and managing the property. Although unfair and 
compulsory to a very large degree, it was viewed as a deal between the government 
and the landlord
303
. 
Another characteristic of the practice of government ‗managing and letting‘ private 
properties was its connection to housing issues, which has been considered as a 
typical public issue in modern state practice. Housing is a very particular field that 
connects public and private realms. In Britain, the concerns of housing have greatly 
facilitated the expansion of public power since the late 19
th
 century.  For example, 
the concerns of ‗non-habitable‘ living environments helped to encourage the birth of 
modern urban planning and the use of compulsory purchase power
304
. It seems that 
the social dimensions of housing make intervention in it particularly justifiable
305
. 
However, the underlying ideology and discourse in Britain and China were different. 
For instance, compared with China, public housing provision in Britain was more 
associated with citizen rights; despite the involvement of the state, housing retained 
strong linkage with security, autonomy and independence, and family life was a 
place of retreat, of privacy
306
. The economic and financial advantage of owning a 
house was also much more obvious
307
.  
In China, notwithstanding the importance of a private ownership system before 1949, 
use value was still the main value of houses. Many elderly interviewees mentioned 
that rent in the republican Beijing was very low, because people were just generally 
poor, and also because ‗people didn‘t have much economic awareness‘ at that time. 
After the 1950s, the real estate market was totally abolished. Occupation rather than 
the title, therefore, was more essential. In fact, in my interviews, nearly all the 
government tenants living there for decades felt they were living in their ‗own‘ 
houses although they never had the ownership certificates. For many previous 
owners who lost their ownership, it was not until the 1990s, when the commercial 
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value of houses was released after the restoration of the real estate market, that they 
realized their huge loss and became much more eager to get their property back.  
The symbolic meanings of a house or home were also different in Chinese society. In 
European history, especially via liberal thoughts, there was a notable demarcation 
between political and economic/domestic spheres, which can be dated from the time 
when Athenians contrasted the polis (state) to the oikos (household).  But in the 
Chinese tradition, home or family did not imply being autonomous, independent and 
retreating from the state. On the contrary, it was intimately connected to the state
308
.  
In modern Chinese, the word for country, nation and state is guojia (国家 ), 
composed by two characters: guo (国), referring to the kingdom in ancient and 
imperial times and jia (家), home or family. The combination of guo and jia to form 
a single word ‗state‘ reflects the homological structure between country and family 
in traditional Chinese thoughts (Figure 5.18). In this theory, the state is actually a 
‗macrocosm‘ of a family, built upon the same principles of a patriarchal clan system 
that reflected natural/universal law. Thus, the King was to the kingdom what the 
father to a family; citizens and bureaucrats were subjected to the King, were 
equivalent to children and their fathers; the loyalty to the King was like the filial 
piety to parents. Accordingly, organising a country was like organising a family, and 
a public power managing the properties of a country or a city was not substantially 
different to householders managing their properties by themselves. While county and 
family share analogous structures and principles, however, they are different in 
scales.  The country had the priority over families because it was larger and involved 
more. From this point of view, ‗public ownership‘ and ‗collective property‘ means 
going beyond the self-interests of a small family and following the principles of 
gong. This is the distinction between private ownership and public ownership in 
terms of symbolic value. To summarise, while the exchange value of properties was 
limited in this period, use value predominated in practise and the symbolic value of 
public ownership was superior to private. As a result, the socialisation of household 
properties, though a shift from the previous system, is not too difficult to imagine 
and accept.  
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In fact, the homology of the state and family, and the integration of the state as the 
embodiment of gong and the household as the embodiment of si have its typical 
institutional presentation in the new age, that is, the work-unit (danwei) system. A 
work-unit refers to a kind of workplace that is an extension of the state apparatus and, 
at the same time, is the institution organising people‘s work, housing, education, 
medical care, food quota and even marriage etc. in the context of state socialism and 
a planned economy
309
. It can be state institutes and agencies, the state enterprises or 
the collective sector. The Socialist Transformation was actually a process that 
integrated all urban residents into a national work-unit system. As we will see in a 
case in the following section, even street acrobat performers became affiliated to a 
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Figure 5.18   The idea of state-family homogeneity  
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formal work-unit, which means to become (indirect) state employees from the 1950s. 
Moreover, work-unit is not only an institution of social integration, but also a system 
of spatial integration. In most cases, people working in the same work-unit lived near 
to each other, but the most common form is not the courtyard houses in the old city 
of Beijing, but gated communities built by the work-units,  which are usually 
enclosed by walls, like separate independent ‗cities‘ (cheng)310.  
Although not a typical spatial form of work-unit, B&DTs area was still reorganised 
through the work-unit system. After the socialisation, Mr. M and later his two sons 
Mr. M1 and Mr. M2 became employees of the joint factory. The two families first 
moving in (the Ts and Ls) were also from the same ‗work-unit‘, the coal ball factory. 
Subsequent newcomers, however, were not Mr. M‘s colleagues, but were from other 
work-units under the leadership of the same local authority (i.e. the district 
government). In a sense, the transformation from household to (a part of) work-unit 
further blurred the boundaries between gong and si, and the perception of the 
ownership of the properties became more ambiguous too.  
5.3 Spatial reorganisation during the Cultural Revolution 
(1967--1976): the masses, public power and private 
properties  
During the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976, the whole country was in an 
unprecedented turmoil. In fact, the Cultural Revolution not only redrew the house 
ownership and occupation map of Beijing but also reshaped people‘s understanding 
of the crucial concepts of property, private property, ownership and, owner 
occupation of housing, etc. At the same time, the experience around properties also 
induced some fundamental changes in state-individual, collective-individual and 
individual-individual relations. B&DTs area, a neighbourhood in the capital, 
experienced significant spatial and social reconfiguration in the ten years of political 
turmoil. This process is what I attempt to illustrate in this section. 
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Some general changes in terms of property occurred during this period: the REMB 
stopped sharing rent income with the landlords, among whom Mrs. H was one case; 
many property owners ‗donated‘ their houses by handing over their land title 
certificates to the REMB; in some very radical cases, the masses, involving the Red 
Guards and tenants evicted the landlords from their houses and sometimes even 
caused death.   
In the case of the M‘s, the government built more houses in the yard, 
accommodating another four households whose members worked for state-owned 
factories. The tenants paid no rent and the house was regarded as a non-wage benefit 
gained from their work-units. However, the occupiers did not ‗own‘ the houses. The 
houses and the land were still properties of the government and the tenants could be 
relocated to other houses controlled and managed by their work units or the local 
government. The M Family, including three smaller families of five people, still kept 
their two houses in title and in reality.   
Here I would like to use another case, the story of Mrs. N and Mrs. D who have been 
living in one courtyard dwelling for more than a half century to give more details 
about what was going on and people‘s mentality towards (private) property during 
the Cultural Revolution.  
5.3.1 Property title and occupation changes: different stories 
Mrs. D and her family lived in a house previously owned by Mrs. N from the 
republican period until now. Mrs. N‘s mother-in-law inherited two houses of six 
rooms from her husband‘s family after her husband died. But in the entitlement 
certificate, the property was under the name of her son, Mr. N. In the republican 
period, Mr. N and his mother were living on the rent from one of the houses. Mrs. N 
married Mr. N in 1945 when she was 14. After Mr. N dead, she became the owner of 
the property in title.  
Mrs. D moved into the courtyard unit in 1943, two years before Mrs. N. At that time, 
the D‘s family had been tenants of Mr. N‘s mother for quite long time. Therefore, as 
a tenant, Mrs. D actually had lived there longer than her later landlady, Mrs. N. The 
relations of the people involved in the case can be found in Figure 5.19. The story 
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here is restructured from the oral accounts of Mrs. D, Mrs. N and Mrs. N‘s two 
daughters. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
During the socialist transition in the 1950s, as a private property owner (sifangzhu) 
possessing 6 rooms, less than the allowed maximum of 15, Mrs. N was not required 
to hand over the properties to the  REMB. Instead, she continued to let three rooms 
and collected rents from the tenants, among whom were the D couple. Mrs. D was a 
street performer and became an acrobat in a ‗state-operated‘ (guoying, literally 
‗run/operated by the state‘) acrobatic troupe when all the troupes were integrated into 
the state system in the Socialist Transformation in the 1950s. Despite being tenants 
of private properties, Mr. and Mrs. D were still seen as householders and therefore 
they were not allocated any new house from their work-units. Yet in 1956, there was 
a chance by which Mr. D could get a house/room from his work unit but he refused, 
for he was worried that it might cause big troubles if he became a ‗property owner‘ 
(fangchanzhu). Mr. N also refused an apartment offered by his work-unit: 
Elder daughter: My dad is that kind of person…Super loyal 
to the state and the party. I would say, he is the person having 
highest awareness in the party. Ha ha ha…  
Interviewer: I heard that he was offered an apartment, but he 
didn‘t accept. 
Mr. N‘s mother 
Mr. N Mrs. N 
Elder 
Daughter  
Younger 
Daughter 
Mrs. D 
Landlady-tenant 
Dead 
Interviewees 
Figure 5.19  Relations of people involved in the case of Mrs. N 
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Elder daughter: My dad thought he was a private owner, ha 
ha ha. He was timid, and dared not accept.
311
  
 
The entitlements of the properties were changed during the Cultural Revolution. One 
day, a person from a branch of REMB visited the N‘s and asked them to hand over 
their three letting rooms to the government to manage and maintain. Partly 
considering the government would maintain the house that had been in a state of 
disrepair and partly afraid of the risk of refusing, the Ns accepted the proposal. The 
original tenants were still allowed to live there, but from then on, they paid their rent 
to REMB instead of Mrs. N. In this way, the D family became the tenants of state-
owned property or public housing tenants (gongfang zuhu). The government did 
what they promised, repairing and maintaining the house. As the Ns could not afford 
to repair their own three-room house, their property continued to be in a state of 
deterioration. Finally, they decided to give their remaining house to the government 
too so that the government would help them with maintaining the property and they 
could still continue to live there. As a consequence, by the early 1970s, both of their 
two houses had been transferred into public ownership, and the N‘s family became 
the tenants of the local government, not the owner anymore.  
The younger daughter of Mrs. N told me the situation: 
Younger daughter: My mum handed over the two houses left. It‘s my 
mum who did that. She said my dad was lazy and didn‘t manage the 
houses. She also thought the houses were too old. Leaking was very 
often. All the houses were in a bad state of disrepair and my parents 
were very worried. 
Interviewer: Was it the landlords who should be responsible for the 
maintenance? 
Younger daughter: Yes, but landlords were poor. Their houses (a 
neighour) were also private properties, but they were poor as well. We 
got very little rent: around 10 yuan (around 1 pound) every month 
under the current rate.  
Interviewer: Was this common? 
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Younger daughter: It depends on the conditions. There were good 
houses, but you couldn‘t afford. And rich landlords even didn‘t want 
to let their houses. Having tenants caused lots of trouble. Old houses 
were cheap, but people were too poor to repair the leakage.  
Interviewer: So the REMB repaired and maintained the house after the 
handover? 
Younger daughter: Yes, they came whenever you asked, because they 
were afraid of causing damage and death. Now you can't find them, 
because the rent is too low and not enough to maintain the houses. 
Raising the rent of public housing is not allowed. 
312
 
 
It is worth noticing that the change in the Cultural Revolution is different from that 
in the Socialist Transformation. In Socialist Transformation of private enterprise, 
like the Ms‘ factory, the policy was ‗redemption and purchase‘ (shumai), which 
meant theoretically the government should ‗buy‘ enterprises from private hands. In 
reality, the government did compensate the owners in varied degrees, such as in 
money, a certain percentage of the shares in the joint enterprises, or promising jobs 
for the owners‘ close relatives. The owners could accept the money or the share, but 
many of them just ‗donated‘ the compensation ‗to the state‘. In this sense, in spite of 
the flexibility and inequality of the contract, it was still a kind of deal. In the case of 
Mrs. H, a ‗big landlord‘, the government ‗managed and let‘ her 25 rooms, but there 
was still a share between the two parties (Mrs. H got 40% rent and the government 
60%). In both two kinds of cases in the Socialist Transformation, ‗private‘ property 
was not completely denied. Yet in the Cultural Revolution, the ideas and practices 
were more radical. Mrs. H not only lost her 40% rent income but also was required 
to relinquish the 12 rooms that she was allowed to keep in the 1950s. The final result 
was that Mrs. H held on to the 5 rooms that her family was using, and gave the rest 
to the government. The government became the owner of the property in title at the 
cost of nothing. 
Mrs. N, owning 6 rooms before, was just a ‗small landlord‘ and her ‗attitude‘ was 
good so she was not treated in a very harsh way. In the interview, Mrs. N and her 
elder daughter seemed very willing to offer their estate to the state, and they felt the 
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changes of the ownership made no difference in the occupation or in the daily use of 
the properties. ‗We can live in the state-owned houses generation by generation‘, 
they said.  
When I talked with them, I could not fully understand this and doubted whether that 
was their true attitude. The following story may reflect something that they did not 
explicitly express. Mrs. N‘s daughter recalled the striking scene that she saw in an 
organised trip watching the outcome of ‗private property owners‘; they were beaten 
and tortured by the Red Guards, many of whom were just middle school students in 
the same age as her, in a room with lots of blood on the floor and walls. She did not 
join the crazy masses as her classmates did, but gave an owner who she knew a hand 
to help him up when all other people left. When she told me the story almost four 
decades after it happened, I could feel her deep fear and sympathy to the private 
property owners. Now it is difficult to know, whether the trust in or the fear of the 
party-state contributed more to private owners‘ decision to give up their rights to 
their properties
313
. This extract from interview reflects some of the situation and 
people‘s mentality at that extreme time: 
Younger daughter: In the Cultural Revolution, I was following the 
Red Guard. They criticized and denounce people like capitalists, 
property owners and small business owners and so on before the 
public… At that time, the masses were ‗revolutionist‘ (zaofanpai) and 
leaders were the ‗establishment‘ (dangquanpai).  
Interviewer: Did they attack you? 
Younger daughter: Yes. They attacked you if you were a tech guru. 
People earning more money, better in job were attacked. 
Interviewer: But your family was not attacked as private owner? 
Younger daughter: We were still proletarians. You must protect 
yourself. Joining or not joining a group. In this area, many private 
house owners were prosecuted, beaten or forced to have their hair 
shaved. To be honest, timid people dared not to go out. I can tell you, 
Beijing First Secondary School was famous (for prosecution). They 
have a basement, and students fought with students there. All around 
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the wall was blood. It was too cruel to see. We were organised to visit 
the basement, and I felt very sad. Why were children beaten like this? 
They were younger than you and fought with each other. 
Interviewer: Why were you people organised to visit this? 
Younger daughter: To teach you. We were still proletarians, not 
capitalists. The organisation (zuzhi) wanted you to see it. I felt bad. So 
many people died. You didn't experience this. I‘m scared, so scared, 
shaking every time I recalled this. You are lucky for not experiencing 
it, or else you wouldn‘t come to Beijing.  
Interviewer: I heard that many private house owners dared not to ask 
their properties back after the Cultural Revolution. 
Younger daughter: During the Cultural Revolution, private owners 
dared not say they had properties. For example, this house was ours, 
but we gave it (to the government), and they became property of the 
gong-family (gongjia, i.e. government).  
Interviewer: Is that for this reason you didn‘t buy a property 
afterwards? 
Younger daughter: That was different. You can buy property as you 
will now, as long as you have money. We didn‘t buy new houses 
because we had too many children. We don‘t have so much money. 314 
The most appalling story that I heard in the neighbourhood is about Mrs. B, the wife 
of a ‗big landlord‘. She was beaten to death by her tenants and the Red Guards in the 
Cultural Revolution because she refused to move out from her property
315
. Mrs. B‘s 
family has been evicted from the area for about 40 years. After the Cultural 
Revolution, along with political rehabilitation advocated by the Party, there were 
also policies in returning the properties confiscated in the Cultural Revolution to 
their original owners. From early 1980s, some previous owners or their near relatives 
regained their properties and moved back to the neighbourhood, and there were 
many cases like this in the B&DTs area, but Mrs. B‘s family did not. I was told this 
story by other neighbours and they also said some ‗murderers‘ were still living in 
Mrs. B‘s houses. I visited one of her courtyards which was jammed by self-built 
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houses. Like people in other courtyards, only few people would answer my questions. 
I did not ask about the story of Mrs. B. 
5.3.2 Attack derogatory si 
The relationship between gong and si and the implications in the Cultural Revolution 
are different from the Socialist Transformation. 
Si, connected with selfishness and narrow private interests, was seen as deficient and 
derogatory. Gong was viewed as a powerful weapon to overcome the faults of si. An 
idiom, dagong wusi, literally ‗enlarging gong and eradicating si‘, meaning ‗selfless‘ 
or ‗putting the interests of the all before one‘s own‘, was frequently used not only in 
official propaganda but also in people‘s daily language. In terms of property, private 
properties embodied si elements. Public ownership, collective ownership or state 
ownership could convert the deficiency of private property. By transforming the 
property into publicly-owned (gongyou), the property and the previous owners could 
become a part of gong, therefore cleaned the sin of si. This is the implication in the 
Socialist Transformation.  
However, in the Cultural Revolution, the attack was not merely on property and 
ownership, but more on the morality of private owners. When the relevance is more 
about the embodiment of si, the nature of the embodiment can be changed (e.g. 
private property being socialised). But if something is deemed as si in abstract and 
moral senses, the whole character is denied. Similarly, once a person is deemed as 
selfish and self-interested (zisi zili) in nature, his whole personality has been 
negated
316
. There will be no way to redeem the moral deficiency. This logic can 
partially explain why the urban proprietors who previously had been incorporated 
into socialism were treated in an extremely harsh way in the Cultural Revolution.  
The moral dimension of gong and si also contributes to the particular intimacy 
between the two, which renders the demarcation of the public and private realms 
even more obscure. In Patrick Joyce‘s account of the changing role of police in 
Britain from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, the responsibility of the police, 
colloquially referred to as the ‗watch‘, was indeed to ‗watch‘ the private premises in 
order to secure property; from the nineteen century, therefore the police secured 
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public space such as streets and squares in the interests of law and order. Joyce 
comments that this transformation contributes to the distinction between public and 
private space
317
. Joyce also argues, an important technique of liberal governmentality 
is to distinguish what should be known and what should be not know; for instance, 
the gaze of the map never penetrates the home, but rather leaves it as a self-
circulating private sphere
318
. But the trajectory of China is different. In Chinese cities, 
the Bell Tower and Drum Tower afforded the function of watching both the public 
and private from the beginning. The ‗police‘ (military guards in early time) regulated 
the peace of the public by regulating people. The public part of a person was not just 
about his/her behaviour but also about his/her morality. For example, in some 
dynasties, filial piety and obedience to parents was most important when 
recommending or promoting a government officer. Because the gong-spirit is 
primarily concerned with morality and ethic, it actually has touched the most 
‗private‘, inner part of a person.  This feature of gong leaves individuals nearly no 
autonomy or privacy.  The power of gong principles and embodiments relies on the 
fact that it judges you, not only in a narrow public sphere, but also as a person. 
However, I need to point out that in the Cultural Revolution it was private people 
rather than public power that played the major role of judge. An individual or a 
family can be judged as either selfless or selfish, depending on their relationship to 
the abstract and moral gong.  The state may claim ability to judge, but the final judge 
is still people. The universality of gong resides in the assumption that it can be 
perceived, understood and judged by everyone. Private persons have this capability, 
and largely because of this capability, the aggregation of private people even can 
threaten the validity of the governmental authority. This is the point that I would like 
to stress in the next section. 
5.3.3 Discontinuation of public power and the masses as gong 
During the Cultural Revolution, especially the first three years (1966-1969), the 
whole country was in an extremely chaotic state. Many city governments were 
overthrown by the radical Red Guards. Beijing, as the place where the Revolution 
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surfaced, was one of the victims. Although the mass organisations (i.e. Red Guards 
and workers) and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers formed revolutionary 
committees as the new government, they did not really know how to govern, and the 
city remained in constant conflicts and had no public services for years
319
. The 
stories described above were within the context of this chaotic background.  
The masses played a pivotal role in the Revolution. Consisting of ‗proletariat‘ and 
radical youths, encouraged by Mao and assisted by the army, the masses overthrew 
and replaced many municipal governments. In many cases, it was not the legal 
public power that expropriated private properties, as in the 1950s or now, but the 
masses-- the aggregation of private individuals—that forced the owners to give up 
their properties. A typical plot from what I read about or heard about is that, private 
owners found their names in the Red Guards‘ ‗big-character posters‘ (dazibao), 
asking them to give up their properties in a commanding and harsh tone
320
. In the 
B&DTs area, many proprietors handed in their estate certificate to the REMB that 
had been replaced or dominated by the revolutionary committees. Some were just 
kicked out by radical Red Guards. 
The mass movements have changed both the Chinese classical definition of politics 
and the relationship between private people and gong-embodiments. As explained in 
Chapter 4, politics (zheng) in the traditional sense was an area for elites, and it was 
about giving the standard, maintaining the order and peace. The elites who knew the 
order of the universe as well as human society were the authority; they were not only 
political authorities but also intellectual and moral authorities. Yet all this changed in 
the 20th century. From the protests in Tiananmen Square in 1919, common people, 
or the masses, participated in politics. Guided by adapted Marxist theories, the 
workers, peasants, students and all the classes were involved in class struggles. The 
masses were increasingly motivated as the key actors in ‗political struggles‘ 
(zhengzhi douzheng) in Mao‘s era, including the turbulent Land Reform in rural 
areas between 1947 and 1952, several campaigns to Suppress 
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‗Counterrevolutionaries‘ (i.e. Kuomintang party members) after 1949, Three-
Anti/Five-Anti campaigns targeting capitalists and business owners in urban area in 
the 1950s, an Anti-Rightist Movement, a purge within the Communist Party in the 
late 1950s, and then the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the Destruction of 
Four Olds targeting ‗old‘ traditions and religions from the 1960s. Here the aim of 
politics was not to give and to maintain the order but to destroy the old order. Top-
down, administrative methods were abandoned; bottom-up mass movements and 
mass politics swept. Orthodoxy, intellectual authorities and political authorities were 
not something or someone to follow and respect any more, but targets to overthrow. 
The linkage between norm, peace, authority and good politics broke.  
This shift in the understanding and practice of politics was significant. But can we 
say it was something completely revolutionary? Was it a substantial break with the 
traditional understanding? I would say no. I shall explain this according to the gong-
si structure given in Chapter 2, especially the direct and essential connection 
between private person and Heaven, the highest, abstract and moral gong (diagram 
2.5).  
The ruler (e.g. emperor) could claim that he gets the mandate from Heaven, and it 
was true that the elites were considered more capable, and therefore had more 
‗rights‘ to engage in political affairs than ordinary people. Yet the ability to judge 
whether the ruler implemented or lost the mandate of Heaven, or whether the 
governing from the elites was desirable, was owned by everyone. ‗Universal law of 
Heaven is in human heart‘ (tianli zizai renxin), as Chinese people often say. In this 
way, private persons, regardless of their intellectual and social status, became the 
unit to perceive the law of Heaven. This position gave people, especially when they 
were in the collective, a potential to challenge and even to overthrow any existing 
public authorities. From this point of view, the structure of gong-si system was very 
unstable, and the reversal between the ruled and the ruler was always possible.  
Referring to the land politics in the Cultural Revolution, the private owners were 
seen as bonded to the moral faults of si, which resulted in the upgrading of conflicts 
between the tenants and new occupiers on the one side and the landlords on the 
other
321
. And because the masses overturned the (local) government as a type of 
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gong-embodiment, private owners were also confronted by the masses, another type 
of gong-embodiment. In the exploration of the genealogy of gong, we have seen, 
besides the highest gong spirit and principles, there are two forms of gong-
embodiments: the state and the collective. The ambiguity between the two can be 
dated from the time when the word gong was used as the title of the tribe leader and 
at the same time as the house and the yard for collective rights and activities of the 
community. The two are interrelated but also can be contradictory. The Tiananmen 
Square populous movement challenging the authority is one example. The fact that 
the Red Guards overthrew many local governments is another. Private people, are 
not only under the shadow of the over-powerful state, but can also be threatened by 
the masses that actually consist of private people. That is what the property 
confiscation and struggle during the Cultural Revolution showed to us. Thus, the 
B&DTs stories display both the conflicts between gong and si and the contradictions 
embedded in the structure of gong.     
5.4 Self-building activities before and after the Great 
Tangshan Earthquake (1976): revenge of si ? 
5.4.1 Self-building activities  
I have mentioned that some people in the neighbourhood built houses by themselves, 
a process referred to as ‗self-building‘. In the 1950s, the policy was to change 
Beijing from a consumption city into an industrial city, which brought a large 
number of worker migrants into Beijing and caused huge housing deficits. By the 
principles of socialism, it was the state that should solve the housing problem for 
everyone, and the state did house a great many by building new houses and by 
expropriating and redistributing private properties. Yet it was not enough. Thus 
people constructed houses by themselves and these behaviours were accepted by the 
government.  
Self-building happened intensively during the Cultural Revolution. Because of the 
anarchic state of Beijing in that period, there were no town planning, land use or 
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construction regulations for many years. In 1964, the town planning sector was 
marked as ‗capitalist road‘, and the Beijing Urban Planning Committee was 
abolished in 1968 and not restored until 1972.  The abolition of city planning was to 
have wider implications. As discussed before, planning is not just a tool for the state 
to govern and regulate; its assumption of the compulsory control over all and its 
intention to actualise the control can be seen as a symbol of the state, of 
governmentality. On Foucault‘s explanation inspired by its semantic composition, 
governmentality is not just the technologies of governing (gouverner), but also 
mentalité, the modes of thoughts, political rationality and maybe also political 
impulse
322
. In a sense, modern planning history is also the process of the state 
enhancing its role as a state in terms of both techniques and mentality. Patrick Joyce 
uses John Stuart Mill‘s term, ‗discovery of the state‘, to describe how the 
administrative apparatus recognised its potential to carry out reform and 
management by applying spatial interventions
323
. The planning history of Britain 
since the late nineteenth century, especially the impressive ‗state (trans)formation‘ 
after the Second World War, is an example
324
. For China, as I have shown in the last 
chapter, the spatial layout of a city was important and meaningful from the very 
beginning. The plan of a city was connected to standards, to the rule of nature, of 
universal law and of public power. It gives guidance, gives the location of everything 
and the way that everyone conduct himself/herself. For socialism, planning became 
even more significant, not only in space, but also in the economy
325
. In fact, planning 
has been used in numerous ways to ensure spatial, social, economic and ideological 
control. But in the Cultural Revolution, the planning department and its crucial 
planning power was abolished. I would argue that it was an important sign of the 
paralysis of the state during the populist movement. The Red Guard, popular groups 
and the military overthrew the authority of the city government, whilst immediately 
establishing themselves as the new authority.  
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The absence of urban planning and regulating authorities contributed to the boom of 
random, self-build construction. As I have shown, the masses were allowed to 
expropriate private properties, and in many cases, people occupied them for private 
use. Thus, the displacement of the residents and disordered construction occurred 
simultaneously, and this changed the spatial fabric of the B&DTs neighbourhood. 
The space became more fragmented. The houses were divided into smaller units and 
occupied by more residents. This was not just a result of the replacement of the 
private owners by proletarians, but was also caused by the need for spaces to house 
new, independent families. The living area per person in Beijing did not increase, but 
actually was reduced in the three decades after the founding of the new China, from 
4.75 m
2
 in 1949 to 4.45m
2 
in 1976
326
. The yards were now crowded with more 
houses (consider the M‘s yard in the 1970s). The land might have been owned by the 
state in title, but these spaces appeared as domestic space for private use.  
The ‗public‘ space of the neighbourhood was also eroded. Some open spaces, the 
ground used for drying coal balls in Mr. M‘s yard, for example, were now occupied 
by houses. Also parts of the square north to the Bell Tower and of the one between 
the two Towers were ‗privatised‘. After the socialist transition in 1953, stall vendors 
were incorporated into collective enterprises and moved out from the squares. The 
space was now occupied for residential use
327
. To some extent, in spite of a strong 
socialist orientation and the critique of private property, both the private and 
common space of the area tended to be developed for private use due to the increase 
of the population. In fact, to fill the huge gap between housing demand and provision, 
the Beijing government encouraged work-units and private people to build houses in 
any open space of the inner city
328
.‘Lowering standard‘ (gandalei and dishuiping) 
was openly promoted as a principle in building new houses between 1966 and 1972. 
Since the Planning Committee was disbanded and plans and regulations were 
suspended, construction in this period was very poor quality and took place nearly 
everywhere.  
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The Great Tangshan Earthquake occurring on the 28th July, 1976 led to a surge of 
self-building in the area.  The epicentre of the earthquake was near Tangshan in 
Hebei, 140 kilometres from Beijing. Due to the high magnitude of 7.8 on the Richter 
Scale
329
, Beijing was greatly affected and more than 30,000 houses were 
destroyed
330
. As noted earlier, buildings in the old town of Beijing were poorly 
maintained and most were constructed at very low standards. Many private owners 
could not afford to repair their houses, like Mrs. N. For the properties managed by 
the government, buildings were only repaired when they were really unsafe to live, 
and usually the tenants did not maintain the houses by themselves. According to my 
interviews of the residents in the B&DTs area, nearly everyone who experienced the 
earthquake remembered the big shaking, loud noise and how the area had been 
destroyed: one dragon head on the top of the roof of the Bell Tower fell down and 
many residential buildings‘ roofs and walls were damaged if not completely 
collapsed. Besides the old houses in disrepair, many new, poorly constructed 
buildings fell into ruins.   
Having lost their houses or being worried about aftershock, many people moved into 
temporary shelters. The government started to provide building materials for the 
reconstruction one week after the earthquake. With these materials, the residents in 
the B&DTs area rebuilt their houses and some built more houses than they had 
before. The rebuilding of the devastated area resulted in a more complicated spatial 
occupation and land ownership. Mr. F, who built his house immediately west to the 
north square was living in another neighbourhood, but moved to this area after the 
earthquake because he could not clear up the ruins in his previous land. There were 
also cases in which people built new houses in their own yards and sometimes even 
in their neighbours‘ yard if the neighbour had moved to other areas or other cities. 
All these buildings, together with those that people built for their children were 
labeled as ‗illegal‘. Although criticised in many ways, the government insists that 
only the houses distributed by employees‘ workplaces and houses managed or built 
by the branches of REMB can be recognised as legal.  
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5.4.2 Private people and the dual roles of public power 
In the case of self-building, we can observe that ‗private‘ needs for housing are 
actually recognised by public power. It is not only because housing is essential for 
labour reproduction. It relates to the validity of the system and the government. The 
moral priority of the state as a gong embodiment relies on its role of taking care of 
each private person (siren), and the advantage of socialism can only be proved by the 
fact that it can at least fulfill everybody‘s basic needs. Thus, it is a moral as well as 
political requirement for the state to meet the housing demand.  
However, when the state could not afford this, even after having redistributed a great 
many private properties, it could only resort to the spontaneity of private people. 
That is why self-building activity was allowed and even encouraged at the time. Here 
the socialist state had a kind of personalised character. The state had the 
responsibility to ‗look after‘ each family and everyone. When ‗the state had 
difficulties‘, people were required to ‗consider and understand‘ the state (like in the 
expansion of Tiananmen Square). Then people also expected the state to understand 
them. The ethical requirements were mutual. For example, in my interviews, it was 
very common to hear opinions like ‗it is impossible for the government to ignore the 
poor situation of my family‘, ‗they must solve out the housing problem for us and 
our children‘, and ‗we have sacrificed so much for the country so they should 
consider our difficulties‘. The confidence of the residents did not rely on legal 
protection of property and citizen rights but on the belief that the party-state shared 
the same perception and moral principle with ordinary people.  This again reflects 
the specific Chinese understanding of the analogy between the state and household, 
between the state and people. 
This understanding has a significant influence on people‘s perception of their rights 
to property. For the tenants of public houses in B&DTs area, they did not feel they 
had fewer rights than the private owners
331
. In fact, even the government admitted 
their equal rights: in the regeneration project, the government tenants got same 
compensation for each square meter as the private owners. Those private owners 
might not agree with the calculation of the area of their property, or want to get their 
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previously confiscated property back, but they did not question the same 
compensation standard applied for the government tenants. This was not merely 
because of the promise of the previous socialist state, but also because a morally 
gong state had been an idea firmly rooted in people‘s mind. In this way, on the one 
hand, the immature law and ownership system failed to protect people‘s property 
rights; on the other, private people‘s incomplete rights to the property were actually 
enlarged by their understanding on the ethics of the state.   
The paternalist state, however, has another face as a regulator. After the Cultural 
Revolution, government‘s functions such as urban planning were gradually restored. 
The residents‘ conventional understanding on the status of their properties and their 
rights to the properties were challenged. The confusions and ambiguities on the 
legality of the status of their properties uncovered in the regeneration project 
revealed this. Self-construction was deemed as unauthorised and therefore illegal. 
Respondents used the word sida luanjian, which literally means ‗privately building 
and disorderedly rigging up‘. Here si means acting illegally, secretly and without 
official permission or authorization. Similar use can be found in words like zousi 
(smuggle), siben (elope) and sixing (lynching). This meaning of si is contrast to gong 
as legal (adj.) and making things public, open (v.). In practice, the institution to 
judge legality and make things public is the state. Legitimate ownership is subject to 
the government‘s sanction. The state in this sense is closer to the rational-legal 
authority described by Max Webber
332
. As a consequence, the traditional paternalist 
and ethical state on the one hand and the legitimising state on the other form a 
tension within gong area. It also challenges (private) people‘s perception on the 
legality of their occupation, which is actually a conflict between gong and si.  The 
next section will discuss this in further detail.    
5.4.3 Occupation  
In the case of the B&DTs area, we can see that occupation served not just as a 
strategy for the daily use of space, but also had great influence on people‘s 
perception and understanding of the ownership of the property and their rights. 
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One important characteristic of Beijing‘s vernacular dwellings was the courtyards. 
For those inhabited by several families, the yard was naturally a shared, communal 
space for all the households. This communal land was different from publicly owned 
property (i.e. government property). From the 1950s to the 1970s, the ownership of 
the yards was quite unclear
333
. The houses were considered owned either by private 
owner or by the government (sometimes via the agency of danwei work-units), but 
the ownership of the yards was not clearly stated. The perception of its ownership 
was more conventional and customary. The residents, sometimes all government 
tenants, sometimes mixed with private owners and government tenants, shared the 
rights to use the yard at an early stage. But as Harold Demsetz shows, one big issue 
of communal ownership is that it has great externalities, which greatly increases the 
cost of negotiation among members
334
. As we can see from the case of the B&DTs 
area, gradually people started to ‗privatise‘ the communal space. It was 
understandable that people used the space around their own houses more frequently 
than others did. The most common case was that some families began to use certain 
spaces next to their houses as storage or as cooking areas. Then they sheltered the 
area- a sign of the occupation and belonging of the space. Because nearly all the 
families did this similarly and the encroached area of the common space was not 
excessive, people did not feel much tension and unfairness. Yet when one family 
built a house, like Mr. T built a house for his son, the occupation of the space 
became contested and led to conflicts. In spite of some controversies, the division of 
the yard was gradually stabilised (Figure 5.20). Even the previous private owners 
also accepted the occupation reluctantly. This process is somewhat similar to the 
change from communio to dominium in the state of nature described by Hugo 
Grotius: those primarily commonly shared ‗could not be turned to use except by 
private occupation (nisi privatim occupando), it necessarily followed that what had 
been seized on should become his to each‘, and such seizure is possessio 335 .  
According to this, it is occupation that results in possession and then the idea of 
property.  
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After the Tangshan Earthquake, the neighbourhood was in ruins. This led to another 
tide of self-construction. Again, occupation became the main strategy. In some cases, 
people occupied land different from their previous one. This period was also the time 
when the occupation of the public space happened most. The most obvious 
phenomenon was that the edge areas of the two squares were occupied for residential 
use. Construction caused by the earthquake did not cause as many conflicts between 
neighbours as normal time. When people‘s basic life was at stake, it seems that the 
occupation of any possible space for the purpose of self-preservation became more 
justifiable. In fact, as time went by, the new spatial arrangement of the 
neighbourhood after the earthquake was gradually accepted by all the people. A 
constant possession is easily transformed into property, as Rousseau argued
336
. 
Indeed, by constant living in and use of these self-build houses, people feel that the 
houses are their properties, and occupation and possession have been accepted by the 
neighbours and the whole community customarily.  
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Figure 5.20  Self-build in the courtyard 
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However, property is a relationship not just between people, but also between people 
and the state
337
. Property rights, according to Rousseau, are guaranteed by the laws 
of the sovereign. The ‗fragile‘ and provisional possession can only become ‗stronger 
and more irrevocable‘ when it is cemented in law338. In contrast, the possession of 
the properties in the B&DTs case lacked of the sanctions of a lawful institution. 
Especially under the circumstance that both the institution and the law have changed, 
the residents‘ right to their self-constructed buildings has never been legally 
guaranteed. This divergence between the perception of private people and the 
recognition of the public power finally brought about the controversies over the 
legitimacy of these properties that we see in the regeneration scheme.  
Here the public authority, a gong embodiment, plays a critical role in the affirmation 
and negation of private behaviours related to property. The legitimating function of 
the state becomes increasingly important in the modern society of the post-socialist 
China, departing from the traditional system in which gong and si could be 
harmonised, or at least understood in an integrated logic. With the establishment of 
the modern state and the introduction of a modern property system since the late 
1970s, the disputes became more distinct. I would like to emphasise two points to 
help comprehend the transformation. The first is about the separation between the 
logic of the state and that of the household. As illustrated before, the traditional idea 
supposes that the state shares the same structure and follows the same logic of the 
household. This understanding may work in the ancient, imperial and even socialist 
China, but faces challenges in contemporary Chinese society. In terms of property, 
the ideas that parents should prepare house for children and the state has the same 
responsibility to house all the people now is questioned.  Following the old logic, it 
is justifiable that people build their own houses when the state fails to do that. Self-
construction seems natural, conventional and morally understandable if it does not 
harm others. But the new system requires formal and official sanction and 
recognition on possession. Here property rights are not primarily customary, but 
need a negotiation with the state law system. The issues of property are unavoidably 
exposed to the public realm.  
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Secondly, one meaning of gong, that is, making public and open carries more 
importance. This is in contrast with the meaning of si as secret and covert, which is 
also seen as a flaw of si. In this sense, the private occupation and ‗quite 
encroachment‘ of the public or communal space lacks legitimacy because it is 
conducted in secret (sixia or simi)
339
. The residents hold the property but never 
openly claim the property, which means the customary holding is never checked 
with the current law system. Of course, the process of occupation and construction 
can be done secretly, but the result must be made public in a certain way to gain the 
‗public recognition‘. This principle also works on public affairs. The rulers can make 
decisions in a non-transparent method and without a democratic process, but the 
result needs to be made public to claim its status as gong affairs and then gain a kind 
of validity.  In the past and even in many people‘s mind in the present, private people 
should be the final judge of whether the claim really fits the principle of gong. This 
potential has be actualised by revolution and popular movements in the history of 
China, but the democratic system, which is based on a different European tradition 
of citizen political rights, also resonates with this idea in a certain way. However, the 
vital importance of the judgements of private person is usually just realised at a 
transforming moment, either in a democratic (when election occurs) or non-
democratic system (overthrowing the current system). During normal times, 
especially on the issues of property ownership, it is the state and the law that do the 
formal and legal judgement.  
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the relationship between gong and si via the lens of 
property conflicts and struggles in the neighbourhood of the B&DTs. The case study 
displays how gong and si elements are interrelated and are therefore a source of 
politics in terms of property in an area that appears a typical si place. 
The Socialist Transformation shows both the two aspects of the household, that is, 
the economic and domestic respects, can be heavily intervened, and under specific 
political regime can even be thoroughly penetrated through by the state, an 
embodiment of gong. This is reflected in the nationalisation of private industrial and 
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business, the socialist reorganisation of the people and the expropriation of private 
property from the 1950s.  
The Cultural Revolution gives an example of the tension not only between gong and 
si, but also between two types of gong embodiments. On the one hand, the state 
continued to confiscate private property. On the other, the local governments was 
overthrown by the masses composed by private persons to some extent. The 
complexity showed in the Cultural Revolution resonates with the traditional idea that 
the collective and aggregation of people can gain even more powerful moral validity 
than the state. I also point out that this power resides in the supposed intimate 
connection between private person and the principle of Heaven.  
The self-build activities in the normal time and after the Tangshan Earthquake 
address the non-movement event and the public relevance of private behaviours 
around property. The case shows the inherent conflicts between the dual roles of the 
state, that is, between an ethical paternalist state that has similar moralities with 
household and private person, and a regulator that holds the legitimating power 
beyond people. This complexity is reflected in the disputes between the private 
perception and public recognition of the ownership of privately occupied space and 
auto-constructed buildings.  
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Chapter 6  Public Power, Urban Land and Politics 
Having explored the relationship between gong and si in two concrete land politics 
cases in socialist Beijing, this chapter aims at drawing some conclusions from the 
empirical studies as well as theoretical discussion in the previous chapters. I will 
formulate the conclusions with respect to the key words of the title of the thesis. 
More specifically, I offer: a summary of the demarcation of public and private, or in 
the Chinese context, the gong-si division; the public and political characteristics of 
urban land and property; the understanding of ‗politics‘ in the Chinese vein; and 
some new political possibilities generated by the practice of property and the ‗city‘.  
 6.1 Gong-si division:the political and moral aspects  
This section will summarise the characteristics of the Chinese gong-si division, 
including the several layers of the senses of each idea and how they are connected to 
each other. A particular stress will be laid on the moral implication of the abstraction 
of gong-si demarcation. I will argue that ethically oriented theorisation has greatly 
influenced the political practice in reality. The immense power of the Chinese state 
highly relies on its status as both political and moral authority.  
6.1.1 A summary of gong-si division and relation 
A distinction between gong and si exists in Chinese thought and practice. This 
distinction overlaps many aspects of the divide of public and private, and the 
different frameworks of the distinction are comparable to some extent. However, the 
particularity of the Chinese understanding is also significant. Compared with the 
models of western public/private divide, I would suggest that, the Chinese gong-si 
divide is primarily manifested by the all-encompassing nature of the abstract idea of 
gong, which is further strengthened by the intricate connections between the 
embodiments of gong and si.  
I would like to summarise the division first and then the connections. The distinction 
between gong and si is evident in linguistic, conceptual, and practical fields. As an 
abstract concept, gong conveys justice, fairness, impartiality, normativity, 
universality, etc., while si connotes selfishness, self-interest, partiality, particularity, 
etc. The demarcation has a strong ethical implication, which bestows moral privilege 
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on gong and demeans si as pejorative and flawed. In practice, there are entities that 
are considered to embody the quality of gong or si. The most important gong bodies 
are the state and collectives, while si bodies are generally individual and family. 
However, the positions of these entities in the spectrum between the two poles of 
ideal gong and si are relative and relational, and therefore ambiguous and unstable.  
First of all, the state, as the most powerful gong body, is considered to share a 
homologous structure with family, a typical si body. This understanding blurs the 
gong-si divide between the state and family, and also resonates with the fact that the 
Chinese state is paternalist. Under some circumstances, however, the gong status of 
the state is changeable. For example, the state usually is seen as the agency of public 
power and as working on behalf of public interests, but it can also be accused of 
being manipulated by certain private interest groups. Secondly, a collective is 
understood to gain its gong status as the aggregations of individuals, of ‗private‘ 
people. This definition connects a genuine gong body to a private person. Thirdly, 
perceiving the spirit of gong and judging whether any behaviour conforms to gong 
spirit or not is believed a capability embeded in each person, which again connects 
the most abstract gong value to the smallest si embodiment: individuals. In addition, 
the relativity of the scale and some particular functions of the embodiments can also 
result in the change of their gong-si relevance. For instance, compared with the state 
or larger community, family is a si body, but for some functions it affords – for 
instance, the education of children – can be viewed as essentially important for the 
public interests of the country: in sum, it enters a gong domain.  
Given the analysis above, I would argue that gong is an encompassing concept. 
Gong and si are not two spheres or realms, but two ideal and abstract concepts. 
Notwithstanding a contrast between the two, they are in no sense equivalent or 
comparable in weight. Gong, as universal law, is actually all-embracing. Si is 
conceptualised as the opposite of gong but it is not considered to have its own 
independent principles and mechanism. To some extent, it is an idea with no territory. 
All the gong and si embodiments, theoretically, are under the influence of the 
normative gong and each can build its specific connection to gong. The universality 
of gong makes it omnipresent: gong is of course embodied in governmental activities, 
but the household, individuals, economic activities, and even personal choice and 
psyche can also be a part of gong. For the moral implication of gong gives gong-
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bodies priority over others, all embodiments in reality, regardless of usually being 
categorised into gong or si group, compete with each other for the symbolic meaning 
of the abstract gong. One prominent example is the contest between the state and the 
collective of people. The Tiananmen popular protest that shook the authority and the 
mass movements in the Cultural Revolution reflect this conflict. The contest for 
symbolic meanings of gong generates politics in reality and further suppresses si in 
discourse. Moreover, as has been emphasised, when the moral judgment involved in 
gong-si division applied on private bodies, especially on a person, it judges the very 
internal part of a person (e.g. motivation), and therefore it denies all the value and 
the whole personality of the person. In this way, again, gong does not leave any 
space for a relatively independent si. 
This all-encompassing characteristic of gong is distinct from the models of 
public/private division. The boundaries between public and private in different 
models are also ambiguous and unstable, but each model still demarcates a core area 
for the private part. For example, using Weintraub‘s categorisation again (see 
Section 2.1), the republican model contrasts household to political community, and 
the liberal model contrasts the market to the government. The private realm in each 
model has its own domain and is attached with great importance. In the liberal model, 
the private (i.e. market economy) is even given some ‗moral‘ privilege in relation to 
the ‗intervention‘ of public power.   
But in the Chinese gong-si conceptual framework, gong is overwhelming, although it 
does not obliterate si. This is not just in concepts and ideology; it also has its salient 
manifestation in reality. That is the tremendous political and moral power of the state, 
the most significant gong embodiment. The empirical study has showed this. The 
next section turns to a theorisation of the role of the state within the gong-si 
framework.  
6.1.2 State as political and moral authority  
Among all the most important gong and si bodies, the state is the most powerful one 
in practice. The power of the Chinese state, because of the regime formed from its 
particular cultural and political history, is even more overwhelming. I will argue that 
the authority of the Chinese state highly relies on the moral privilege attained by its 
gong status and on its practice of continuously constructing other bodies as si. 
177 
 
However, the gong-si frame also provides a mechanism to ‗counterbalance‘ the 
prominent power of the state, that is, the state-family analogy requires the state 
massive responsibilities along with its power, the internal contests between the state 
and collective within gong, and the challenge from individuals against their direct 
connection to the moral principles of gong.   
I hope the case studies have made it clear that the state claims as well as acts itself as 
both political authority and moral authority. This is the mystery of why the immense 
power of the state possible. The priority of the state is also always in relation to the 
disparagement of si bodies such that gong almost requires si. For examples, the land 
expropriation in the expansion of Tiananmen Square praised the public interests of 
the country and debased the private interests of individuals and families; the 
Socialist Transformation of the industry and commerce in the 1950s was an attempt 
to eliminate the market economy and capitalism which pursued private profits; the 
property confiscation and the illegalisation of the self-constructed houses in the 
B&DTs area can be seen as a denial of private property ownership and private, 
unauthorised occupation. By constructing the si bodies and activities as morally 
flawed and even illegal, the state enhances its moral and political advantage as a 
gong body for the public good. It is worth noting that the state‘s connection to public 
interests is not based on the assumption of a representative government as in many 
democratic systems but for its status as an embodiment of the abstract and normative 
gong.  
Pierre Bourdieu explains the distinctive power of the modern state from the 
perspective of symbolic capital, which is insightful for us to understand the moral 
sense of gong and public. For Bourdieu, the quasi- magical power of the state is 
based on its monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence. Yet different 
from Max Webber, he believes that the monopoly of symbolic capital is the 
condition for the possession and exercise of physical violence
340
. For Bourdieu, the 
modern state emerged from the ‗culmination of a process of concentration of 
different species of capital‘, especially the symbolic capital341. This symbolic capital 
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here conveys a strong moral sense of normativity and universality like the discourse 
of gong and public. With the constitution of symbolic capital, the state transforms 
the particular into the universal, shapes the collective belief, values and cognitive 
structures and also produces principles of classification and social recognitions. 
Bourdieu then gives a specific stress on the juridical capital, an ‗objectified and 
codified form of symbolic capital power‘342: 
The universal is the object of universal recognition and the 
sacrifice of selfish (especially economic) interests is 
universally recognized as legitimate. (In the effect to rise from 
the singular and selfish point of view of the individual to the 
point of view of the group, collective judgment cannot but 
perceive, and approve, an expression of recognition of the 
value of the group and of the group itself as the fount of all 
value, and thus a passage from ‗is‘ to ‗ought‘). This means that 
all social universes tend to offer, to varying degrees, material 
or symbolic profits of universalization (those very profits 
pursued by strategies seeking to ‗play by the rule‘). It also 
implies that the universes which, like the bureaucratic field, 
demand with utmost insistence that one submits to the 
universal, are particularly favourable to obtaining such 
profits
343
.  
Bourdieu‘s theorisation overlaps some of my concerns about the state as both moral 
and political authority, especially his attention paid to universalization. The 
legitimisation of the universal involves an illegitimisation of the particular, of the 
private. It is also parallel to the construction of the idea of public interest and the 
notion that government is oriented in principle to the common good. The physical 
power relations between the state and people are simultaneously symbolic relations, 
and people‘s acts of submission or obedience are cognitive acts 344 . This 
interpretation echoes the universality of gong and its priority over si. In the case of 
China, the state power also has a marked impact on mentalities. The state never 
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ceases to try to convince people that the state follows the value and spirit of gong, 
and government helps maintain the order of the world. To a large degree, people do 
take this notion for granted. However, neither Bourdieu‘s France nor the socialist 
Chinese state that I study can monopolise the symbolic capital or moral power 
completely.  There are always ‗conflicts between symbolic powers that aim at 
imposing the vision of legitimate divisions‘ 345 ; there are also contests among 
different bodies for a specific type of symbolic power.  
In the case of China, the combination of symbolic power and physical violence is 
undeniable. Yet the immense power of the state attained by its dual status as both 
moral authority and political authority does have its counterbalance. For one thing, 
the morality of gong requires responsibility. But the responsibility of the state is not 
because of the rights of the citizens; instead it is derived from the state-family 
homo-structure. Just as parents have authority as well as duties for their children, 
the state is considered to be responsible for the welfare of the people. Gong morality 
does not only give power but also means moral obligation. That is why the residents 
in the Bell & Drum Towers area would like to give their properties to the 
government but at the same time had requirement of housing, jobs and children 
education. Second, the collective shares the moral power of gong with the state, 
which forms a potential challenge to the authority of the state. As the case studies 
demonstrate, under specific circumstances, the collective is able to use its moral 
power as well as physical violence to challenge-- even overthrow-- the state (e.g. 
many municipal governments were overthrew during the Cultural Revolution). 
Third, individual‘s moral perception and judgment is also potentially able to 
damage or dismiss the moral authority of the state. In Bourdieu‘s interpretation, the 
state plays a role as the ultimate source of symbolic power and as the ultimate 
referee
346
. Yet from the notion of gong, Heaven is the source of the universal law 
and moral power, and everyone, against their inborn perceptive and intuitive 
capability, is the referee. Of course, in practice, the state saves no efforts to 
monopolise moral power, but still we can see the moral judgments from common 
people are also influential. The B&DTs case shows that individuals can utilise the 
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private, but also common people‘s moral sense, genuinely or strategically, to guard 
their interests even when this means they confront a powerful state.  
From the analysis above, we can identify two significant tensions: the tension 
between the state and collective, and the tension between the state and individuals. 
These two challenge the moral as well as political authority of the state within the 
area of gong and from the side of si respectively. It is also interesting to see that 
these two tensions in a way respond to the two traditions of the western political 
thoughts on public/private. The separation of the state and collective, or between the 
sovereign and the common, resonates with the coexisting traditions of the notion of 
sovereignty inherited from Roman Empire and the understanding of collective self-
determination from Greek polis and Roman Republic. However, the collective 
power in China has never been well institutionalised. There are cases of collective 
actions like uprising or revolutions which changed history, but the collaboration of 
people has never been integrated into the political system. The suppression of any 
form of organised collective exactly reflects the pivotal moral contests between the 
state and collective.  
The tension between the state and individual is also an interesting comparison to the 
liberal notion of the contrast between state action and private individuals‘ contractual 
activities. In the liberal tradition, the private sphere, or the market, adopts a 
defensive and watchful gesture towards the public power. It emphasises the 
difference and separation from the public sphere or sector. But in the Chinese gong-
si division, the private people‘s potential to challenge the state is not because it is in 
a separate realm and inclined to keep the autonomy, but based on the notion that they 
are connected to gong, on their intimacy rather than separation with the other realm.  
Thus, although theoretically the collective and individual have their own moral 
power and they do restrict the moral authority of the state, collective and individual 
moral power is never transformed into political power in practice as efficiently as the 
state.     
6.2 The public and political feature of land and property 
Land ownership, or property, is an issue on the interface of public and private; it is 
also a debate constantly connected to gong-si relationship. This section discusses the 
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public, private and political elements embedded in urban land and property. It 
focuses on the following aspects: first, the public aspects of land, including the state 
as the landlord of ‗public‘ property and as sovereign to intervene into land issues; 
second, the social, interpersonal character of land use and land ownership, including 
the externality of land use, the economic dimension of property and the cultural, 
moral and customary understanding of property and ownership; third, the intimate 
relationship between private people and property, involving labour investment, 
occupation, life activities and people‘s psychic perception on their rights. I will also 
discuss the conflicts and politics caused by the interweaving public and private 
features of land and property, especially how the different understanding of 
ownership and property rights are reflected in legitimation.  
Some important controversies brought by gong-si division over land and property are 
revealed in the thesis. One is about the debates on public and private ownership. 
Chapter 2 outlined the role of state and collective ownership in Chinese history, and 
empirical studies demonstrated how it, combined with socialism, resulted in the 
reorganisation of land ownership in Beijing after the establishment of the PRC in 
1949. As has been emphasised many times, once associated with gong-si division, 
property ownership raises moral and political issues. In the land politics of socialist 
Beijing, we can see that attacks on private ownership and private owners were very 
fierce. This was associated with the moral judgements on si and on all its variations. 
To achieve socialisation, the authority disparaged all private elements and 
exaggerated the moral inferiority of si. In order to eliminate private elements and 
thus the defective si, the public power expropriated the space of private bodies and 
activities, that is, the confiscation of private corporate properties and household 
properties. The belief was that, by transforming ownership from private to public, all 
the activities and people on the land would become more ‗public‘ and then more 
morally right. In this sense, land is hyper-political because it is about the interplay of 
gong and si. It is the arena for both public and private bodies and activities, and 
therefore it cannot avoid the conflicts brought about by the morality of gong-si 
relationship. I would like to theorise this by interrogating land and property in its 
relationship to the state, community and private people.  
The modern state is an entity integrating sovereignty and territory. When we say the 
territory of a country, it first appears as a territory in relation to the external world, to 
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other countries. But internally, it is also the state‘s territory; the sovereignty of the 
state is not just relational to other sovereign powers, but also is over its domestic 
land and people. In practice, the state is the owner of so called ‗public‘ lands, which 
shows the face of the state as landlord. It is also the sovereign, no matter whether it 
claims the embodiment of gong from the top or the embodiment of ‗the people‘ from 
the below. This is reflected by the state‘s monopoly power to compulsorily 
expropriate property as the public authority. In fact, only the state can enable the 
ownership transferred from private into public.  Moreover, for those lands that the 
state does not own or does not intend to transfer, the state still has the power to 
regulate.  As the case of City of London v Samede and Others (Chapter 1) and the 
case of Beijing (Chapter 4 & 5) showed, unlike the private property rights to exclude 
others, the power of the government over land is the rights to interfere. This power is 
reflected in urban planning, land use control and various regulations. In addition, the 
legislative power of the state defines the different bodies‘ ownership of and rights to 
properties, and demarcates the boundaries between legal and illegal.  
The coerciveness of the state power here is apparent. Especially the coercive power 
of compulsory acquisition, that is, taking private property for a purportedly public 
use, is exercised exclusively by the state or the functional equivalent of the state. It is 
also one of the three major inherent powers of the state (i.e. taxation, police power 
and eminent domain)
347
. As has been explained before, land expropriation and 
planning are actually associated with police power in the historical traditions of 
certain societies (Section 4.3.3). In this point, the power to intervene into land 
ownership and land use is extremely important in terms of both presenting and 
actualising state sovereignty. The significance of land for state sovereignty renders 
land and property a salient political theme.   
Moreover, the state sovereignty over land does not only display coercion but also 
indicates legitimacy. This is the normative and moral dimension of public power. It 
is also the base of the legislative power of the state. State intervention is of course 
primarily a political reality. We at least partially agree that it is necessary to have 
public power, an authority to deal with the common issues and interpersonal 
conflicts. To some extent, the state interference implies that a completely private 
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world is flawed if not impossible. It reflects a particular pursuit for the universal, 
normative standard, etc. Legislation of property rights is an attempt to unify 
particular property practice into one ordering system.  
However, property has its private facet, that is, people‘s personal and interpersonal 
relationships with land and property. People occupy a piece of land, live their life on 
the land and invest their labour and money into the land. All these, life, labour and 
occupation, build a very personal and intimate relationship with the land. These 
practices also shape people‘s perception and understanding of the ownership of the 
land and their rights to the land. This perception and understanding may be 
controversial with the legislation, but just like the B&DTs case has showed, they 
exist and work. In the summary of gong-si relationship in Section 6.1.1, si is 
interpreted as a concept without its own territory. But in practice, si bodies and 
activities have their own land. They happen somewhere. They ‗privatise‘ space and 
bestow private attributes upon land. The moral flaws (from a Chinese perspective) of 
si in conception may render si bodies disadvantaged in reality, but they never 
eliminate private activities.  
Even more, the interactions among private bodies over land forms a type of 
publicness. First of all, compared with other properties, a special aspect of real estate 
is its ability to create externalities. The occupation and use of the land have an 
external effect. It is the embedded public nature of land, regardless of whether the 
state intervention has been established or not. Secondly, property can be exchanged 
as other commodities in the estate market, which is within the contractual practice 
among private bodies. Usually this is still viewed as a private field from the 
perspective of liberal thought, but the inter-subjectivity forms a ‗common‘ area 
between private bodies. Last but not the least, the recognition of occupation, 
ownership and rights are social, conventional and cultural. Ownership is not just a 
completely personal relation between the occupier or holder and the land, but also a 
constant negotiation between neighbours, as well as a communal, customary 
perception and recognition from all other members of a community. Rather than the 
public realm of the state, this is the common realm of the people. The customary law 
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and social norms are another type of powerful legislation, parallel to and at the same 
time contesting the legislation of the state
348
.  
These three layers of property-- that is, state control, private use and social contract, 
with their respective legislative logics -- bring about controversies and conflicts. In 
this sense, the politics of property resides in the complex qualities of land: land is 
both private and public, and it is public in at least two different senses. To 
summarise, on the one hand, all lands, including private lands, are within a territory 
and under the influence of the sovereign.  Land, especially private land, on the other 
hand, is held and used by private bodies. Even non-private land like city roads, 
squares, parks, etc. enjoyed by the public, it is (private) people‘s daily use of these 
spaces that sustains its public character. The overlapping public and private 
authorities on the same land, and the confusion of gong and si, lead to the conflicts 
between the state and individuals, between public power and private rights.  
The legitimation of ownership, including different legitimate logics from the state, 
community and private people, cause further politics and further (con)fusion of gong 
and si. Following Robert Hale‘s idea that property is a relationship between two 
people and the state
349
, we can say that property is a relationship between different 
private bodies and public power. In other words, property is an issue involving a 
profound interaction between gong and si, and between si and si (- the latter create 
another type of gong). It also expresses that ownership needs legislation, or 
ownership actually fuses different kinds of legislation. Property rights are on the one 
hand socially recognised, but on the other, as Rousseau suggested, property rights 
must be given legitimately. Especially in modern society, property rights need legal 
recognition from the state. Because property rights are attached to legal codes and at 
the same time to customary and moral codes, conflicts are unavoidable. This is also a 
manifestation of the controversy between ‗public‘ and ‗common‘, between the moral, 
political and legislative power of the state and collective consisted of individuals as 
two types of gong embodiments.  
This contradictory understanding of ownership and property rights has been 
demonstrated by the land politics in the B&DTs area. Local residents‘ perception of 
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the ownership and their rights to the property were largely based on the actual 
holding of the property, on the constant occupation and utilisation of the land and 
also on the acquiescence or recognition of their neighbours and the community; their 
understanding of their rights was also affected by their understanding of the duty of 
the state, rather than just based on legal codes or arbitrary explanation from the state.  
Against is important to underline that customary or perceived ownership and rights 
were unprotected, but not necessarily powerless. In contrast, they were very strong 
and have worked for decades. This is of course because of the specific social-
political conditions, and especially the immature legal system of China at that time, 
but even in the recent regeneration project, we still see the moral, customary codes, 
which are actually in opposition to present legislation, take effect. China is very 
much still a society in transition, with traditional, customary codes and modern legal 
system working simultaneously. The case of B&DTs shows the conflicts between 
the two systems. Yet it is also a reflection of the notion that private people are 
intimately connected to the moral gong, to the law of Heaven. The state as gong 
embodiment and the state law are just second to the ideal gong and the highest law. 
Private people can perceive the universal law of the moral gong and do the 
judgement. This forms a big challenge to the authority and to the legislation of the 
state. As has been argued, moral power has a potential to be converted into political 
power; in our political world, moral power is political power. Private persons, as 
bearers of morality and as referee, together with his/her role as land occupier and 
user, can define ownership and rights not less powerful than the state in some 
circumstances.  
To summarise, the issues of land ownership and property rights displays the tensions 
between public and private, between private and private and the conflicts within 
public. Land and property also ground the politics of gong-si relationship.  The state 
sovereignty in transferring land ownership and in regulating land use is in conflict 
with or resisted by private people‘s daily use, occupation of land and their perception 
of the rights. The divergence between the formal, legitimate recognition of property 
rights from the state and the moral, customary understanding of property rights from 
the people/community further makes property/ownership an extremely political issue, 
as it is the contest for standards, for principle, for ‗the right‘. The next section will 
continue the discussion from the Chinese perspective of politics.  
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6.3 Rethinking politics in Chinese contexts 
This section discusses the particular Chinese understanding of politics. This is also a 
response to the question that I proposed in the introductionary chapter: what do ‗the 
political‘ and politics mean for Chinese people, and how is politics practised in the 
Chinese society?  
I have put a lot of stress on the normative and moral sense of gong. In the etymology 
of the Chinese word zhengzhi for ‗political‘ and ‗politics‘, I pointed out that the word 
primarily meant standard, just, upright, etc. (see Section 4.3.5). In the empirical 
study, we also see that people attached great importance to the morality of both 
private and public bodies in reality. All these lead up to the following argument: the 
traditional Chinese ‗politics‘ is about standard and normativity, and it particularly 
pursues order. This is very different from the political tradition of Europe. Derived 
from the Greek word politika and its Latinisation politicus, politics referred to 
‗affairs of the polis‘ and those ‗of, for, or relating to citizens‘. It was about 
government and governance indeed (though a democratic or republican type), but 
there was no particular implication of order or normativity in the words. In contrast, 
politics from the Greek tradition was related to debates and disagreements around 
public affairs, was about how to solve out the disagreements via participation and 
discussion. Rather differently, the Chinese perspective believed universal standards 
and assumed something normative and right, thus politics was to keep the normative 
and the right and to correct or remedy the wrong, which was in a sense lacking of 
‗democratic‘ tradition. 
The emphasis on standards in thoughts laid a different foundation for Chinese 
political practice. Since standards were assumed, the contests for standards became 
the real politics in reality. Standards or principles were considered to be set by 
Heaven and to be the source of moral as well as political validity. As the discussion 
of gong-si relationship showed, different actors‘ capabilities to approach these 
standards were not the same. More specifically speaking, in the imperial era, the 
emperor declared to be the Son of Heaven and to afford the mandate from Heaven, 
and zhengzhi was to govern ‗all-under-heaven‘ and to keep the order and peace. The 
modern state also tried to set itself as the embodiment of gong, but not in the sense 
as representative of the citizens or the public from below, but rather as the media to 
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convey the spirit of gong and to demonstrate its standards from the top. As it was 
explained, the state could claim that it represents gong due to its political advantage, 
but ordinary people had the quality to judge whether the claim was true or not. 
However, these ordinary people did not engage in ‗politics‘ in a narrow sense (i.e. 
government), although their judgement could result in very political consequences 
(e.g. uprising or revolution). The traditional governing group was intellectual 
officials or elite class. Selected from normal people by a national examination 
system, they were seen as more eligible to understand the universal standards and to 
use them to govern the country. It was this group, rather than ordinary people (not 
even the emperor), that governed the country and exercised statecraft, the Chinese 
zhengzhi.  
Above is an account of Chinese ‗politics‘ based on individual actors. The image will 
be different if we aggregate individuals into collective as a whole. As has showed in 
genealogy, gong idea started to take shape from a very early time, compared with 
which Heaven and statecraft in Confucianism was a rather late theorisation. 
Primarily, gong was connected to multiple people, regardless of referring to all the 
people or more to the head of these people. The commonality sense of the gong idea 
reflected the fact that people lived with each other in a society. However, it did not 
necessarily lead to Arendt‘s definition of politics as activities and actions of people 
in plural
350
. In a world with presumed harmony, people were supposed to keep or 
restore the order and the universal law of the world. A harmonious world was not a 
politically active world. It did not encourage collective actions. As the history of 
Beijing city and Tiananmen Square showed, collective rites played a more important 
role in most of the time. Yet the idea of collective was still very powerful. As has 
been explained, it was a possible ‗origin‘ from which the word of gong derived, and 
then it became a key embodiment of the moralised gong idea parallel with the state. 
It was also a hybrid of gong and si. It was viewed as a typical gong because it related 
to multiple people, while it also had a linkage to si because collective consisted of 
individuals. In this way, collective had the judging capability of private person but at 
the same time it took priority over individuals as it was larger in quantity.  
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The collective‘s combination of the advantage of gong and si can be very powerful. 
It may challenge the priority and validity of the state. The protests in Tiananmen 
Square and the mass movements in the Cultural Revolution showed this potential. In 
a sense just because of the huge political potential of collective, the state always 
keeps a wary eye on its formation. There are many examples expressing the tension 
between the state and collective and how the state suppresses collectives. For 
instance, the collective ownership and collective corporations created in the Socialist 
Transformation were finally claimed to be state-owned. At present, the state is still 
very cautious of any collective actions or alliances. One example is that Chinese 
people still do not enjoy the freedom of association and assemblage although they 
are prescribed in the Constitution.  Collective actions such as protest, demonstration 
and strikes are rigorously controlled; organising political parties
351
 and independent 
work and trade unions are highly restrained. The government in no way encourages 
people‘s organisational ability. Even many social media (like Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram) are banned in China for their potential to organise people. The political 
power and moral power of organised collectives are seen as the largest threat to the 
rule of the communist party-state.  
In this way, people, in spite of their capacity for moral judgement and their political 
potential as collectives, are still kept in the private realm and debased as si bodies, 
therefore excluding from a gong and political world. By dismissing the collective 
power of organising other gong embodiments, the state enjoys its exclusive privilege 
as gong embodiment. After the ‗Reform and Opening up‘ starting from 1978, the 
economy of China has rapidly developed, but all economic activities are also 
categorised as merely si activities. Politics keeps its narrow and rather closed terrain.  
However, there are changes that can be detected within the system. Now the state, 
although it still is the overwhelmingly dominant political authority and constantly 
claims itself on behalf of public interests, is not a moral authority as powerful as 
before. This is partially a result of the rationalisation and bureaucratisation of the 
governmental system, and partially because the understanding of Chinese people is 
departing from tradition and creating a new social, economic and cultural 
background. Since the 1980s, the market economy was (re) established, and 
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economic development has been attached increasing importance, and even becomes 
‗public interests‘. But in recent years (i.e. 2008-present), a policy called ‗the state 
advances, the private sector retreats‘ (guojin mintui) has been carried out, advancing 
state-owned enterprises and discouraging pure private enterprises, which shows the 
great advantage of the state even in economic field and again reflects the all-
encompassing character of gong
352
. 
Another significant change is the (re)emergence of the ‗city‘. The city has not only 
(re)emerged as an important governance unit, as was the case during the republican 
era, but it has also emerged as a field or a site for para-collective political actions. 
These actions are mainly concentrated in protests for urban environmental issues, 
resistance to urban redevelopment schemes and collective actions for the 
preservation of heritage buildings and historical neighbourhoods, etc. In these 
struggles, for one thing, si elements are increasingly recognised and enhanced, 
including private rights and interests as proprietors, such as the protests of property 
owners again pollution projects initiated by the governments
353
. The protesters not 
only strategically utilise the moral power of ‗public interests‘ but also use the 
discourses like property rights and citizenship, which are quite different from the 
traditional gong discourse. For another, both ‗rights protection‘ (weiquan) activities 
to safeguard private interests and the ‗right to the city‘ actions more for the sake of 
public interests see a growth of the public sphere of the city
354
. Concerns for the 
environment, history, culture and justice of the city are explicit. This encourages a 
more grounded public domain in the scale of the city. As I have discussed, in 2000 
years‘ imperial history, China did not have a unit as ‗city‘, either in the sense of 
community or in the sense of government. But growing participation in city affairs 
helps the citizens advance their perception of the city and capabilities to engage in 
city affairs. In addition, compared with the popular movements in the last century, 
urban collective actions nowadays are more compatible with the modern legal 
                                                 
352
 See ‘Guo Jin Min Tui’, New York Times, 26-03-2009; ‘The State Advances, the Private Sector Retreats - Crisis 
Economic Policy in China’, 14-05- 2010.  
353
 For examples, see ‘China orders petrochemical plant shutdown after protests’, Watts, Jonathan, The 
Guardian, 14-08-2011; Anti-incinerator campaigns and the evolution of protest politics in China, Lang, Graeme 
and Xu, Ying, Environmental Politics, Vol. 22, No. 5, 2013, pp. 832–848; Johnson, Thomas R, ‘Regulatory 
dynamism of environmental mobilization in urban China’, Regulation & Governance, 2014;  
354
 For example of the ‘right to the city’ activism in China, see He, Shenjing, ‘Two waves of gentrification and 
emerging rights issues in Guangzhou, China’, Environment and Planning A, Vol. 44, 2012, pp.2817 – 2833; Shin, 
Hyun B, ‘Elite Vision before People: State Entrepreneurialism and the Limits of Participation’, in Altrock, U. and 
Schoon, S., eds., Maturing Megacities: The Pearl River Delta in Progressive Transformation, Springer, 2013. 
190 
 
system, which means that they are more likely to be tolerated by the state and 
therefore more able to contribute to the institutionalisation of these individual as well 
as collective political participation.  
Within the administrative system, the rise of municipality -- which is described as 
localism, regional decentralization or financial federalism -- is even more 
remarkable
355
. The urban economy, very much based on estate development, has 
become pivotal to the development and stability of the state, and the municipalities 
have gained their independent interests distinct from the state and also found their 
way to resist or play with the central government. In the hierarchical administrative 
system, city government has become the most efficient level. By constructing urban 
infrastructure, (re)developing urban lands, dealing with the welfare of people and all 
other urban affairs, the city has become the most perceivable governance scale for 
normal people. We can expect that the city, as both a governance unit as well as the 
common area of the people of a city community, contributes more in the 
transformation of the Chinese political system.  
It is also worth noticing that urban land, or property, plays a pivotal role in all these 
changes: the (private) citizen rights struggles, including the resistance to land 
expropriation and pollution industry, are much based on the organisation of property 
owners; the ‗right to the city‘ activism focuses mainly on urban regeneration projects, 
historical neighbourhood preservation and public participation in urban planning, 
etc.; and the growth of the city government is highly dependent on the huge profits 
acquired by the city governments against their compulsorily purchase power over 
urban lands. Urban land grounds the private interest of property owners (or 
occupiers), the common interests of the city community and the public power of the 
city government in relation to the central government. From urban land politics we 
can see the blurring or integration of imperium and dominium. Undeniably, the 
conceptual and ideological power of the ideas around gong and si are fundamental, 
and centuries‘ history shows how the state gong suppresses si and other possible 
gong embodiments. However, land also shelters and opens other political 
possibilities. Land preserves si elements and cultivates them, expanding and creating 
territories for si activities and other gong practice. By constant grounded practices 
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and struggles, we can expect a reconfiguration of gong-si relationship in both the 
conceptual and empirical world.  
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Appendix I 
Chronology of China 
Date Dynasty 
 
Pre-history 
c. 27-22 cent. B.C. Age of the Five Rulers 皇帝至舜 High 
Antiquity 
c. 22-16 cent. B.C. Xia 夏 
Ancient 
China 
c. 1600-1046 B.C. Shang 商 
c. 1046-771 B.C. Western Zhou 西周 (feudal) 
770-221 B.C. 
Eastern Zhou  东周 (feudal) 
770-476 B.C. -- Spring and Autumn Period 
475-221 B.C. -- Warring States Period 
221-207 B.C. Qin 秦  
 
 
 
 
 
Imperial 
China 
206 B.C.-A.D. 9 Western Han 西汉 
A.D. 9-24 Xin (Wang Mang interregnum) 
A.D. 25-220 Eastern Han 东汉 
A.D. 220-280 
Three Kingdoms   三国 
220-265 – Wei    魏 
221-263 – Shu    蜀 
229-280 – Wu     吴 
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A.D. 265-316 Western Jin 西汉 
A.D. 317-420 Eastern Jin 东晋 
A.D. 420-588 Southern and Northern Dynasties 南北朝 
A.D. 581-617 Sui 隋 
A.D. 618-907 Tang 唐 
A.D. 907-960 Five Dynasties 五代 
A.D. 907-979 Ten Kingdoms 十国 
A.D. 960-1279 
Song 宋 
960-1127 -- Northern Song   北宋 
1127-1279 -- Southern Song 南宋 
A.D. 916-1125 Liao 辽 
A.D. 1038-1227 Western Xia 西夏 
A.D. 1115-1234 Jin 金 
A.D. 1279-1368 Yuan 元 
A.D. 1368-1644 Ming 明 
A.D. 1644-1911 Qing 清 
1840- 
Modern 
China 
A.D. 1911-1949 
Republic of China (mainland China) 中华民国 
(until now for Taiwan area) 
A.D. 1949- People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国 
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Appendix II         Interview Schedule  
1) First Round: Interviews for General Information  
Purposes: To build the contact with the interviewees; to get the general information 
of the interviewees and their properties; to select suitable interviewees for the next 
round interviews.  
Aspects and questions: 
(1) Current situation: what‘s the situation of your property in the current regeneration 
project? Ownership? Compensation? Are you satisfied? If not, why? How does the 
government communicate with you? What‘s your basic appeal? What‘s your attitude 
towards the regeneration programme? What‘s your plan for the next step? 
(2) Family and property history: When did your family first moved here? What‘s the 
situation of the neighborhood at that time? What types of house did they live? 
Ownership? What changes have happened after settling here? Could you tell me the 
stories of your family? Let them tell their stories in their own ways. Don‘t lead them 
but pay attention to what happened to their families and properties in the following 
key events: time of moving in, the end of Qing Dynasty, Republican era, the 
establishment of PRC, Socialist Transformation, Great Leap Forward, Cultural 
Revolution, Tangshan Earthquake, Reform and Opening up, several regeneration 
schemes. 
(3) Personal history: tell me some of yourself? Impressive experience? Not 
necessarily related to property. To know the interviewees‘ life stories and his/her 
particular understandings and perceptions of some events. Try to understand the 
position, subjectivity and personality of the interviewees. 
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2) Second Round: Interviews for more details about the 
history of the interviewees, their families and properties 
and the neighbourhood 
If the interviewees are willing to tell their stories, the interview can go to the next 
round. 
Purposes: to get more detailed information of the interviewees, their properties and 
the neighbourhood; to know their specific opinions on some crucial events and key 
concepts; to select cases for the next round interviews. 
List of questions:  
(1)  What‘s the ownership of your property in title? Do you agree? How did the 
government assess the value of the property and the compensation level? Any 
problems in the process? 
(2) Have you ever considered the possibility that this area would be redeveloped and 
your property might be expropriated? What was your consideration and plan at that 
time? Is it the same with what is going on now? Why? Examples? Who do you 
contact directly in the regeneration projects? Do you think they are on behalf of the 
government? See how the interviewees think about the district government and street 
Community Committee. Pay attention to their understanding of the state and 
hierarchical government.   
(3) What‘s your plan now? Why do you plan like this? Do you have any demand that 
must be met? What is the most important thing? Do you know any other people 
whose properties are also included in the regeneration scheme? Experience of them? 
Do you communicate with other residents? What are their opinions? Do you or 
anybody think of doing something together?  
(4) What do you know about the regeneration project? How do you get the 
information? Do you like the plan? Why? How do you think of the possibility of not 
regenerating the area? Do you think it is possible? How long do you think it can 
sustain. If the area and your property is in a secure situation, what do you plan to do 
about your property?  
221 
 
(5) May I ask some history of your house? When did the first person of your family 
move into the area? What did he do at that time? Why did he move here? How was 
the area like then? How was the location chosen? How many houses were 
built/bought/rented then? How about the certificate of the title of the property? Do 
you know there was a temple there? Were there many private properties then? 
(6) The changes of their families and properties: What are the main changes 
happening to your family and property? See how they recollected the history and the 
logic. Pay attention to what is impressive for them. These are important for my 
analysis. Don‘t give them my presumed historical line and key events, but after they 
have told their stories, I can ask more about what was happening in the following 
events: Republican era (1912-1949), Sino-Japanese War(1938-1945), the 
establishment of PRC (1949), Socialist Transformation(1950s), Great Leap Forward 
(1950s), Cultural Revolution (1967-1976), Tangshan Earthquake (1976), Reform and 
Opening up (1978), several (proposed) regeneration schemes (1980s, 1990s, now). 
If they know or heard a lot of the history of the neighbourhood, their families and 
properties, and at the same time they are willing to tell, ask more detailed questions: 
 (7) How many generations of your family have lived here? How many people 
roughly were living in the neighbourhood in the late Qing and Republican era?  
Could you describe the extension/area change of your family property? Any 
interesting stories about your family? Any changes caused to your family by the 
replacement of the state authority? Any changes about the status and careers of your 
family members? How did the new government recognize the property ownership? 
Anything changed?  
(8) Have you ever heard of the commercial and residential situation of the area 
around Bell and Drum Towers in the Republican era? How did people rebuild or 
repair their properties? How was the relationship between neighbors? Any public or 
common spaces in the area? When and how did people use them?   
(9) The significant changes happening regarding your family members and the house 
after 1949? What‘s the influence of the Socialist Transformation? How was your 
house handed over to the government to let and manage? Rent control by the 
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government? How did you/your family think at that time? How was the agreement 
between your family and the government made? The general mentality of people?  
(10) What changes of your property in the Cultural Revolution? How many rooms 
did the government leave to your family? Other changes in the unit of your yard 
settlement? Different or similar stories in the area? Who moved in and moved out? 
How was the relationship between the private property owners and tenants of public 
housing?  
(11) What‘s the influence of the Tangshan Earthquake? Any self-constructed houses? 
How to do that? What was the attitude of the government towards this? Other self-
building activities in other time? More in the Cultural Revolution, normal time or 
after the restoration of the market since 1980s? What‘s the recent changes regarding 
your house? 
(12) What do you do now? What did you do before? What‘s your first memory about 
this neighborhood? When were you born? Did you have your school education in the 
area? What do you usually do in your free time? Do you like Beijing? What 
experience or people do you think have greatly influence you? Do you have children? 
How do they like to live in the ‗old‘ area of Beijing? What‘s their opinion on the 
regeneration? What‘s your expectation on your children? What are the changes of 
Beijing? The most important changes? What changes of the area you live? Do you 
like new developed communities? How is your feeling about the house here and the 
area? How do you think of living in the new area of Beijing? What will you get and 
lose if you move to the reallocated community provided by the government?    
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3) Third Round: In-depth interview designed for each 
selected case 
Purposes: in-depth interviews about the significant events or aspects of each case 
selected from the last round, to know more details of the property changes and to 
better understand the relationship between political and personal experience on the 
one hand and personal understanding and perception of ownership on the other. 
Case 1:  
Status: private property; moving from Qing; big business family; moving out in the 
Cultural Revolution  
Interviewees: Mr Y and his mother  
Question:  
(1) Commercial history of his family enterprise ‗Southern Textile Manufacture‘ 
(Jiangnan zhizao) in Qing Dynasty. Further questions: were their lots of wealthy 
people living in the area in the late Qing? How large of their properties? Social status 
of businessmen? 
(2) Changes brought by the founding of the Republic and the PRC? Especially those 
related to the enterprise and the property of the family.  
(3) The influence of the Socialist Transformation: Any property rented out then? 
How many houses/rooms were handed over to the government to let and manage? 
How did you/your family think of this? Were they happy? Did they resist? How did 
the government use the property? New tenants? How many households and people 
were living together? Relationship between you, old tenants and new tenants? What 
did the government do (e.g. repairing, rebuilding, building) about the property? How 
did people use the yard? Who owned the yard? Any conflicts between different 
households?  Any tension between the government and your family? Your 
perception of the ownership of the houses and yard. 
 (4) Changes during the Cultural Revolution? How many rooms did the government 
confiscate in the Cultural Revolution? What‘s the different between this property 
expropriation and the one in the Socialist Transformation? How was the process like? 
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Who represented the government? What was the (illegal) procedure? Any damages 
caused for the property? How was people‘s attitude towards them? New people 
moving in? The advantages and disadvantages as private owners? Stories? Other 
stories heard about the owners in the neighborhood?  How was the relationship 
between your family, old government tenants and new comers? How did the 
government manage and repair the public property? New building? How did people 
use the common area of the yard?  
(5) What is your earliest memory about the Bell and Drum Towers area? Any 
changes of the landscape? Changes of people and neighbor relationship? Changes of 
the sense of community?  Changes of people‘s life?  
(6) After the Cultural Revolution, the state had policy of returning the properties 
confiscated in the Cultural Revolution. Did you/your family know this? How did 
you/they think of this? Did you/they do anything? Do you know any other cases in 
which the owner got their property back? Mentality? How did the government dealt 
with the public tenants? The tension between the owner and the tenants?  
(7) Self-building activities. When? Why? How? The policy and regulation from the 
government at that time? General situation of the neighborhood?  How did the 
government say about the self-constructed houses? Did the government also build 
new houses? Legalization? 
(8) When did you/your family leave the area? Why? How to deal with your property?  
How to manage the property in distance? How to choose tenants? Requirements for 
the use of the property?  Repair and rebuilding of the houses? How to get an 
agreement with the tenants? Any engagements with the government?  What‘s the 
situation of the government managing properties? Better or worse than private ones?  
(9) How did you heard of the regeneration project for the first time? Dialogue with 
the government? Doubts and discontents in terms of the planning, expropriation, 
compensation and relocation? The ascertainment of the ownership? Any conflicted 
understanding? How about the compensation for the public tenants?  
(10) What are your requirements for the compensation and relocation? Hope for the 
future of the neighborhood?    
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Case 2:  
Status: private property; an important public function of the property: it has the only 
sweet well in the area  
Interviewee: the inheritor of the property (in controversy) who knows lots of the 
family history  
Question:  
(1) When did you start to live in the area? When did your family moved to Beijing 
and the area? Why? How to get the property? 
(2) Do you have any memories of the well? Its look? Other (bitter) wells nearby? For 
people or for cattle?  When did your family start to manage the well? How? Any 
relations with the government?  Private? When was the most flourishing time of the 
well? Can you describe? How large area did the well served? How many hutongs? 
Who lived with your family at that time (e.g. accouter)?  Where did the labour 
carrying the water live? How to calculate the volume of the water? Price? Compared 
to your neighbors, what‘s the difference of your life brought by the well? From when 
the well was not used?  
(3) Did the public-private ownership affect the business of the well? When did the 
running tap water was installed? How has it influenced the business of selling water?  
(4) When was the house immediately near to the street/square built? For what use? 
When did it change into a shop? How the Socialist Transformation affected the shop 
and your family?  
(5) Memories of the area around the two towers: living space like the rice and flour 
store, restaurants,  communal activities. Do you remember anything about the 
filming of the movie Rickshaw Boy in the 1980s. Why did they choose here? Many 
rickshaws living in the area? The general status of the people living here and their 
ways of earning their life? 
(6) Festivals in your memory? What temple fairs did you have nearby? Difference 
from normal time? Difference from nowadays? How did people use the two squares 
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in the past? Do you know there was an Islamic temple nearby and many Uygurs 
lived here? Any changes? 
(7) Any underground public shelters were built in your yard? From when the yard 
became a ‗tenement courtyard‘ (dazayuan)? Would you like to tell some of the 
stories of your family members in the Cultural Revolution? Any persecution? Do 
you remember the day that the Cultural Revolution ended? Anything special?  
(8) In 1983, the government planned to redevelop the area. Do you have any 
memories about this? What did the government do at that time? Any other proposals 
for the redevelopment after that?  
(9) How did you find your job after graduated? Allocated by the government? 
What‘s the job of your wife? Do your children go to the school(s) nearby? How do 
you feel about living in the area?  
(9) When did the tourism rise in the area? How did it affect your property and the 
shop? How did it change the neighborhood?  
(10) From when there were private tenants? What did they do? Were they migrants 
from country area or other cities? Why did they come here? What‘s their life like? 
Could you describe the main building activities occurring in the courtyard? How 
many times? When and why?  
(11) From when ‗private property‘ became sensitive?  How was your property 
occupied by other people? Your feeling towards this at that time and now? How 
about the daily maintenance of the houses? The use of the yard and other common 
space?  
(12) When did you move into new building? Allocated by the work-unit? How did 
the status as private owner affect this? Did you get the same housing subsidy as 
others as the owner of the courtyard house? 
(13) How do you feel about the part of your property to be compensated as ‗public‘ 
property?  What do you  know about the regeneration? You have done refurbishment 
for your property, any compensation? Did you anticipate the regeneration? If it is 
possible, would you live to stay or move? What kind of regeneration do you think is 
good for the neighborhood?  
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(14) How do you feel about the personnel of the Removal and Reallocation Office? 
Do you feel they represent the government? What‘s the relationship between them 
and the Real Estate Management Institute and the Street Residential Committee? 
What problems do you feel about the regeneration project and the behaviors of the 
government?  Did you complain? How?  
 
Case 3:  
Status: Previous private property with household factory which was expropriated in 
the Socialist Transformation; now it is occupied by the previous owners and many 
government tenants 
Interviewees: M Brothers and Mrs M (owners); Mr T and Mr L (government tenants) 
Question list:  
(Note: because of the interesting details given by the interviewees, the interview 
questions changed a lot from the designed ones, and many new questions were added 
too. Here is the questions extracted from the transcripts) 
Questions for public tenants: 
(1)  Why didn‘t you accept the new apartment distributed by your work-unit? Was it 
private property?  Could you buy it from the work-unit? Other cases of your 
colleagues in your work-unit? What were the criteria to get an apartment from the 
work-unit? What were other welfare from the work-unit? Any changes since the 
reform in the 1990s?  
(2) How do you feel about living here? There are many houses crowed in the yard, 
are they affecting the light of your house? Do other people living here (including 
private owners and government tenants) get the same compensation standard as you? 
Do you think it is fair?  
(3) Where is your kitchen? Where do your children live? Where did they move out? 
How did they live before moving out?  
(4) Did the Real Estate Management Bureau repair the houses that they own/manage? 
When? How? Who pays?  
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(5) Are people worried about living in public housing because the ownership is not 
yours?  Can you let or sell the house allocated by the government? How the rent is 
paid?  
(6) When were the houses in the yard built? How did people decide how large and 
how high of the houses? How did the Real Estate Management Bureau build new 
houses?  
(7) Any changes of the tenants? Why? Are they all from the same work-unit?  
(8) What‘s the name of your work-unit? Did you experience the ‗up to the mountain, 
down to the village‘ (shang shan, xia xiang) movement? Where did you go? Who 
looked after the property at that time? How did you come back? Did you do the same 
work? How about the experience of your siblings? 
(9) Did the Cultural Revolution affect you? How?  
(10) How did the housing reform affect the house you lived? Any changes of the 
ownership?  What‘s the job of your wife were doing? Did she get any housing 
allocation from the work-unit? 
(11) How did you buy the apartment for your child? Is it a commercial apartment? 
How do you feel the difference of the rights between it and the house you are living?  
(12) What‘s the ownership type of the apartment provided by the government 
because of the regeneration project? Can you sell it? Can your children inherit it?  
(13)  How does the government assess the area of your house? Is the yard included? 
How about the standard for the self-built houses? Are they legally recognized? Does 
the government require ownership certificate? Any disagreement from the 
government?  
(15) How is the relationship between you and other tenants? How is the relationship 
between you and the previous owner?  
(14)  What‘s your plan? Will you move? Do you know how other tenants think about 
the expropriation and the project?  
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(15) I heard of a tenant moved out from this courtyard, do you know why? Where 
did he move to? Is that also a government property? How does the government or the 
work-unit reallocate people?  
(16) It seems there is something called ‗right to rent‘? Does that mean the 
government and the work-unit can‘t end the tenancy with the tenants? Can you buy 
the property? How? Do you have any certificate or contract for the use of the house?  
(17) What‘s the difference between the public housing directly managed by the 
government and those managed by work-units?  
(18) It seems the government allow the tenants to buy the public houses now? How? 
Does that mean you can get the same compensation as private owners?  
(19) Other people complained about the principles of the compensation. They think 
it is more reasonable to compensate according to the small households rather than 
area. Do you agree?  
(20) You solved out the housing issue for your children. How about other tenants or 
your colleagues?  
(21) How about the rent you pay? How much at the beginning? Have it changed 
much? How about the rent for public housing in the multiple-stored buildings?  
(22) Do you know anybody living here having other property? Do they prefer to be 
compensated by money or apartment?  
(23) The government requires that all the households in one courtyard unit must sign 
the agreement together. How do you and other people feel about this? Do you know 
whether the people who have signed the contract are satisfied about the 
compensation or the new apartment?  
(24) I heard of a tenant who lived here for years but has been kicked off by other 
tenants, do you mind telling me a bit more about the story?  
(25) Do we have people relying on the benefit from the government living here?  
(26) You mentioned many cases about public housing from Hong Kong and 
Singapore, do you pay lots of attention to this? 
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(27) Do mentioned your mum also has a house co-owned with her brothers but 
couldn‘t get the compensation because she could find all her brothers. Could you tell 
me more about this?  
(28) Were your mum and grandparents, as private owners, affected by the political 
movements between the 1950s to the 1970s? How did your grandparents solve the 
housing issue for their children?  Who are living in your mum‘s property now? Will 
your do something to help your mum to get her proportion of the property? 
(29) Have you ever thought of saving for buying new property? Or you feel satisfied 
and secure with the public housing? How did your attitude change since the reform 
in housing and medical service? How has the expropriation caused by the 
regeneration changed your mind?  
 
Questions for private owners: 
(1) Could you tell me some of your early memory about the area (living space, 
market, commercial space, school, surgery, communal activities)? Could you 
describe a typical day of yours? How about the consumption? Anything impressive 
about the Bell Tower and Drum Tower? How did people use the two squares? Did 
you read newspaper, listen to radio? Exhibition in the Drum Tower?      
(2) When was the Residents Committee and the Street Office established?  
(3) When your family moved here, how did they feel about Beijing and the area? 
How did they feel about the difference between urban dwellers and people from the 
countryside?  How do you feel about the ‗capital‘ and living ‗behind the Imperial 
Walls‘?  
(4) How many people in your big family? What do they do? What are the changes of 
their jobs? Do you know your neighbors? Their jobs? How do people get along with 
each other?  
(5) Do you have the memory that many people were sent to the countryside from 
Beijing? Any of your family members involved? Could you tell me some stories?  
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(6) What changes happened about your family and the area (don‘t lead the interview 
but try to cover all these periods): Republican era (1912-1949), Sino-Japanese 
War(1938-1945), the establishment of PRC (1949), Socialist Transformation(1950s), 
Great Leap Forward and Commune Movement (1950s), The Great Famine (1958-
1961), Cultural Revolution (1967-1976), Tangshan Earthquake (1976), Reform and 
Opening up (1978), Tourism development (1990s-), several (proposed) regeneration 
schemes (1980s, 1990s, now). 
(7)  When did the public tenants move in to your courtyard? What‘s your parents‘ 
attitude on this? Where are they from? How did they earn their life? When did these 
houses in the courtyard built? Any tension between your family and tenants? Why 
didn‘t your family build more houses? Is housing always an issue?  
(8) From when ‗private property‘ and ‗private owner‘ became sensitive? How was 
the property of your family sold to the state? Procedure? How much money did they 
pay? Is your case typical? How did the government maintain the property? How did 
you engage with the Real Estate Management Bureau? Why didn‘t you get the 
property back after the Cultural Revolution? 
(9) Do you know the several housing construction movements (e.g. Gandalei, 
zhongzilou, jianyifang)? Any influence on the people living here?  
(10) Any changes since the housing reform in 1988? Have you ever thought of 
rearrange the use of the yard or rebuilt/repair your houses?  
(11) When did you start to feel the hutongs here might be demolished? Do you 
admire the people who living in modern buildings? How did you solve the housing 
issue for your children? How did they think of the demolition of the neighborhood?  
(12) Have you get the housing benefit from your work-unit? Any difference because 
of your private owner status?  
(13) Your parents were running a coal-ball factory before the transformation. Could  
you tell me how the factory was like? Why and how did they sell/give it to the 
government? Public-private partnership? How many percent of the profit did your 
family share with the public part? Any changes in the past more than a half century?  
(14) Festivals? Temple fair? Mosque? Square and Street vendors?  
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(15) How is the area and value of your property assessed for the compensation? Are 
you satisfied with this? The public tenants get the same standard, how do you 
understand this? How do you feel about the personnel of the Removal and 
Reallocation Office? Do you feel they represent the government? How will you rate 
the interaction between you and the government? Any problems from your 
perspective?  
 
Case 4:  
Status: Private property handed over during and after the Cultural Revolution; the 
previous owner became government tenants; other tenants have been lived here for 
more than 50 years 
Interviewees: Mrs N (previous owner)and her daughter; Mrs D (tenant) 
Question list:  
(1)  You have told me that your father-in-law owned six rooms before the Cultural 
Revolution, and then three were left after that. Could you tell me more details about 
how this happened?  
(2) How was the three left to your family changed into public ownership as well? Do 
you pay the rent? To whom? 
(3) Why do you trust the government so much? Don‘t you worry that they may 
expropriate the house and you can‘t live in it anymore?  
(4) Who occupied other houses? Who are responsible to maintain the houses? How 
frequently? Do you need to report? Do you need to share the cost?  
(5) What did you do? Did you go to school? How were you incorporated into the 
state work-unit system? What‘s the welfare as a formal work-unit employee?  
(6) Were there lots of street performers like you before or even after 1949? Did they 
all become state employees? How was the process? Did you earn more after the 
nationalisation?  
(7) How did your colleagues get their houses?  
(8) When were these self-built house built? For what purpose? Did the government 
agree? The effect of the Tangshan Great Earthquake?  
233 
 
(9) What are the jobs of your  children? Why didn‘t their work-units solve the 
housing issue for them?  
(10) What‘s the influence of the Cultural Revolution? Did you perform during the 
Cultural Revolution?  
(11) Did you experience any prosecution meetings? How was it like? Were private 
owners important target?  
(12) There are policies that you can get your property confiscated in the Cultural 
Revolution back, but why you didn‘t do that? Why many people not do that?  
(13) Do you want to move? Do you want to live in a modern building and new 
community?  
(14) You want to move and feel the allocated apartment by the government is good, 
but why do you refuse to sign the agreement with the government?  
(15) What kind of compensation standard for the self-constructed houses do you 
think fair?  How about other people‘s opinion?  
(16) How many heads of your household? How are they arranged in the three rooms? 
(17) Do you think the government should compensate for the three rooms 
confiscated in the Cultural Revolution? What‘s the difference of the right to the three 
rooms you are living in if they are still your property in title?  
(18) It seems the B&DTs is an area inhabited by lots of government tenants. Why?  
(19) The relationship among people living in these two courtyards is particularly 
good. Why?  
(20) Who clean the yard? Who paint the entrance door? Who hanged that national 
flag?  
(21) Do you know the compensation for other residents? Did you ask anybody?  
(22) The government compensate for the houses but not for the yard. How do you 
understand this? Who owns the yard? Who have the right to use the yard? What‘s the 
difference between the yard and the houses?  
(23) Where is the bathroom? Is it shared? Who built that?  
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(24) You said one tenant has lived longer than you. When did she move in? Why 
didn‘t you collect rent from her? What the change of the relation between you and 
your tenants after the handing over the property ownership to the government? 
(25) Were you forced to give your property to the state? How did you think about 
this at that time? Do you regret?   
(26) Do you have memory of the Commune movement?  
(27) You mentioned your husband was offered a house by his work-unit but he 
refused, why? Was this typical?  
(28) Your daughter bought an apartment from her work-unit? What type of the 
ownership of the apartment? Is it private now? Could the work-unit sell the public 
property?  Did your daughter pay the rent before she bought it?  
Questions for the daughter:  
(29) Your mum said you were a support of the Cultural Revolution. What did you do? 
Did the status as a private owner‘s daughter affect you? Did you see many Big 
Character Posters in the neighbourhood?  
(30) Do you agree with your mum, feeling living in the public house has no 
difference from living in self-owned property?  
(31) Could you tell me some stories of other tenants?  
(32) Could you tell me when were different houses in the courtyard added? When 
did people start to use separate kitchens?  
(33) What‘s the contrast of life between the planned economy period and the market 
economy period?  
(34) When did you have electricity and tap water? Heating system?  
(35) Were you satisfied with the conditions here before moving out? What kind of 
blue-print you would expect about the neighbourhood?  
 
